The U.S. Army
CHAPLAIN CORPS
Journal



U.S.ARMY

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

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

Senior Leader Reflections

Reflections on Our Journal

Scholarly Writing from Our Corps

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Current Thought

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Chief of Chaplains

CH (MG) Thomas L. Solhjem
U.S. Army Chief of Chaplains

In recent months, our Nation and our Army have faced unprecedented challenges. The Chaplain Corps is not exempt from the far-reaching effects of the changes which have occurred as a result. The COVID-19 pandemic has altered how we work, how we worship, and how we connect with one another. Recent events have also highlighted the challenges our society and our Army face around liberty, justice, and fairness. During these times, I believe our Chaplain Corps has a sacred mandate to be a part of healing and reconciliation in our units, across the Army, and even for the Nation as a whole. This requires the Chaplain Corps to play a role in character formation, which is foundational to our success as Religious Supporters and advisors to Army leaders, and to the success of the Army at large. As our Chief of Staff, General McConville, wrote, "success depends on the leader exhibiting ethical courage by doing the right things in the right way." Doing the right thing is hard, especially when it really matters.

To this end, the *U.S. Army Chaplain Corps Journal* is a beneficial resource for personal and professional development on many fronts. This edition of the Journal includes discussions around character development, partnerships, insights into supporting the health and wellbeing of the force, and some of the other challenges we are facing as a Corps. We need this type of serious reflection on these topics and others, now more than ever.

Looking back during this 100th year since the establishment of the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, I am proud of all that the Corps has accomplished for the Army and the Nation we serve. Looking ahead, I am aware that we must continue to grow. Our Army Chaplain Corps vision is to be a "world-class, fully-integrated network of mutually supportive Army religious support professionals." Trust is critical in achieving that vision – trust between professionals in the Corps and trust with the community we serve. Much of the work ahead will involve continuing to build within ourselves, and within our teams, the character that is the basis of trustworthiness. I invite everyone in our Chaplain Corps – officers, enlisted, and civilians – to join me in the hard work of character formation.

Regimental Sergeant Major

SGM Ralph Martinez
Regimental Sergeant Major

It has been said many times that, "Non-Commissioned Officers are the backbone of the Army." This makes character formation among our phenomenal Religious Affairs Specialists essential to our success as a Chaplain Corps. The trust we build within our ministry teams should be a model for trust across the organizations and the communities we serve.

The articles highlighted in this edition of the *U.S. Army Chaplain Corps Journal* provide helpful insights for our work together, as we build and model trust. I encourage our UMTs to take advantage of this work, by reading and discussing the journal articles together. In doing so, you will sharpen and strengthen one another, professionally and personally.

Every member of our Chaplain Corps team matters. Becoming a "world-class, fully-integrated network of mutually supportive Army religious support professionals" requires each of us to "do the right things in the right way," while we respect and encourage and support one another, without exception. I'm proud to be part of your network as your teammate, as we accomplish our shared mission of "building Army spiritual readiness to deploy, fight, and win our Nation's wars, by providing reliable and relevant world-class religious support."

"Character does not happen by accident; it requires a commitment by the leader to internalize the values of the organization and to understand that the unit's success depends on the leader exhibiting ethical courage by doing the right things in the right way. This cultivation of character strengthens trust within the unit and preserves the American people's confidence in the Army."[1]

GEN James C. McConville
40th Chief of Staff of the Army

"People First. That includes Families. After nearly two decades of sustained combat operations, our generation of leaders has learned firsthand that Families are directly tied to readiness. In these challenging times, we must know our People better than ever, be flexible to balance their needs with the needs of the Army, and continue to put People First in everything we do."[2]

SMA Michael A. Grinston
16th Sergeant Major
of the Army

[1] "Preface," A Persistent Fire: The Strategic Ethical Impact of World War I on the Global Profession of Arms, Timothy Mallard and Nathan H. White, eds. Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2020.
[2] "SMA Sends: Supporting Our Families is Putting People First," Message to Army personnel, 1 September 2020.

Great Articles from the Chaplain Corps Journal Over the Past Four Decades

by CH (Colonel) Brian D. Ray, Ph.D.

The U.S. Army Chaplain Corps has a long and proud tradition of producing a top-quality academic journal. With the digitization initiative that placed over 1,200 articles just a click away, it is fitting to highlight the great work of our Corps over the past four decades. As such, the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps Journal continues the tradition started two years ago of highlighting the top articles from forty years ago (1980), thirty years ago (1990), twenty years ago (2000), and ten years ago (2010).

The Top Articles from 1980

Finding Power in "Weakness" – The Real Energy for Ministry
CH (MG) Kermit Johnson, U.S. Army Chief of Chaplains
https://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00034/13j

"Spiritual Journeying" and The Chaplaincy
CH (COL) Eugene Allen, President of the U.S. Army Chaplain Board
https://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00036/11j

Taking Another Look at Time
CH (COL) O. D. Nelson, Selected for Promotion to BG at the Time of Publication
https://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00036/121j

Some Novels for the Pastor's Study
John Killinger, Ph.D., Professor of Preaching, Vanderbilt Divinity School
https://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00033/17j

The Top Articles from 1990

First Brigade Task Force Ministry
CH (MAJ) Reese Ryder Stephens, Task Force Chaplain, Operation Just Cause
https://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00075/37j

A Commander's Letter to His Chaplain
LTC(P) Marshall Helena, U.S. Army War College Student
https://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00075/87j

Seeking God's Presence (A Rabbi Chaplain's Reflection)
CH (CDR) Arnold Resnicoff, Provided Ministry Immediately After the 1983 Bombing of the Marines in Beirut
https://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00073/71j

The Top Articles from 2000

Initial Ministry to Persecuted People: Reflections by Army Chaplains Providing Religious Support to Kosovo War Refugees During Operation Provide Refuge
CH (LTC) Eric Wester, CH (MAJ) John Stepp, CH (MAJ) Donald Holdridge
https://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062435/00009/42j

A Philosophy of Ministry in the 4th Infantry Division
CH (LTC) Ron Hilburn, Command Chaplain, 4th Infantry Division
https://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062435/00009/59j

A Philosophy of Ministry for the 75th Ranger Regiment Ministry Team
CH (MAJ) Steven Berry, Regimental Chaplain, 75th Ranger Regiment
https://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062435/00010/43j

Chaplain Ministry in Prison
CH (LTC) Arthur Pace, Chaplain, United States Disciplinary Barracks
CH (MAJ) Daniel DeBlock, 705th MP Battalion Chaplain
https://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062435/00009/37j



Main Themes of Articles Published in Past Editions of the *Journal*

The Top Articles from 2010

How to Defeat Discouragement
CH (BG) Ray Wooldridge, U.S. Army Reserve
https://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062435/00020/21j

Giving Voice to the Sacred Story: Developing Military Homileticians
CH (COL) Ken Bush, USACHCS Director of Training & Leadership Development
https://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062435/00020/12j

Chaplain (COL) Brian D. Ray, Ph.D.

Joint Staff Chaplain, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Army Reserve Element)

Executive Editor, U.S. Army Chaplain Corps Journal

CH Ray assumed his duties as the Joint Staff Chaplain for Joint Chiefs of Staff (ARE) in February 2019. Prior to this assignment he served as the Senior Army Reserve Advisor for the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School's transformation initiative. He also served as Command Chaplain for the 377th Theater Sustainment Command, the largest command in the U.S. Army Reserve with 35,000 soldiers serving in 500 units across the United States. In this role CH Ray directed the religious support of over 100 chaplains and 30 chaplain candidates. In his civilian capacity Dr. Ray serves as Director of the Poe Business Ethics Center at the University of Florida.

Shooting an Azimuth:

Reorienting the Army Chaplain Corps for Effective Mission

by **Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Renee R. Kiel**

The United States Army Chaplain Corps' focus and training are currently misaligned with its legally mandated role and central mission. If the Chaplain Corps continues on its current trajectory, the result will be chaplains who are increasingly insecure in their roles and identities, a loss of Chaplain Corps relevancy, and (worst case scenario) a future Army with no Chaplain Corps to provide religious support or moral guidance. However, with intervention and proper strategic decision making, Army chaplains can become bold and confident in their provision of robust religious support; the Chaplain Corps will regain a firm legal footing with a clear mission; and the Army will be more healthy, spiritually fit, and emotionally ready to engage the enemy in the nation's wars.

This paper will first outline the legal role and central purpose of Army chaplains. It then turns to current priorities and programs within the Army Chaplain Corps that undermine both the legal standing and primary mission of the Corps, and considers the cultural pressures which likely contribute to this misalignment. The paper next outlines the three core functions of the Army Chaplain Corps and explores the capability gaps between Army chaplains' professional training and their required functions. Finally, the paper offers strategic recommendations to correct the Chaplain Corps' current misalignment and reorient it in the direction of its central mission of religious support.

The Chaplain Corps' *Raison d'Etre*

Facilitating the free exercise of religion for all Soldiers is the cornerstone of the Army chaplaincy. If chaplains do not perform this basic service, the chaplaincy is sorely missing the mark. This responsibility is not new, rather it dates back to the establishment of the Chaplain Corps. In 1775, George Washington wrote to one of his colonels, "[A]s far as lays in your power, you are to protect and support the free Exercise of the Religion of the Country and the undisturbed Enjoyment of the rights of Conscience in religious Matters, with your utmost Influence and Authority."[1] In 1776, the first Roman Catholic priest was commissioned as a chaplain of the Continental Army to support Catholic Soldiers.[2] The idea of a pluralistic Chaplain Corps that would facilitate all Soldiers' free exercise of religion is woven into the origin story of the US Army.

In 1979, the lawsuit *Katcoff v. Marsh* crystalized the primacy of facilitating Soldiers' free exercise of religion as the Chaplain Corps' foremost function. Two Harvard University law students challenged the constitutionality of the Army chaplaincy under the US Constitution's Establishment Clause of the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."[3] The plaintiffs based their suit on the premise that the military chaplaincy promoted "an establishment of religion" in violation of the Establishment Clause. The defense argued instead that the chaplaincy supported the "free exercise" of religion, the other half of the religious freedom amendment. In 1981, the Army Chief of Chaplains wrote, "The court challenge to the Constitutionality of the Chaplaincy is the single most critical issue facing us at this time. The future of the Chaplaincy rests on the outcome of this case."[4]

After six years the lawsuit culminated in the federal Court of Appeals. The court ruled in favor of the Army chaplaincy, writing, "This appeal raises the question of whether Congress and the United States Army ("Army"), in furnishing chaplains as part of our armed forces to enable Soldiers to practice the religions of their choice, violate the Constitution. We hold that, except in a few respects that require further consideration, they do not." The ruling goes on to state, "the *primary function* of the military chaplain is to engage in activities designed to meet the religious needs of a pluralistic military community."[5] Thus, the legal basis of the Army Chaplain Corps rests almost entirely on its facilitation of Soldiers' free exercise of their respective religion.

Katcoff v. Marsh, resulted in a substantial shift in the primary function of a chaplain. Whereas chaplains used to serve mainly as a proponent of his or her own religious tradition, after *Katcoff*, a chaplain's most important role evolved to that of ensuring the constitutional free exercise of religion of all servicemembers. Indeed, by regulation, Army chaplains are referred to universally as "chaplain" (as opposed to pastor, priest, imam, rabbi, bhikkhu, etc.) in order to reinforce and facilitate collegial cooperation and to communicate to Soldiers that they are "chaplain" to all.[6] Army Chaplain Corps doctrine supports this new constitutional emphasis, stating:

> In the pluralistic religious setting of the military, the Chaplain Corps performs or provides religious support for all Soldiers, Family members, and authorized Department of Defense (DOD) Civilians from all religious traditions. Chaplains cooperate with each other, without compromising their religious tradition or ecclesiastical endorsement requirements, to ensure the most comprehensive religious support opportunities possible within the unique military environment.[7]

As one chaplain observed, "Now it might be argued that the chaplain's foremost governmental sanctioned activity is more pluralistic than sectarian."[8]

Seeking Relevancy in the Wrong Places

Few would argue with the assertion that facilitating Soldiers' free exercise of religion is a chaplain's primary focus and duty; however, in practice the Chaplain Corps has not made this mandate a priority. For several decades the Chaplain Corps has sought to be helpful by spearheading programs that are not inherently religious. In the recent past, for example, chaplains oversaw programs such as suicide prevention, character development, and the Army's drug and alcohol program.[9]

Similarly, today, the Army Chaplain Corps has turned it focus to peripheral programs, namely Ready and Resilient (R2) programs such as Strong Bonds and Comprehensive Soldier Fitness. Both are well funded programs and popular throughout the Army.[10] However, while Strong Bonds and Comprehensive Soldier Fitness are helpful to many Soldiers and families, devoting a large portion of the Corps' time, energy, and resources to resiliency programs poses an existential threat to the Chaplains Corps in two ways: (1) they are not inherently religious programs, and (2) they are garrison-based.

Though the Army Chaplain Corps is the proponent of Strong Bonds, it is not, fundamentally, a religious program. A chaplain-instructor may bring his or her faith anecdotally into the instruction, but religion is not a central component of most training weekends.[11] Still, Strong Bonds is the largest funded program within the Chaplain Corps at $34 million annually.[12] Strong Bonds has grown into such a large and well-known program for the Corps, it has become a primary means by which many chaplains are known.[13] It is not a stretch to assert the most well-funded and best-known program of the Army Chaplain Corps is non-religious.

The Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) program is also not inherently religious. Quite the opposite, CSF understands "spirituality" in a humanistic rather than theistic sense. As one Spiritual Fitness article states, "The *human spirit* is the essence and animating force of the individual. . . . *Spirituality* refers to the continuous journey people take to discover and develop their human spirit. . . . Spirituality is both a process and path people use to discover their inner selves and develop their human spirit.[14]

As a part of the $125 million dollar CSF training program, the Army trains enlisted Soldiers (E6-E8) and officers (01-04) to serve as "Master Resiliency Trainers" (MRTs), who in turn train their Soldiers in five fitness domains.[15] Because one of the domains is "Spiritual Fitness," Army chaplains naturally wondered how they fit into the program. As it turned out, CSF does not directly involve the Chaplain Corps. Chaplains are prohibited from being trained as MRTs.[16] The Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness regulation states that a unit MRT "serves as the primary trainer of the operational resilience training modules, replacing the chaplain as the primary unit trainers." [17]Still, chaplains regularly conduct Spiritual Fitness training under the guise (and resources) of CSF in the form of prayer breakfasts, retreats, and unit training events.

There are arguments for the Army Chaplain Corps to embrace religiously neutral and popular programs. Culturally speaking, generic spirituality is more broadly acceptable than religious language and practice. Thus, programs that are secular or cloaked in generic spirituality such as Strong Bonds and the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness are venues which may broaden a chaplain's reach within the units they serve. Strong Bonds and CSF are also well funded programs which provide needed resources and funding to the Corps. As one historian warns, "chaplains who refuse to adopt a non-religious approach to morale building, including spiritual resilience and spiritual fitness training . . . risk marginalization."[18]

However, the Army Chaplain Corps must be clear-eyed regarding the associated risks that come with investing resources, training, and energy into non-religious programs. Legally, the Chaplain Corps exists solely for the purpose of religious support. For this reason, in 1981, then Army Chief of Chaplains Kermit Johnson directed a "zero-based" chaplaincy founded on "*essential* chaplain programs . . . shorn of non-essentials, that could be legitimately defended against all [legal] attacks."[19] He understood that investing in non-religious programs posed an existential threat to the Corps.

Secondly, the Chaplain Corps poses a risk to its continued existence by investing primarily in garrison-based programs. On the surface it makes sense, since garrisons hold the largest concentration of Soldiers and families. However, the legal rulings that undergird the constitutional basis of the Army Chaplain Corps rest on chaplains facilitating the free exercise of religion for those serving in remote and restricted environments. In 1963, Judge Potter Stewart wrote in defense of the military chaplaincy, "Spending federal funds

to employ chaplains for the armed forces might be said to violate the Establishment Clause. Yet a lonely Soldier stationed at some faraway outpost could surely complain that a government which did not provide him the opportunity for pastoral guidance was affirmatively prohibiting the free exercise of his religion."[20] The concern of providing religious support to Soldiers serving in isolated areas is echoed in Judge Walter Mansfield's opinion in *Katcoff v. Marsh*:

> It is readily apparent that this Clause, like the Establishment Clause, obligates Congress, upon creating an Army, to make religion available to Soldiers who have been moved by the Army to areas of the world where religion of their own denominations is not available to them. Otherwise the effect of compulsory military service could be to violate their rights under both Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.[21]

Remarkably, Judge Mansfield goes on to state that the "necessity" of the military chaplaincy "is not readily apparent" in an "urban center" where military personnel may "worship in their own [off-post] communities." For Soldiers in garrison, "the justification for a governmental program of religious support . . . is questionable."[22] This statement should give the Chaplain Corps considerable pause and concern over the practice of investing heavily in garrison programs.

Furthermore, the federal code's specific mention of affording Army chaplains transportation is under-emphasized in chaplain ministry and training. It signals congress's expectation that chaplains should not be sitting at their desks in garrison. Title 10 of the United States Code specifically directs that "Each commanding officer shall furnish facilities, *including necessary transportation*, to any chaplain assigned to his command, to assist the chaplain in performing his duties."[23] Army Chaplains are expected by federal law to be mobile in seeking out their troops, especially those serving in remote and restricted areas. Additionally, prioritizing ministry to Soldiers in remote and restricted training environments reinforces the need for military chaplains, as opposed to contracted civilian clergy.

Soldiers serving in isolated, remote, and austere environments face unique and serious stressors, to include "separation, loneliness, strange surroundings, fears, financial hardships, and family problems."[24] Therefore Judge Mansfield writes, "The Army has proceeded on the premise that having uprooted the Soldiers from their natural habitats it owes them a duty to satisfy their Free Exercise rights, especially since the failure to do so would diminish morale, thereby weakening our national defense."[25] The remote and restrictive nature of Army service is one of the primary legal underpinnings of the Army Chaplain Corps. When the Chaplain Corps focuses its energy and resources on garrison-based, non-religious programs, it undermines the legal and moral basis of its existence.

Cultural Pressures

Army chaplains have encountered a variety of destabilizing challenges in recent years. These pressures include the decline of the clergy profession at large, the waning of religious faith and practice, and the increase of religious pluralism. Any one of these phenomena would be challenging; taken all together, they have hit the Army Chaplain Corps like a sandstorm. There is an urgent need for the Chaplain Corps to shoot an azimuth and reorient itself within a rapidly-changing environment.

The clergy profession has experienced a remarkable decline in prestige in the United States. Though this decline has been most acutely felt in the past few decades, the occupational prestige of clergy within the United States has been in decline for hundreds of years. In the 18th century, clergy held the highest rank among all professions in America. By the early 19th century, lawyers claimed the top spot while clergy slipped to number two. In the 20th century, medical doctors captured the highest ranking for occupational esteem.[26]

This phenomenon parallels the slow but steady ascendancy of cultural secularism with its elevation of reason (e.g. law) and the empirical sciences (e.g. medicine) over divine revelation and transcendent authority (e.g. theology). In a Gallup poll, people who rated clergy as "high" or "very high" in honesty and ethical standards fell from 67% in 1985, to a relatively low 37% in 2018. Police officers, accountants, and funeral directors all currently rank higher than clergy in "honesty."[27] Several studies have concluded that "over three-quarters of Americans now believe that a person should come to his or

her moral values independent of what the person's church, synagogue, or mosque may say."[28] Clergy no longer possess the standing or moral authority they once did within their respective communities. It should not surprise us, then, that this societal trend is reflected within the US Army and felt by its chaplains.

Institutional Christianity in North America is in decline. White mainline Protestant, white evangelical Protestant, black Protestant, and Roman Catholic churches have all experienced slow yet significant regression in both membership and participation since the 1980s.[29] The rise of the number of Americans claiming no religious preference, commonly referred to as the "Nones," has grown substantially in the past fifty years. In 1972 only 5% of the population did not claim a religious affiliation. In 2018 that number had grown to over 23%, edging out the number who identify as Roman Catholic (23%) and Evangelical (22.5%).[30] The decline of Christian denominationalism in the United States has been well documented over the past several decades.

When considering these polls, bear in mind that to claim no religious affiliation is different from claiming no faith at all. Seventy percent of Americans still identify as Christian, even if they do not belong to a specific church. Additionally, 49 percent of the religiously unaffiliated (i.e. Nones) say they are "fairly certain" or "absolutely certain" there is a God.[31] "Most of these Nones are not dismissive of God or spirituality but simply find religious labels and affiliation too narrow and constraining."[32] Many people are separating their personal spirituality from the practice of institutional religion. Thus, a growing number of Americans self-identify as "spiritual but not religious."

The American decline of the practice of institutional religion is reflected in the Army. A 2009 study published by the Military Leadership Diversity Commission found that 25% of military service members claimed "No religious preference" on a "Religious Identification and Practices" survey. Response to this question appears to be age dependent, with younger servicemembers being more likely than older to claim "no religious preference," [33] mirroring the US population at large. Few would argue with the assertion, based on observation, that fewer Soldiers and families are attending on-post worship services as compared to two decades ago.[34] Navigating this new religious landscape has been an increasing challenge for Army chaplains and their Corps.

Concurrently, Americans have become more religiously pluralistic. In 1917, only mainline protestant clergy and Roman Catholic priests were commissioned as chaplains in the United States military. The diversity of conscripts during World War I caused the military chaplaincies to expand their chaplain corps to include Jews, Mormons, Salvation Army, and Christian Scientists, the latter three being placed under the "Protestant" umbrella.[35] During World War I, a Soldier's dog tags read one of three ways: "P" for Protestant, "C" for Catholic, or "H" for Hebrew. Since then there have been several official expansions of the number of faiths recognized by the Army. In 2017, the Department of Defense released its current table of "Faith and Belief Codes," allowing Soldiers to choose from 221 denominations and religious groups, including Sikh, Wiccan, Atheist, Pagan, and Humanist.[36] This religious diversity found within the military parallels that of the civilian population, and the younger the Soldiers, the greater the diversity.[37]

The growth in religious pluralism has come with challenges for chaplains. As the number of recognized faith categories proliferate within the Army, each chaplain's specialized religious expertise and, arguably, relevancy becomes narrower. It is a fair question to ask, "How does a chaplain endorsed by the North American Mission Board (Southern Baptist) effectively serve as a unit chaplain to a Muslim Soldier?" As the Army has at once become more religiously diverse, and less religious, many chaplains are increasingly unsure of their role within their units.

Like all service members, chaplains want to know their job and contribute meaningfully to their organizations. Most officers learn the ropes at the company level. By the time they are working on a battalion staff, they have had years of experience as an Army staff officer at lower echelons. Not so, however, with Army chaplains. Because of their scarcity and specialization, chaplains' initial assignments are made at the battalion level. This can, understandably, impede their effectiveness within the organization as it may give an impression that chaplains do not know how to make meaningful contributions as a member of the staff. In reality, they are likely simply new to the Army.

In the past, chaplains were able to overcome their lack of military experience with their professional knowledge, maturity, and specialized contributions. However, today this is less often the case. Given the decline of the clergy profession and the concurrent rise in secularism and religious pluralism, the chaplain's professional role within Army units has grown increasingly tenuous. Additionally, since 9/11, the Army has granted many of its chaplains waivers to come into the Corps with little or no post-seminary professional ministry experience.[38] Over the past two decades a large percentage of chaplains have come into the Army with no professional ministry experience. This has set up a perfect storm resulting in professionally inexperienced chaplains who are increasingly unsure of their role within their organizations.

The Chaplain Corps' Core Mission

What does the Army Chaplain Corps' legal mandate of providing for the free exercise of religion look like, practically and logistically? Army doctrine mirrors Joint doctrine in that it identifies the overarching role of chaplains as both to provide religious support and advise on matters of morals and morale. This mandate is often shortened to the phrase, "provide and advise." These two capabilities reflect Army chaplains' roles as both religious leaders (provide) and staff officers (advise).[39] However, there is a disconnect between this military doctrine and legal rulings in regard to the lawfulness of the military chaplaincy. The legal rulings spotlight the chaplaincy's role in

the provision of religious support only, and hardly (if ever) mention a chaplain's role as an advisor. Therefore, military doctrine is correct to emphasize the chaplain's role as providing religious support, and should take care in accentuating an advisement role.

Joint doctrine is particularly helpful as it breakdowns the religious support role of chaplains into three primary functions, (1) "The provision and facilitation of religious worship, [and] rites . . . to accommodate the free exercise of religion for all authorized personnel," (2) "Pastoral care and counseling and those services that attend to individual needs such as personal and relational issues," and (3) "Advising the JFC [Joint Force Commander] on ethical and moral issues, and morale." [40] These three functions of providing for the free exercise of worship, counseling, and moral advisement are the *raison d'etre* of military chaplaincies, both legally and doctrinally.

Unfortunately, there is a capabilities gap between the Army chaplains' professional training and their execution of these three core functions. A ill-equipped Chaplain Corps in regard to these capabilities degrades the Army as an organization since Army chaplains play a critical role in the health, moral-bearing, and readiness of Army Soldiers and the units they serve.

Facilitate Free Exercise of Religion for All

Many Army chaplains do not proactively provide religious support to all their Soldiers. The reasons are multifaceted. In addition to the lack of practical training and accountability, it may also be attributed to the propensity for people, including chaplains, to stay within their comfort zones. Most Army chaplains come from a civilian parish context in which they are not practiced in providing religious support to people outside their belief system. Quite the opposite, clergy are each prepared for ministry by and to their respective faith traditions. Providing ministry to hundreds of Soldiers of numerous denominations and faith traditions is an entirely different mission than that of civilian clergy who serve religiously monolithic congregations. Thus, chaplains do not enter the Army with the understanding or practice of offering religious support to an organization of diverse faith groups.

The Chaplain Corps has not always emphasized the importance or practical logistics of supporting the religious needs of a wide variety of faith traditions within the Army. For decades the Corps has lumped diverse faith traditions such as Latter-Day Saints, African Methodist Episcopal (AME), Southern Baptists, and Episcopalians together under the heading of "General Protestant," and called it good. This practice should be exceptional rather than the norm as it comes at the expense of the unique beliefs and dearly-held practices of these respective traditions. For example, Army basic trainees who identify as "Protestant" rarely if ever receive Holy Communion during Basic Training, though many Protestant traditions commune regularly, and some weekly.[41] Receiving the sacrament could serve as a source of solace and strength for some during the stressfulness of Basic Training, but trainees have no option to attend religious services elsewhere as they are in a restricted training environment. It is a chaplain's primary function to be situationally aware and facilitate to the best of her ability the religious practices of *all* Soldiers in her care, especially those in stressful environments. The Army chaplaincy can and must do better in training its chaplains to attempt to support all their Soldiers religiously. Too many Army chaplains view "religious accommodation" as an occasional exception to policy for a Soldier of a minority faith tradition rather than as their chief daily function and responsibility to all.

The Chaplain Corps' responsibility to serve diverse religious communities is undermined by its lack of religious, gender, and ethnic diversity. The over-representation of evangelical, white, male chaplains impedes the overall effectiveness and accountability of the Corps. In 2017, almost 70% of military chaplains were endorsed by an evangelistic-Christian faith tradition, while only 13% of the military population identified as evangelistic-Christian (see Figure 1).[42]

In 2015, 95.7% of Active Army chaplains were men, and 4.2% were women.[43] The fact the Army Chaplain Corps is not nearly as diverse as the military population it serves when it comes to religion, ethnicity, or gender impedes its propensity and ability to provide a broad-range of diverse religious support.

The Corps' lack of diversity poses a threat to its own existence and mission effectiveness because only a demographically diverse Corps can meet the religious support needs of a demographically diverse Army. As Chaplain Israel Drazin (one of the lawyers who defended the Army Chaplaincy in *Katcoff v. Marsh*) warned, the services own chaplains



Figure 1

are the greatest threat to the chaplaincy's continuance. He emphasized, "the chaplaincy could be destroyed by its own members if they were insensitive to Soldiers' free exercise rights."[44] Likewise, Chaplain (Colonel) Wayne E. Kuehne, former Director of Plans, Policy Development, and Training for the Office of the Army Chief of Chaplains, warned, "To the extent that military chaplains act like civilian clergy and minister only to members of their own denomination, they are weakening the legal basis and moral foundation of the chaplaincy."[45]

Pastoral Counseling and Ministry of Presence

Chaplains promote the spiritual, mental, emotional and physical strength of the Army by offering pastoral care and counseling to the Army's personnel. Individuals who have a religiously-grounded and communal expression of their relationship with God possess a powerfully resilient framework for all the "dangers, toils, and snares" of life. Numerous studies attest that religious faith and practice is associated with greater well-being, less anxiety, an increased ability to cope with stressful situations, and better mental health.[46] People of faith are more likely to imbue negative events with meaning and purpose, which helps them to better cope and maintain hope in such situations.[47] Several studies associate religious faith and practice with lower rates of alcoholism, drug abuse, suicide, and depression.[48] The Director of Duke University Center for Spirituality, Theology and Health, Dr. Harold G. Koenig, notes that "religious coping resources include powerful cognitions (strongly held beliefs) that give meaning to difficult life circumstances and provide a sense of purpose."[49] Dr. Lisa Miller, Director of the Clinical Psychology Program at Columbia University, has done extensive work on the impact of spirituality on young people. She notes:

> Spirituality is the most robust protective factor against the big three dangers of adolescence: depression, substance abuse, and risk taking. In short, adolescents who have a personal sense of spirituality are 80 percent less likely to suffer from ongoing and recurrent depressions and 60 percent less likely to become heavy substance users or abusers. Girls with a sense of personal spirituality are 70 percent less likely to have unprotected sex.[50]

A chaplain's role in nurturing and sustaining the religious faith and spiritual grounding of Soldiers contributes directly to the health and readiness of our nation's fighting force.

History attests that one of the greatest benefits military chaplains provide is comfort and calm through their "ministry of presence." [51] The word "chaplain" comes from the Latin word *cappella*, meaning "little cloak." The story behind the word comes from the fourth century CE. While serving as a Soldier in the Roman Army, Saint Martin of Tours saw a beggar shivering near his Army encampment. St. Martin cut his cloak in half with his sword and covered the needy man with it. This image serves as an archetype for all "chaplains" who serve as "little cloaks" for their Soldiers.

The health benefits and unit stability chaplains provide via a chaplain's "ministry of presence" may not be fully appreciated by chaplains themselves. As one psychologist notes, "Probably the most important contribution made by the chaplains to mental hygiene and morale was an unconscious one. Their mere presence was often sufficient to give a man an assurance and confidence he would otherwise not have had."[52] In discussing the role of chaplains in WWI, another study reports, "Chaplains may not have appreciated the contribution that they were making in terms of bolstering the numbers of operationally-effective personnel."[53] A post-war survey of chaplains who served in Vietnam revealed most believed their principal role was "to be present—simply being near and with Soldiers in the war zone." The Soldiers and officers agreed with this sentiment as they "ranked the chaplain's ministry of 'presence' as his most important duty in Vietnam, and the one that occupied most of his time."[54] A chaplain's presence among the troops, facing the same risks they did, raises the morale and courage of Soldiers on the battlefield.[55] Chaplains who frequent the worst, most unpleasant duty areas provide the best ministry of presence.

Army Chaplains spend a preponderance of their time counseling Soldiers, both formally and informally. In 1950, the Chief of Chaplains noted that "the typical chaplain spent 30 percent of his time counseling, 25 percent on religious services, 8 percent on collateral responsibilities, 8 percent on education, and 4 percent on community liaisons."[56] In 1976, Chaplain Mayer, a brigade chaplain with the 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, N.C., stated, "I think I did more serious counseling the first 2 weeks I was in the Army than the 5 years I did as a civilian minister. . . . I would say the true religious counseling I do is probably in the minority compared to just helping people."[57] Recent data collected from a Regular Army Division indicated its chaplains spent 40 percent of their time counseling Soldiers and families, and 22 percent on activities surrounding worship.[58] Two prolonged recent wars have intensified the counseling role of chaplains. As one senior chaplain observed, "With a chaplain in nearly every battalion-sized unit, chaplains are the go-to person for innovative and immediate care interventions.[59]

Within the framework of counseling, chaplains offer several unique and powerful capabilities: prayer, benedictions, confidentiality, grief ministry, and referrals. The restorative impact of a unit chaplain offering brief, non-judgmental personal counseling, combined with these additional capabilities, should not be underestimated. Military chaplains, unlike doctors and other behavioral health professionals, are the only military personnel that Soldiers can talk with in complete and absolute confidence.[60] Access to confidential counseling can serve as a pressure-release valve for a Soldier and thus promotes the overall health and fitness of the Army community. Likewise, the chaplain has historically served as "the Army's official mediator of grief."[61] Severe grief may contribute to depression, anxiety, loss of confidence, drug and alcohol abuse, or suicide.[62] The impact of grief is compounded by the youth of many Soldiers who have

never before experienced acute sorrow. In an austere environment, a chaplain may be the sole person available to provide a variety of counseling capabilities.

Some Soldiers need professional mental health care which falls outside of the chaplain's purview. In such situations, chaplains serve as liaisons between Soldiers and other healthcare professionals. Most chaplains form collaborative relationships with their military mental health counterparts. A chaplain may even offer to accompany a Soldier to a health care facility, which can be intimidating for a young Soldier to navigate on their own. When a Soldier presents a major depressive disorder or other clinical need, the chaplain often serves as the link between the Soldier and appropriate mental health care.

Despite the enormous amount of time chaplains spend counseling Soldiers, most receive relatively little professional counseling training. Most chaplains come into the Army with a Master of Divinity degree, which requires only a smattering of counseling courses. Recognizing this deficiency, the Army's Chaplain Officer Basic Course offers several hours of intensive training in counseling techniques, but is not able to fully prepare a chaplain for the depth or breadth of counseling most face. Regular and sustained professional training in pastoral counseling strategies and techniques would greatly benefit and undergird the Chaplain Corps in its principal role of religious support to Soldiers. Chaplains facilitate the emotional, mental, and spiritual health of Soldiers. The better prepared Army chaplains are to address such Soldier needs, the more mission-capable the Chaplain Corps will be in supporting the readiness of the Army as an organization.

Moral Leadership and Religious Advisement

Both Army and Joint doctrine call upon chaplains to exercise their prophetic voices as a part of their religious support duties. A chaplain's moral advisement does not apply solely to the religious domain, but to "all aspects of military operations."[63] The assignment of chaplains to battalions throughout the Army and as personal staff to commanders makes them especially well-positioned to deliver candid moral advisement.

Whether contemplating the ancient siege of Melos and its subsequent massacre, the WWII bombing of Dresden, or the atrocities of My Lai, Thucydides's warning that "war is a rough master" reverberates hauntingly throughout history.[64] War is morally corrosive. Ethics and morality tend to spiral downward in war, and the longer the conflict, the greater their decent. War crimes, atrocities, and abusive behavior continue to happen within the United States military. Recent examples include: The Bagram torture of prisoners (2002), the Abu-Ghraib prisoner abuse and torture (2003), the Haditha massacre (Nov 2005), the Mahmmadiyah rape and killings (Mar 2006), the 5-2 Stryker murders (2009-10), Marines urinating on enemy dead (2011), and the Panjwai massacre (Mar 2012). Advanced technology complicates our nation's ethics on killing. Discussion continues regarding where the moral redline should be drawn in regard to the use of remotely piloted aircraft (aka: drones) to carry out "targeted strikes" around the globe.[65] From the Soldier on the ground to senior governmental and military leaders, all regularly face complex ethical decisions.

Poor ethical decisions threaten American national security by eroding national values and public support for the military. The Geneva Conventions assert that "even in the midst of hostilities, the dignity of the human person, universally acknowledged in principle, shall be respected."[66] The current 2017 National Security Strategy echoes this ethos, stating, "the dignity of every human life [is] central to who we are as a people."[67] In response to the "enhanced interrogation" practices employed by the United States government during the early years of the War on Terrorism, Senator John McCain, a former prisoner of war himself, appealed to our nation's ideals, stating: "I believe past interrogation policies compromised our values, stained our national honor and did little practical good."[68] Whether committed by the highest levels of government, or a lone Soldier in the field, abusive and unethical behavior make the United States less secure as a nation by unraveling its credibility and moral fabric, and eroding public trust.

Atrocities and abusive behavior by US Soldiers feed enemy resistance and propaganda. As a weaker force in asymmetrical warfare, insurgents require the support of the local nationals. Thus, both sides are trying to "win the hearts and minds" of the local people. When indigenous people learn that US troops have committed such acts, it serves as a boon for insurgency recruitment and support. War crimes and acts of brutality committed by US troops strengthen the enemy, place US troops at greater risk, and may ultimately prolong a war.

Committing acts of atrocity or witnessing abusive behavior increases a Soldiers' risk for PTSD, moral injury, depression, and suicide.[69] Moral Injury is the number one predictor of suicide among combat veterans.[70] Soldiers who dehumanize the enemy and establish the greatest emotional distance from them experience more psychological problems than those who view the enemy as human beings.[71] The dehumanization of the enemy enables war crimes and brutality. Chaplains possess powerful intervention capabilities in these situations as they remind Soldiers of their humanity and moral bearing.

The duty of offering moral advisement is not easy. Some theologians during the Vietnam War asserted that chaplains were incapable of offering unvarnished religious advisement because they had "sold out" to their large paychecks and had been coopted as agents of the state.[72] Though this view is exaggerated and unfair, it does raise the issue of a possible conflict of interest for chaplains. Chaplains work for and are rated by their commanders. This, combined with the concern that moral critiques may be viewed as unsupportive to the troops, makes for a notable disincentive for military chaplains to offer moral judgement. Chaplain Johnson notes that moral critique in the midst of war may be viewed as "inherently unpatriotic because it violates a sacred wartime precept: support our troops."[73] As one senior Army chaplain (retired) observed, "When war turns barbaric the real test of the chaplain comes into play."[74]

On the other hand, chaplains may not struggle with this tension as much as one may suppose. In 1973, one researcher set out to discover how military chaplains coped with the inherent friction within their roles serving as both a prophetic voice and a military officer. Interestingly, he discovered most chaplains experienced no conflict at all:

> Every chaplain saw clerical and military role-values as being almost identical! Thus the focus of my major survey instrument had to be changed; I decided not to concentrate on the extent of "role-conflict" among chaplains (which was so small) but rather to concentrate on the ways in which each chaplain defines his (relatively conflict-free) role.[75]

It should not be surprising that Army chaplains, like most military personnel, are overwhelmingly patriotic. Yet given a chaplain's specialized role as moral leader, one might expect to find some professional tension in this regard. However, this is not usually the case. Most chaplains view themselves primarily as pastors rather than as prophets. A historian found similar sentiments when researching chaplains who served in Vietnam, noting, "consistently, during and after the war, chaplains claimed that their primary role was a priestly, or pastoral one. They were present as ministers, not prophets."[76] Since most chaplains understand themselves primarily as pastors providing care and solace, many are hesitant to offer moral judgment, especially in relation to combat operations.

There have been notable exceptions. In 2012 a senior chaplain came to the US Army Chaplain Center and School and spoke to a class of junior chaplains. He asked the class what they thought of the use of waterboarding and like measures by our government to extract intelligence from prisoner detainees. The class sat uncomfortably silent. Then he asserted, "Since no one has an opinion, I'll give you mine. It's wrong, and anyone who argues otherwise is wrong."[77] Still, examples of chaplains raising concerns or intervening in regard to the moral actions of Soldiers or military leaders are difficult to find. Perhaps such situations are usually dealt with behind closed doors, and/or chaplain intervention may prevent some atrocities before they happen. Still, several chaplains, with the benefit of hindsight, say they wish they had done more in the face of moral violations. Chaplain Claude Newby, who served during Vietnam, wrote that one of his "great regrets" is that he did not intervene in an abusive prisoner interrogation he had witnessed. Likewise, Chaplain Joseph Dulany "admitted to doing nothing in the face of possible atrocities."[78] During the My Lai Massacre trial, the Rev. Carl E. Creswell, an Episcopal chaplain in Vietnam at the time, told the court that while he had "mentioned a report of the incident to Army superiors, 'In hindsight, I feel I should have done more.'"[79] Thus, it seems the Army's "Chaplain Professional Development Plan" written in 1979, was likely more aspirational than realistic:

> Army chaplains demonstrate a prophetic presence. They are so in touch with their own value system and those of their churches that they boldly confront both the Army as an institution and individuals within it with the consequences of their action. . . . They are knowledgeable, able and willing to confront both individuals and the Army with the ethical aspects of decision making, policies and leadership. . . . They are prepared adequately to 'stand up and be counted.'[80]

In truth, across the Army, chaplains are known more broadly for their pastoral rather than prophetic voice.

Chaplains should serve as a moral voice in leader decision-making processes. "They are endorsed representatives of the churches of America, and they are expected to influence decisions which become in the final analysis, American decisions. . . . Chaplains don't make the battle decisions, but they surely can have input in the process."[81] Chaplains should not assume their ethical input will be spurned. On the contrary, many commanders and leaders want to hear from their chaplains in these matters. "The nation and the Army will

be robbed of a perspective and presence that represents the humanitarian and religious traditions of the nation" if chaplains remain silent.[82]

An Army chaplain must be prepared to offer appropriately enthusiastic opposition to decisions or actions which violate the conscience and moral bearing of the Army as an institution. The chaplain must be prepared to communicate such moral concerns tactfully, confronting both superiors and subordinates alike when necessary. At the same time, chaplains must do so in such a way which preserves his or her role as a pastor within the organization. The chaplain, to be truly effective, must maintain both a pastoral and prophetic voice within the Army. Chaplains offer a voice of compassion in an authoritarian and pragmatic system. Their humane and ethical influence is essential to the well-being of the Army.

The Army Chaplain Corps is the proponent of moral leadership training throughout the Army.[83] However, the Corps is not exercising this capability in a robust manner. As noted by one Army senior leader, "Part of the Army's problem is poor moral education. Although it claims to be a profession, it currently *fails to prioritize* ethical education and governance. It therefore lacks one of the basic criteria of professionals." He goes on to state that Army ethics training is "outsourced" to chaplains and lawyers, but that the "content is minimal and dependent on each instructor's knowledge."[84] Army chaplains require specialized training to empower them in their dedicated role as moral agents. Seminaries do not prepare Army chaplains for such ethical situations as civilian clergy would almost never find themselves amid complex and "grey-zone" combat activities and decision making. Ethical advisement, atrocities, and the rules of reporting and confidentiality are complex waters. The time to learn these navigation skills is not amid the storm. The Army must prepare its chaplains to act with confidence and skill as both pastors and prophets within their organizations.

Recommendations

Drawing on the framework of DOTMLPF, the following strategic recommendations will be organized under the headings of doctrine, training, leadership, and personnel.[85]

Doctrine

Recommend the Army Chaplain Corps more closely align its doctrine to that of Joint doctrine in articulating the three functions of chaplains as providing (1) religious support to all Soldiers, (2) pastoral counseling and ministry of presence, and (3) moral leadership and advisement. To better align with federal law and legal rulings, recommend all three of these functions be grouped under the heading of "religious support," rather than the current twofold grouping of religious support and religious advisement.

Training

Recommend the Army Chaplain Corps promote and provide sustained and specialized training in these three primary religious support functions throughout chaplains' military careers across all training domains: institutional, organizational, and self-development. Institutional professional military training (PME) is limited in time and pressed with many Army-wide "core curriculum" requirements. Therefore, recommend the Chaplain Corps utilize the organizational domain as its primary means for the professional development of its Corps. Recommend the Corps institute professional training events for all components, organized annually around one of the three functional capabilities of religious support: providing for the free exercise and facilitation of religion, pastoral counseling and ministry of presence, or moral leadership and advisement. Recommend such annual Chaplain Corps training venues be at least three-days in length and include professional reading assignments, plenary sessions, small group discussion, and practical training such as role-playing.

Specific training topics may include: the legal, tactical and logistical basics of providing religious support to all faith traditions, how to access and strengthen cooperative religious support networks, and ministry strategies to those serving in remote and/or restricted training environments. In regard to counseling, topics may address the parameters of confidentiality, short-term counseling techniques, knowledge of referral procedures and resources, grief counseling, critical event debriefings, and suicide prevention and intervention best practices. Recommend ethical advisement and moral leadership training include vignettes akin to those offered in the Combat Medical Ministry Course which address "medical ethics."[86] Recommend the Chaplain Corps develop its own body of literature and training material concerning appropriate chaplain responses to a variety of ethically-complex scenarios. Training may also address the definition of war crimes and atrocities, international law, as well as provide direct, practical strategies for chaplains to mitigate brutality and abusive behavior within the Army, and the proper reporting of war crimes while upholding the mandate of absolute confidentiality.

Leadership and Education

Recommend the Army Chaplain Corps direct supervisory chaplains to prioritize their junior chaplains' provision of the three primary functions of religious support. Recommend the Chaplain Corps train supervisory chaplains in the development and implementation of systemic processes to facilitate the training and assessment of chaplains' providing pluralistic religious support, pastoral counseling, and moral leadership and advisement across the Army. Recommend supervisory chaplains be held accountable on evaluation reports in their oversight role of junior chaplains.

Recommend the Army Chaplain Corps develop messaging directed toward Army commanders at the company, battalion, and brigade levels regarding the specific roles, capabilities, and expectations of Army chaplains within their organizations. The most opportune time for this messaging is at pre-command courses. Recommend the Chaplain Corps develop and provide material which chaplains may employ in briefing

company and battalion commanders on their (the commander's) responsibility for the unit's religious program, religion's impact on Soldier health and readiness, of the legal requirement to provide for the free exercise of religion for all Soldiers, and of their chaplain's role and capabilities in supporting these requirements.[87]

Finally, recommend the Chaplain Corps leadership develop a standardized assessment tool commanders may use to informally rate their respective chaplain's performance and effectiveness in the three core functions of providing pluralistic religious support, pastoral counseling, and moral leadership and advisement. Recommend the Chaplain Corps' technical chain manage these assessments. Such an assessment/survey would provide helpful feedback in several regards. In addition to affording direct feedback to supervisory chaplains, it would provide Chaplain Corps senior leaders metrics from commanders on the overall effectiveness of the Corps regarding its core role and functions. Finally, it would have the added benefit of raising commanders' awareness of Chaplain Corps capabilities and would likely result in the heightened profile and utilization of chaplains throughout the Army.

Personnel and Talent Management

In alignment with the Army Chief of Chaplains "Recruiting Organization Future End State - 2028," recommend the Army Chaplain Corps rebalance itself by ensuring it "reflects the religious, racial, ethnic, and gender demographics of the Army."[88] Since chaplains naturally recruit in their own image, recommend the Chaplain Corps fill chaplain recruiting slots with female, minority, and low-density faith chaplains. Recommend sustainment of the "Every Member of the Chaplain Corps a Recruiter" program, which prioritizes temporary duty for Army chaplains within these special categories to return to their seminaries on recruiting missions. Recommend the Office of the Chief of Chaplains recognize any Army chaplain who successfully recruits a new accession in support of this rebalancing effort. If legally permitted, recommend the Army Chaplains Corps request the Director of Military Personnel Management (DMPM) place a cap on the percentage of chaplains it recruits from evangelistic faith traditions, and increase accessioning incentives if accession numbers are not met.

Conclusion

The Army Chaplain Corps' focus and priorities are misaligned with its central mission of religious support. In seeking to remain relevant amid cultural challenges, it has over-invested its energies and resources in non-religious, garrison-based programs such as Strong Bonds and resiliency training. This misalignment poses both legal and existential threats to the Corps. The Chaplain Corps' mission is religious support via its primary functions of facilitating the free exercise of religion for all, pastoral counseling, and moral leadership and advisement. The Army Chaplain Corps can reclaim its central mission of religious support by clarifying is doctrine, conducting professional training which focuses on its core functions, messaging its core capabilities directly to Army leaders and commanders, and rebalancing itself to better reflect Army demographics. Shooting an azimuth in the direction of its central mission of religious support will enable the Army Chaplain Corps to secure its legal footing and confidently set out on a path toward an animating future full of reconstructed possibilities.

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2 Drazin and Currey, *For God and Country*, 11.
3 U.S. Const. amend. I.
4 Drazin and Currey, *For God and Country*, 218.
5 *Katcoff v. Marsh*, (US Court of Appeals, 2nd Cir. 1985), No. 352, Docket 84-6184, https://casetext.com/case/katcoff-v-marsh. Emphasis added.
6 US Department of the Army, *Army Chaplain Corps Activities*, Army Regulation 165-1 (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, June 23, 2015), 7.
7 *Army Chaplain Corps Activities*, AR 165-1, 1.
8 Donald W. Kammer, "The United States Army Chaplain as Prophet in the Twenty-First Century: "Is There A Soul of Goodness in Things Evil?" MA Thesis, College of William and Mary, Virginia, 2005, 28.
9 Janet Hake, "Sunday Every Day," *Soldiers*, Vol 31 (October 1976), 30.
10 "Ready and Resilient (R2)," Army Resilience Directorate, February 24, 2020, https://readyandresilient.army.mil/index.html, and "Strong Bonds: Building Ready Families: Program Management Guide," Office of the Chief of Chaplains (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 1, 2015), which states, "As a vital part of the Army's efforts to increase the resiliency of Soldiers and their Families the ministry of Army Strong Bonds is now a key program in the Army's Ready and Resilient Campaign (R2C). As a multi-million-dollar commander-approved and chaplain-led program, it is annually evaluated by the Army's Ready and Resilience (R2) Program Capabilities Assessment Program and increasingly sought out by commanders as a training opportunity to support their Soldiers and Families."
11 The most popular curriculums being *PREP* (Prevention and Relationship Education Program), *Speed of Trust*, *7-Habits of Highly Effective Families*, *Oxygen*, *Laugh Your Way to a Better Marriage*, *Active Relationships*, *Family Wellness*, and *Creating Connections*. Originally, the curriculum was developed by chaplains. However, over time the Chaplain Corps turned to "off the shelf" curriculum developed by private companies. In the early 2000s some Strong Bond's curriculum came in two versions: secular and faith-based. However, the secular versions of the training material have become more widely used by chaplains.
12 Army Strong Bonds spending from FY2016 -FY2019 averaged $34 million per year, while projected funding for FY2016-FY2024 averages $41.6 million per year. "FACC-Strong Bonds: POM-BES FY21-25 Requirement Brief," Office of the Chief of Chaplains, PowerPoint Presentation, Washington, DC, October 31, 2018.
13 Some senior leaders within the Corps were reportedly disturbed when they heard commanders referring to their chaplains as "Strong Bonds Officers." Therefore, while working in the Chaplain Directorate of the US Army Reserve Command, I was told to ensure AGR chaplains overseeing regional Strong Bonds programs were referred to as "Training and Resource Chaplains" rather than as "Strong Bonds Chaplains."
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18 Loveland, *Change and Conflict in the US Army Chaplain Corps Since 1945* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2014), 248.
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20 *School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp*, (374 US 203, 1963), No. 142, https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/374/203#writing-USSC_CR_0374_0203_ZD.
21 *Katcoff v. Marsh*, (US Court of Appeals, 2nd Cir. 1985), No. 352, Docket 84-6184, https://casetext.com/case/katcoff-v-marsh.
22 *Katcoff v. Marsh*, https://casetext.com/case/katcoff-v-marsh. This sentiment may run counter to one of the Chief of Chaplains current training priorities which is to "revitalize and integrate Army Religious Communities" and "integrate home-station UMT RS efforts with dynamic Army Chapel activities with are properly resourced." Chaplain (Major General) Thomas L. Solhjem, *Fiscal year 2020 (FY20) Chief of Chaplains (CCH) Training and Leader Development Guidance* (Washington, DC, September 18, 2019).
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25 *Katcoff v. Marsh*, https://casetext.com/case/katcoff-v-marsh.
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Beyond Competence:

Capabilities Based Senior Leader Development

by **Chaplain (Colonel) Lawrence M. Dabeck**

Several recent years on the Joint Staff demonstrated to the author the importance, if not criticality, of well-developed senior leaders. During that time, Combatant Command (CCMD) senior leaders, notably Command Chaplains, demonstrated varied proficiencies in the capabilities required to be strategic theater senior leaders.[1] Most special and personal staff officers tend to default to their comfort zones of being effective direct leaders or organizational leaders.[2] When National Military Strategy and National Security are at stake, this level of comfortable ineffectiveness is undesirable, if not harmful to the Commander's mission. At these theater strategic levels of war, senior leaders[3] must better understand the capabilities required, not just competencies, to lead strategically within their spheres of influence as well as proficiently advise the command regarding their areas of expertise, as Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Michael Ducharme[4] notes in his research on principles of strategic advisement.[5] After briefly defining the context for the leaders we are addressing, we will review the current use of various germane concepts of Army leadership. This paper will then clarify essential definitions, propose four critical capabilities of a Senior Leader Capability Model needed for senior leaders to succeed in mission accomplishment at the strategic level of warfare – particularly for senior chaplains as an applicational example, and then offer a brief model of a professional military education application moving forward.

Senior Leaders and Context

"Senior Leader" here and throughout this paper refers to those officers at the rank of Colonel who lead the joint military enterprise at the Combatant Command (CCMD), Army Service Component Command (ASCC), and even the Corps echelons. Strategic Leaders are by distinction the General Officers (GO) who command at those echelons. The GO plans theater operations based on the objectives, effects, and assessments provided by the senior leaders. "The [Combatant Commander] plans joint operations based on analysis of national strategic objectives and development of theater strategic objectives supported by measurable strategic and operational desired effects and assessment indicators."[6] Senior Leaders provide those analyses, assessments, and effects advisement. Knowing about whom we are discussing, we now explore what they do.

Background: Competence, Capacity, and Capability

Clarity is necessary from the outset to be focused and clear about terms and their use. "Competence" and "Capability" are often used almost interchangeably when referring to characteristics or skills necessary at any level of leadership. For this paper's purposes, competence is "proven abilities… [and] include a combination of knowledge, basic requirements, skills, abilities, behaviour and attitude," and is focused on the current needs of the organization.[7] However, and more importantly, capability incorporates competence (and capacity, below) and is "an integration of [competencies of] knowledge, skills, and personal qualities used effectively and appropriately in response to varied… circumstances," while focused on future needs.[8] In other words, we cannot have competencies without the greater capability under which competencies must be organized.

The plethora of lists of Army competencies abound. Detailing every competency offered across Army publications is outside the scope of this research. Suffice it to detail here that there is strong research which details the causal link between leaders with decision-making authority and their facility to inspire others to accomplish the corporate mission. In a long-standing work on the causal correlation between leader competence and collective morale (read *inspiration*, see leadership definition below), Hamblin, Miller, and Wiggins established in 1961 how effective and crucial leader competence is:

> Morale in an organization is a function… of the relative technical competence of the leader in coping with [i.e., understanding and solving] the organization's problems. In other words, if the leader, the member of the organization with decision-making authority, is less competent than other members, then morale will be low, whereas if he is more competent, morale will be high.[9]

In addition to incorporating competence, one other facet of capability has to be addressed here as well. That facet is "capacity." For this paper's purposes, Dr. Sergio Espana of Utrecht University gives the most concise distinctions between competence, capacity, and capability, where the latter will be understood here, "as the combination of the ability, [i.e. competence] and the capacity to achieve some goal."[10]

We expect senior leaders at the strategic level to have demonstrated competence. These skills and abilities are taught and tested throughout the officer's career. However, capabilities must also be developed and assessed throughout one's profession when considered for promotion to levels of increased responsibility based on any future potential. Current leaders must help develop and mentor future senior leaders' current capacity in those competencies while assessing increased capacity to serve well at upper levels of war.

Capacity-building then is the joint venture that requires both the current leader's development and assessment of the future leader, and the initiative of the future leader for self-development. Capacity in its most basic form is easily understood as the concept of volume, of what space is available – "the maximum amount that something can contain."[11] For a fixed container, this cannot change. But for human capital, the Army's most valuable asset, senior leaders must be able to increase their capacities at upper echelons to know, understand, analyze, create new learning, and lead change, ala Bloom's Taxonomy below.

In a conversation with Chaplain (Major General) Thomas Solhjem, Chaplain Solhjem stressed the importance of a senior leader's capacity. The officer has "grown" over time through training, education, and experience. If successfully increasing one's capacity, "to grow bigger on the inside," the officer has progressed from being a novice as a company-grade officer, to be "advanced" as a Major – responsible for and growing others, while growing themselves. Then the Lieutenant Colonel must be the "Expert," both on the organization and its people, as well as mission, task, and purpose of the organization. Lastly, the Colonel as a senior leader is the "Master" of the enterprise. They build on the previous levels, continue to increase their capacity, and lead the enterprise with exceptional strategic communication.[12]

In his article on human capacity building, E. E. Yamaoh cites where Groot and Molen (2000) define "human resources capacity building as the development (growth/increase) of knowledge, skills, and attitudes," with Brews' (1994) addition of increasing "empowerment" as well, which suits Mission Command doctrine perfectly well.[13]

To educate new senior leaders, the Army War College implicitly understands this inherent requirement for capacity building as well. In its Primer for students, "Strategic Leadership: Primer for Senior Leaders," the US Army War College devotes an entire chapter to senior leader development. The Primer notes well that leaders must be committed to lifelong learning, even building on the assumption "that leaders can develop."[14] This assumption is apt in that it makes explicit the requirement for progressive and increasing personal capacity.

One consideration to note is the concept that for some leaders, there exists the possibility of diminishing return for capacity building, that is, we hit our "ceiling" – our level of comfortable ineffectiveness. This is known more popularly as the "Peter Principle," based on Lawrence Peter's 1969 satire of the same name. In their work on corporate promotion principles, Benson, Li, and Shue defined the Peter Principle as promotion policies that overestimate past performance without appropriately considering future leadership quality.[15] That is, past performance is not linked to future success without considering capability, and so successful people are promoted beyond their capability. Benson, Li, and Shue's research goes on to demonstrate across significant data that top performers do not necessarily make good leaders. In our context here, we will adapt this to understand that past individual capacity, if not intentionally expanded and self-developed, will yield inept senior leaders at the crucial strategic level of war.

To develop and succeed with future strategic leadership capabilities, incorporating demonstrated competence and improving capacity, we must understand exactly what we are discussing about leadership.

Leadership

The Army background for leadership terms of reference across the doctrinal spectrum contributes to this lack of clarity for the expectations of senior leaders. A surprising, if not troubling, survey of primary Army doctrine and publications, especially regarding senior leaders, chiefly results in a long list of verbs, organized within various categories. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22 *Army Leadership*, relates who strategic leaders are, i.e., what jobs they hold, what competencies they apply, and how they affect organizational change.[16] But this remains unhelpful to understand core capabilities to successfully lead and advise at strategic specific levels of warfare. The Army War College (AWC) Primer, though not exhaustive on the topic, provides only little more focused understanding of requisite senior leader competencies.

The AWC Primer, in summary, tells us about the actions of strategic leadership, strategic leadership teams, three senior leader focuses, nine senior leader competencies under three categories, and six senior leader tasks to provide leadership for large organizations, with a previous course reference regarding ten senior leader roles in three categories (ala AWC use of Mintzberg's Framework).[17] The latest edition of this Primer adds a welcome addition to include yet another competence – the character of the senior leader.[18] The focus in all of this appears to be descriptive for what a senior leader *does*. Nevertheless, focused clarity on senior leader capabilities— attributes that describe who a senior leader *is*—remain uncertain. What is needed in this retinue of senior leader actions, tasks, categories, and descriptions, is additional professional military education (PME) and intentional field experiences that

Figure 1.

are a phased, graduated development of senior leader competencies, capacity and thus capabilities in a proposed Senior Leader Capability Model (SLCM). This proposed model will enable senior leaders to lead well within their sphere of influence at the strategic level and advise the command with strategic expertise.

Capability-Based Senior Leaders: The Way Ahead

The US Army, if not the Joint Force in the Combatant Commands, must clearly identify four new essential senior leader capabilities in order to provide effective strategic leadership and advisement. Before detailing these four essential capabilities of this proposed SLCM, the characteristics of the model itself will be described.

This paper proposes a taxonomic, incremental, and iterative model, based on an adaptation of Bloom's Revised Taxonomy.[19] Bloom's Taxonomy should also have significant application in establishing the learning criteria for any PME development, which will be developed here later. For now, the taxonomy provides an apt analogy (see Figure 1).

The taxonomy also effectively describes the senior leader's movement throughout the model, starting at the bottom and moving from an organization with which they are expertly capable to thoroughly understand and evaluate, to an environment which they are proficiently capable to analyze and in which they can apply Army senior leader competencies. From there, the senior leader seeks both to intelligently (presciently?) understand the operating environment and to perceptively anticipate the future, while applying current competencies to affect that future vis-à-vis the mission. The SLCM capability model concludes with the capability to create and lead organizational change to accomplish the organizational goals through that environment to the future. And so, the senior leader would continuously repeat this process, moving from that which is best known, the organization, through the environmental context, to the least known "beyond the horizon" future. The SLCM then would look like this:

⇦ 4. Lead Organizational Change

⇦ 3. Evaluate the Org. vis Future

⇦ 2. Analyze Environment vis the Org. and Apply/move the Org. through Env.

⇦ 1. Deep understanding of Organization

This iterative SLCM appears on its face to apply to "strategic leaders" as defined by the AWC Primer, but for this paper's purposes, we limit its initial proposal to senior leaders. At the risk of complicating the intentional use of Bloom's taxonomic terms, another way to frame this SLCM is to:

1. *Know* well the organization
2. *Understand* the operating environment
3. *See* beyond the horizon
4. *Lead* organizational change

Without these four capabilities, no senior leader will be able to accomplish any prescribed list of skills, tasks, or competencies in any number of various categories for a theater strategic level organization. We will now explore these four critical SLCM capabilities in detail.

Know and Evaluate the Organization

Effective senior leaders have the experience and education to take the time to know well and evaluate the organization. Although Bloom's taxonomy posits knowledge and understanding as the shallowest level of learning, here we use the concepts in a more foundational and robust role. The senior leader, after more than two decades in the Army enterprise, must have a comprehensive command of how the Army works from the ground up, again building on "down and in" to "lead up and out."

Tactical and operational leadership required leaders to look intently at the fighting organizations and their requirements – "down and in." At the Corps and above more strategic levels of leadership, leaders must also see and understand national and theater-of-war strategies, connections, and consequences – thus leading "up and out." Although not the commander here, the senior leader functions more as a "chief" executive officer (CEO) *per se* for their area of expertise, on a team of CEOs who serve the Commander.

To illustrate the concept of deep organizational understanding by the senior leader as a "CEO," we will draw from Lars Finskud's work on organizational responsibility for corporate success. Finskud shows how the senior leader is responsible for the strategic branding of the organization, thoroughly knowing the "brand"—the organizational mission and structure for the senior leader—both qualitatively and quantitatively. This profound comprehension of the enterprise allows the senior leader to chart the future for how she leads the team to demonstrate corporate effectiveness. Finskud summarizes this where the senior leader "must be a passionate and proactive brand steward… [having] responsibility for… performance, overarching clarity on brand, vision, and values, and the ability to make cross-functional decisions…."[20] Note how Finskud highlights the leader's "clarity on brand, vision, and values." This exceptional clarity requires a profound understanding of

our first SLCM capability. But Finskud adds an affective element with which the leader must also begin—passion. The capable senior leader will care, and care deeply, for the enterprise, its mission, and most importantly its people. This passion will be contagious as the Army leader seeks to *inspire*, as discussed below.

Peter Senge gives an apt illustration of this deep understanding of the organization with a view to the senior leader as "designer."[21] Senge's words excellently describes moving the leader's perspective of organizational understanding beyond being merely the "Captain" of the organization to having the depth of understanding that the designer of the "ship" should have. That is, the senior leader evaluates the organization against the plan of what it is, where it is, what it should be doing, and where it should be going.

To undertake this highest level of taxonomic capability, the competencies in this first SLCM capability include assessing the enterprise against that plan, and judging what works and what does not toward mission accomplishment. The organizational evaluation should be team-based, but ultimately the senior leader bears the responsibility. Bannister and Higgins' research has demonstrated this essential capability for corporate success. When they studied General Electric Company's strategic success, they found that senior leader understanding of the corporation was both foundational and critical to its ability to succeed in communicating its strategy to key stakeholders… "a [successful] strategy that appears to us crystal clear … – seems less so to some of our key constituencies [as] more likely a failure of our communications efforts than one of *understanding* (emphasis added)."[22] In our Army context, these stakeholders are both internal across our enterprise echelons as well as external to the American citizenry, our allies, and even experientially for our adversaries.

This evaluative, deep understanding capability enables the senior leader to move the well-known organization into an understandable but less known environment.

Understand and Analyze the Environment

With an exceptional "designer" knowledge of the organization, the senior leader is then capable of taking that organization through a less-well-known but understandable operating environment. This deep organizational knowledge and understanding leads to our second SLCM capability of understanding the environment and "applying" the organization to that environment. Here they can both analyze and apply what they know to what they are seeking to know in the environment. The stock standard catchphrase of strategic leaders "looking out and up, not down and in," is at best overly simplistic, if not incomplete. The strategic senior leader must build on the competencies of understanding echelons down, at the warfighting tactical and operational levels, while also looking "out and up" from the operational to the strategic level.

These perspectives are not a binary either/or postulation. They must be concurrently both/and. Senior staff operating on the strategic level must look outside in order to plan for and advise in allocating significant organizational, if not national, resources against that environment. Dr. Chuck Bamford established four criteria,[23] adapted here, to strategically understand any area of environmental operations:

1. Deep understanding of the environment.

2. A narrow comparison set of environmental factors affecting the mission.

3. Understand the real and perceived costs of personnel and matériel from the standpoint of the operating environment.

4. Map the points where the organization "touches" (affects) the environment with effects.

This strategic capability is arguably the most complex and requires the greatest staff work available to leverage organizational expertise. Successful senior leaders effectively lead this team process, shepherding the team as a whole, or contributing to the next echelon up as the subject matter expert in their area of proficiency. They draw connections among cross-functional staff sections and government and non- governmental organizations. They examine, question, and test to apply expertise to solve problems, test courses of action, and implement the commander's intent,[24] moving the enterprise through the environment.

In his 2006 work on strategic theory, Harry Yarger offers clear concepts to build this strategic environment understanding capability. The leader's job is to create certain effects in the environment for the mission's success, i.e., preventing unfavorable outcomes while creating favorable outcomes.[25] He notes that the standard "ends, ways, and means" is a simplistic strategy to address the environment, "but the nature of the strategic environment makes it difficult to apply. To be successful, the strategist must comprehend the nature of the strategic environment and construct strategy that is consistent with it…."[26]

To frame the absence of this capability negatively, no successful strategic leader can move from the known (the organization) to the unknown (the future) without this intermediate and connective capability. Evaluating the operating environment from every strategic perspective, both in terms of the mission's effect on the environment and the environment's effect on the mission, is the only means to accomplish the theater strategic mission—to analyze and apply the enterprise through the battlespace to mission accomplishment, into an understandable future.

Foresight: See and Analyze the Future

This strategic "See Beyond the Horizon" capability appears to be the most counterintuitive. How does one "know" the future, or see beyond the horizon? But this capability is most likely to be innate or intuitive to the future senior leader, and least likely to be taught or caught.

This latent capability should be identified as early as possible in the careers of potential senior leaders by those who have the demonstrated and proven ability to successfully navigate into the future. Yarger notes this capability when he describes the leader's aptitude to move into the future through the environment, discerning that, "some things are known (predictable), some are probable, some are plausible, some are possible, and some remain simply unknown."[27] The exceptional prescient leader will be able to sift through this spectrum and discriminate between the known future and the unknowable future, and everything in between.

In his groundbreaking work, "Leading Change," John Kotter notes that this visionary understanding of the future requires the senior leader be able to reasonably discuss what the future looks like and why.[28] They recognize that trends and events lead somewhere, they characteristically succeed in describing that future, and successfully take teams to that future. In his book, "Get There Early," Bob Johansen calls this capability "foresight."[29]

In the taxonomy described here, "understanding" tends to be the most foundational upon which to build, but here in the SLCM, it is the most ambiguous and the most volatile. But the understanding foresight that Johansen references is not a goal to predict the future *per se*, but to "provoke creativity and prepare for [the] biggest challenges."[30] Strategic foresight, though nebulous, is indeed attemptable, if not accomplishable, according to Dr. Colin Gray.

In his monograph on Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War*,[31] Gray argues that we can anticipate, if not foresee, future threats.[32] The dilemmas and cares of 400 B.C.E. Greece are not very different in kind than those of today. Of course one cannot know the future, but Gray's recommendations allow us to create a fourfold paradigm for a senior leader's capability of recognizing and comprehending future strategic threats out of the current operating environment. Gray directs us to a virtue of "Prudence" with which to begin. He never defines prudence *per se* but speaks to its utility as the ability to "cope with the challenge of defining future threat… [because it] captures the critical difference between risk and danger… in its required focus on consequences."[33] Prudence then is right judgment or wisdom—foresight—regarding the future and probable outcomes, with a healthy measure of informed caution. As Michael Desch notes, Pericles here was truly a great leader who used Prudence well to lead and motivate the Athenians. However, his successors could not fruitfully combine Pericles' brilliance, ala Alcibiades, with his prudence, ala Nicias.[34]

Secondly for our purposes, Gray commends a senior leader and advisor's ability to navigate these threats, exercising *discretion* in identifying and defining those future threats. These threats initially, from a distance, are necessarily immature and unformed. Discretion is then required to "discern possible and probable second- and third-order effects."[35] This facet of our capability to foresee and analyze, and thus plan for, an emerging future requires an increasing capacity to learn, especially from history. Gray's discretion here allows the senior leader to discern and prioritize those expected events which will most shape the organization's efforts through the known environment to that foreseen future.

Thirdly, Gray dismisses the idea of future forecasting based on mere historical analogies. History, in fact, does not repeat itself. He urges us to see our current situation more as a "historic parallel." As Gray relates:

> History teaches nothing; it is not an agent with motives active on the course of events. But history is by far the best educator for our strategic future…. We can and should seek assistance, perhaps inspiration, in the intellectual construct known as the "historical parallel."[36]

Gray's "historical parallel" captures well our third capability of strategic foresight, of "seeing over the horizon." For Gray, historic analogies do not present instructive repetitions. However, history does have a "strategic course" and provides important similarities between then and now. The capable senior leader will seek to discern these historic parallels and apply them to the current context for future success.

Lastly Gray challenges our over-the-horizon vision by reminding us that our constraints are the requirements to abide by the same rules as everyone else (both intra-nationally as well as internationally) and to design with the same doctrine we all share. The United States is essentially stuck with the hand it has been dealt in international relations. A realistic perspective of the world as it is *vis-à-vis* possible threats, especially regarding Russia and China in great power competition, constrains the planner to meet these threats and to design a "response that is both adequate in discouragement of hostile initiatives and likely to prove encouraging of moderation abroad."[37] With our current treaties, allies, Law of Armed Conflict, Army doctrine, Just War Traditions, et cetera, the strategic senior leader would do well to understand these enduring constraints and apply them prudently, while meeting a reasonably knowable future with a capability of strategic foresight.

Thus, strategic foresight enables the senior leader to sense the possible before the actual and to innovate to meet those possible opportunities, challenges, and threats. This strategic innovation leads the institutional change which necessarily follows.

Create the New: Leading Change

This fourth and final capability in the SLCM takes us back to where we began— the organization. But now the senior leader can inspire and lead institutional change, helping to create a new and improving team, able to negotiate the environment into the anticipated future.

The key concept here for leading informed change comes from reviewing Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership*. At this point in our SLCM, the most critical facet of moving the organization forward is the *inspiration* the leader must provide. Although intangible, inspiration is essential. An Army

leader must, "inspire and influence people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization."[38] And a leader cannot provide what she does not possess herself. That is, to have this competence of being inspirational, the leader must herself be inspired. This again prompts increasing capacity. For others to be inspired, a leader is inspirational, drawing out of her own increasing inspiration.

The taxonomy describes this inspirational creative capability as the summit of the leader's developmental process. Only by building on the capabilities to understand, apply, analyze, and evaluate, can the successful senior leader help create something new, something better—an organization that is different from the one with which the senior leader and team began, and can effectively meet the emerging future.

Both the military and marketplace are replete with excellent works describing how to successfully lead institutional change. Kotter notes that the forces of inertia and tradition will be a drag on leading change, and implies that the time required to implement change is proportional to both the size of the organization and the scope of the change.[39] Finskud also shows the "CEO" senior leader sets the pace for the organization to proceed. "The CEO will seek to establish the right mindset so that everyone in the organization, regardless of function, [always] contributes."[40]

The most comprehensive work we can adapt for our purposes here comes from Harvard Business School's core curriculum in Ryan Raffaelli's work "Leading Organizational Change."[41] Raffaelli provides four essential competencies within our last SLCM capability, which are:

1) Diagnose the Need for Change

2) Design the Change Process

3) Deliver Change

4) Evaluate Change[42]

Raffaelli's competencies here, when applied by the senior leader to the organization, moving through the environment to meet the foreseen future, enable the institution to dynamically adapt.

Raffaelli's first requisite competence is to *diagnose*. This explicitly builds on our SLCM's first two capabilities regarding the organization and the environment. The senior leader must comprehend both concurrently to know why change is needed and what change is needed. Regarding the deep knowledge of the institution (SLCM 1) and the environment (SLCM 2), the senior leader can identify *performance gaps* and *opportunity gaps*[43] in order to lead change. These performance gaps arise from the actual performance against expected performance. The opportunity gaps arise in relation to the operating environment against a foreseen future (SLCM 3), "as potential future problems or missed… opportunities the organization will face if it does not act (or change) today."[44]

Next, Raffaelli offers the most challenging competence required of a senior leader to lead change. This is the *design* process. These subject matter expert advisor/ leaders can apply Raffaelli's acronym S.O.R.T. for Scope, Origin, Rollout, and Timing to act as an "architect and engineer" of organizational change.[45] Scope prescribes knowing if the change needs to be radically immediate or incremental over time. The Origin denotes if the change is led from the top down generating buy-in, or from the bottom up, emerging from the diversity of internal stakeholders. When Scope and Origin are integrated, Raffaelli shows that we arrive at four different types of change – Tactical, Transformational, Evolutionary, and Revolutionary. We refer the reader to Raffaelli's work for more in-depth discussion here but suffice it, for now, to see how these types of change align in Figure 3, for types of change based on scope and origin design decisions.

Thus, where the Scope of change and the Origin of change denote the type of change, Rollout and Timing speak to Raffaelli's change delivery for how to implement change.[46]

Rollout and Timing also speak to leaders' competence to know the best approach to *deliver* the change. In assessing the organization through the environment to the future, the leader chooses if the rollout is either localized within a section or staff, or is systemwide across the command. The leader then resolves if the timing is to be slow or fast, or somewhere in between.[47] Rafaelli notes well that the more systemwide and faster the change process is, the greater the "stretch and stress" the individuals and organization will experience.[48] The most important factor for change success here is generating buy-in and mitigating resistance and obstacles.

Raffaelli's final step, which reinforces our SLCM model iteratively taking us from leading change back to knowing the organization, is *evaluating change*. This is the response loop which "determines the process's effectiveness and… makes[s] appropriate adjustments that increase the odds of success."[49] Although Raffaelli offers excellent measures and assessments of the processes of change effectiveness, Army senior leaders should already be able at this strategic stage to conduct standard measures of performance



Figure 3.

and measures of effectiveness for these organizational changes.

Because senior leaders in the Army must possess the four capabilities required of the SLCM, we now briefly explore an educational plan proposal to furnish these capabilities.

SLCM and Professional Military Education

Once we are convinced that senior leaders in the Army should develop these required SLCM capabilities, we then need to be intentional to educate Strategic Leader commanding line officers about their staff's capabilities, which creates a demand signal for these SLCM capabilities from the senior leaders. The Army also needs to ensure these senior leaders are incrementally educated and assessed throughout the PME in these capabilities for fitness as leaders and advisors at the theater strategic level of war.

This planned-for, integrated, and phased capability must occur at the officer PME schools as well as intentionally in the field, on-the-job by senior leader mentors. Joseph Cerami, in his work on how to develop emerging leaders, understands this approach, that "the opportunities for integrated leader development are part of the DNA of military organizations at all levels…. Overall a key pattern for emerging leader development in all sectors… remains understanding the unique differences in the context… as well as organizations in the environment" (SLCM 2, "environment").[50] His work shows the need for career development at all grade levels, especially at understanding internal organizational culture as well as external environmental understanding as demonstrated in the SLCM.

As an Army Chaplain, the author will propose here a brief SLCM education paradigm for application to the US Army Chaplain Corps as a model for other senior leaders, focusing on one unique Chaplain requirement of "advisement." The author expects that other special staff and personal staff will also have similar requirements unique to them at upper Army echelons in which to apply this PME proposal.

As Chaplain Colonels at the ASCC and CCMD echelons, Chaplains should significantly and positively impact the Commander's mission in the theater of operations. These senior leader command chaplains (CCH) impact the mission not only through direct Title 10 Religious Support to the command, but especially with the unique capability of advising a commander regarding the effects of area religions on the mission, and the effect of the mission on regional religions. This advisement is referred to as "external advisement,"[51] and is found in the Army Techniques Publication 1-05, which specifies as a "required capability," that "the chaplain advises the command on the specifics of the religious environment within their area of operations that may impact mission accomplishment."[52] The Chaplain Corps seeks to incrementally develop this expertise throughout its US Army Chaplain Center and School (USACHCS) professional military education specific to chaplains. The significance of this advisement expertise at the theater strategic level is outlined in Field Manual (FM) 1-05 "Religious Support." This FM outlines the requirements at the ASCC level for chaplains, noting this critical capability to, "advise the commander regarding religious issues [throughout the Area of Operations (AO)]. Religious issues at this level of war are inherently complex and *impact strategic outcomes*" (emphasis added).[53]

With a required capability for a senior leader as personal staff to the commander, Army PME must therefore intentionally account for equipping the chaplain senior leader with this capability.[54] This creates a "push" up for the capability from the senior leader CCH. However, the Army must also educate the line officers/future strategic leader/ General Officers throughout their PME that this capability exists, creating an expectation and demand as a "pull" signal from above. This ensures the chaplain offers this strategic external advisement while the strategic commander will concurrently require it (see Figure 4).

The figure above demonstrates how this one SLCM competence must be developed along the progressive lines of Bloom's Taxonomy throughout the chaplain's and the commander's PME. The senior leader chaplain grows in her ability to know, understand, apply, analyze, evaluate, and lead change in the arena of advisement—knowing well each organization, understanding environments at echelon, foreseeing requirements, and leading appropriate change. This competence growth is progressive, moving from battalion level tactical internal advisement, through operational to the strategic competence of external advisement at the ASCC and CCMD levels.

Senior Leader (SL) and Strategic Line Officer (GO) PME Progression

Capability	SL Rank	SL PME	Echelon	GO Rank	GO PME
Internal Tactical Advisement	CPT	BOLC/CCC	Battalion	LTC	ILE
Operational Advisement	MAJ	ILE	Brigade	COL	AWC
Advanced Operational Advisement	LTC	Field/AWC	Division/Corps	MG	Capstone
Strategic External Advisement	COL	AWC	Corps/ASCC	LTG/GEN	Capstone
Strategic National Advisement	BG MG	Capstone	ASCC CCMD	GEN	Capstone

Figure 4.

Concurrently, commanders are educated throughout their PME that this chaplain competence exists and should, therefore, require it, creating the "pull" demand signal at each echelon of command. This way, both the senior leader staff officer and the strategic leader commander can apply this one competence, like any other, across the Senior Leader Capability Model.

Conclusion

Essential to and logically prior to lists of strategic tasks and competencies, the proposed Senior Leader Capability Model will enable senior leaders to lead well in their spheres of influence and provide their best military advice to their commands. With a thorough understanding of leadership, and the differences between competence, capacity, and capability, these leaders will be able to effectively advise and lead with their unique expertise. These SLCM capabilities must therefore intentionally be integrated with the officer corps PME. Only when leaders know the organization, understand the environment, foresee the future, and lead organizational change, can senior leaders help accomplish strategic missions.

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Command Chaplain ARSOUTH Joint Forces Land Component Command

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NOTES

1 Per the US Army War College Strategic Leadership Primer, these senior leaders are not General Officer strategic leaders, but Colonel leaders who lead at the strategic theater level of war, for both Army Service Component Commands and Combatant Commands (p. 3ff).
2 Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession*, July 2019, 1-13.
3 Tom Galvin, Dale Watson (Eds.), *Strategic Leadership: Primer for Senior Leaders*, 4th ed., United States Army War College (AWC), Department of Command Leadership and Management, 8.
4 Michael DuCharme, "Principles of Strategic Advisement for United States Army Chaplain," *US Army Chaplain Corps Journal*, CY2019, 61-63.
5 "Strategic Advisement" throughout this paper is the advice a Senior Leader staff officer provides to a General Officer Strategic Leader regarding subject matter expertise at the strategic theater level of war.
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21 Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization* (New York: Doubleday, 1990), 341.

22 Brendan Bannister and Richard Higgins, "Strategic Capability, Corporate Communications, and Strategic Credibility," *Journal of Managerial Issues* (Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 1993), 94.
23 Chuck Bamford, *The Strategy Mindset* (Charleston, SC: CreateSpace Independent Publishing, 2015), 29-30.
24 Armstrong, "Bloom's Taxonomy."
25 Harry Yarger, "III. The Strategic Environment," *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy* (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Feb 2006), 17.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 2012), 87.
29 Bob Johansen, *Get There Early* (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc.), 8ff.
30 Ibid.
31 Colin S. Gray, *Thucydides Was Right: Defining Future Threat* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, 2015).
32 For the development of this essential third capacity of seeing beyond the horizon, Gray's work is exceptional. He well uses Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War* to educate on the competencies required within this capability.
33 Gray, 29-30.
34 Michael Desch (Brian and Jeannelle Brady Family Director of the Notre Dame International Security Center), in discussion with the author. March 6, 2020.
35 Gray, 45.
36 Ibid., 36-37.
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38 Army Doctrinal Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession*, July 2019, 1-3.
39 Kotter, 138.
40 Finskud, 81.
41 Raffaelli's work should be read in its entirety as an excellent educational model for leading strategic change.
42 Ryan Raffaelli, *Leading Organizational Change* (Boston: Harvard Business School, 2017), 3.
43 Ibid., 4.
44 Ibid., 5.
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46 Ibid., 5-9.
47 Ibid., 10-12.
48 Ibid., 14.
49 Ibid., 27.
50 Joseph Cerami, "Patterns Across Sectors in Emerging Leader Development" Ideas and Actions," *Developing Emerging Leaders: The Bush School and the Legacy of the 41st President* (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Sep. 1, 2015), 170.
51 Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 1-05.03, *Religious Support and External Advisement*, May 2013.
52 Ibid., 1-1.
53 Army Field Manual 1-05, *Religious Support*, October 2012, 3-7.
54 "Capability" here is the doctrinal use for chaplain advisement in the ATP and FM. It is technically a competence within this paper's "Understand the environment" SLCM capability. This external religious advisement also implies the "See Beyond the Horizon" capability in analyzing the religious AO *vis-à-vis* the mission, and the mission *vis-à-vis* the religious AO. Advisement here also implies the "Leading Change" capability in applying that analysis to and improving the organization.

The Suicide Prevention/Intervention Challenge... A Better Way

by **Chaplain (Colonel) Shmuel L. Felzenberg**

"One who saves even a single life, it is considered as though he has saved the entire world."
Talmud[1]

Suicide prevention/intervention (SP/I) is one of those truly "wicked problems" facing the military, both past and present. However, the current suicide challenge we face today is unique in its own right, due to various factors including those of a generational nature, but which also present opportunity for the way ahead. Despite there being no one magic solution, there are verifiably beneficial tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) worthy of implementation, as well as those worth avoiding.

In light of escalating suicide rates, and the need to mitigate this crisis and reduce such activity, engaged leadership is quintessential. It has no substitute, and nowhere is it more essential than at the first-line supervisory level. Leadership that is caring, empathetic, instills purpose/meaning, and fosters connectedness, while maximizing opportunities for leverage and utilizing best practices/TTPs, can make a huge impact.

Going on the thought (see epigraph above) that each life is a world unto its own, it is appropriate we frame our military's approach to the way ahead by invoking General Mattis' use of a famous Albert Einstein quote cited in his book *Call Sign Chaos*, as follows…"When asked how he would order his thoughts if he had one hour to save the world, Einstein sagely responded that he would spend fifty-five minutes defining the problem and save the world in five minutes."[2] Thus, defining and properly framing the problem, along with identifying relevant recent developments, is most important. While the problem at-hand may at first seem essentially quite evident, there are challenges inherent in this problem which are less obvious and in need of clarification before considering possible solutions. This work will attempt this clarification.

Nevertheless, because this is such a truly wicked and not-completely-solvable problem, this paper will not attempt to present any one precise magic solution, nor should the reader expect it to do so. Rather, it will present lists of both positives and negatives, i.e., things that can, have, or will work in the Army's favor (affording leverage if utilized), or against us (if gone unheeded), as the Army strives to deal with the suicide challenge. It will provide recommended TTPs that have merit as being best practices (i.e., good TTPs) worth incorporating into any SP/I program, as well as identify those practices which are counterproductive (i.e., bad TTPs) and worthy of avoidance. Finally, while this work will not attempt to endorse any one specific (commercially produced) training model as the go-to solution of choice, it will offer one user-friendly, cost- efficient, successful tool which can help supplement/augment any SP/I program effort.

Disclaimer: the findings shared herein are put forth for the readers' awareness and consideration, and though this work will articulate its observations and findings as clearly as possible, the author will not dilute content nor mince words to achieve any expectation of political correctness or broader acceptance. This topic is a matter of life and death, literally, and as such the author is morally compelled to relay what is necessary, plainly so. These findings are based on research, decades of experience, and conclusions drawn. There is no claim as to the absoluteness of these findings, nor to the overall comprehensiveness of this paper on the vast and complex topic of suicide. However, it may provide pieces of the puzzle yielding greater understanding and enhanced SP/I efforts across the force. Each life is a world worth saving.

To start, we must properly redefine "the goal of suicide prevention as being suicide risk *reduction*" – consisting of steps taken to lower probability that an individual may engage in acts of self-destructive behavior. This is because some suicides may still occur even in units/organizations with the best leadership and most efficient suicide prevention/crisis intervention programs.[3] Though we yearn for *eradication*, substantial *reduction* achieved by legitimate best efforts is a worthy and obtainable goal.

This work will highlight some unique challenges, both generational and other, which help explain the complexity of this wicked problem. An entire litany of commonly understood difficulties will not be enumerated herein. To be clear, the word "wicked" is used above strictly in the proverbial sense of the expression (i.e., a challenge without any clear solution), and attempts no judgment whatsoever about the assumedly beleaguered person-in-crisis who sadly opts for that course of action. However, in an ethical society based in a country where religion plays such a prominent role, suicide should also be understood as a significant moral issue, and ethical challenge, with no inherent goodness in it whatsoever…other than fighting it. Thus, it is not solely a matter of either leadership responsibility or of military readiness that compels us to prevent suicide, rather it is a moral imperative of the highest order. Nevertheless, as we seek to address the matter, we must approach the topic from a standpoint of empathy (for the person/people challenged with or affected by it). Empathy is a key leadership attribute.

This suicide challenge spans all demographics (i.e., gender, race, religion, etc.) as well as military affiliation – MOS (military occupational specialty), components (Active Duty, National Guard, Reserve), service branches (Army, Navy, etc.), and retired veterans, to include civilian employees and family members. Each has volumes written on it, and articles appear continually about retirees/veterans who account for 8.5% of the population but 18% of the suicides.[4] The plethora of statistics can be divided up in numerous ways, either focusing on a specific demographic, comparing categories, or cutting across the entire force. Statistics and graphs abound, and are too numerous to provide or synopsize. A singular chart illustrating the Department of Defense's problem over time, Figure 1 adequately depicts the suicide trend (completed suicides) over the past 18 years in the Active Duty component for all service branches combined.

The chart ends with 2018, the last whole year for which final statistics were available prior to this project. The problem is clear: suicide rates are progressively rising over time. Recent years averaging more than 20 per 100,000 are more than double the rate of the early 2000's, and notably higher than the national average of 14.5. The 21st century has thus far been a challenge, to put it mildly. Being a nation at war has played a role to be sure. Much of this period has been characterized by high operational tempo, numerous deployments, repeated family separation, and related hardships. Impact is not immediate, but aggregates over time, expressing itself in delayed effect years later. Our work is cut out for us, and the task is monumental, but there is more.

One reason that makes eradication of suicide (presumably) impossible, and even significant reduction difficult, is the difficulty/inability to adequately track people on the downslide. It is often taught in SP/I instruction, that those who commit or attempt suicide have very often given verbal/behavioral warning signs manifesting their intent. It is also widely held that it is not uncommon for a person-in-crisis (if gone unaided) to progress from ideation to gesture or attempt, and potentially (barring intervention) to completion. Now this is logical, sells well, and may often be the case, however, not always and this is why. Refer to Figure 2 below for illustration that indicates much to the contrary.

The numbers depicted are actual real-life statistics, based on an approximate two-year span of time at a given installation and reflect all SIR (serious incident report) accounts for suicide-related activity including ideations, attempts and/or completions. Most significant for purposes of our illustration here are not the three primary category numbers themselves (i.e., 544, 103 and 12), but rather the category-overlap numbers (i.e., 27, 2, 1, and zero as indicated by the blank space in the middle) where the circles intersect with one another and/or altogether, which indicate how many people of one category also migrated (for better or for worse) into another category. Please note that these overlap numbers are by comparison amazingly low, with no less than 75% of completed suicides having no documented case of any prior incident whatsoever. The readers can deduce the rest of the mathematical implications on their own, but all of which



Figure 1. Suicide Rate for Active Duty Service Members, All Branches, Per 100,000[5]

indicate significantly limited overlap between categories. This makes tracking the presumed progression of people-of-concern all the more difficult. Though it may also indicate good local interventive efforts on the part of the installation, the fact remains that 75% of all completions and attempts seem to come out of nowhere, as it were. This makes the job of efficient/timely intervention that much more difficult for leaders/peers.

Nevertheless, the overriding key to the prevention of suicide is positive and proactive leadership with a deep concern and interest in the lives, welfare, and wellbeing of those people for whom they are responsible.[7] "Leadership involvement is paramount."[8] Nowhere is this more important than with first-line supervisors who have the most direct and sustained contact with those they lead. They are uniquely postured and represent our best hope to help overcome the challenges presented by crisis- contributing factors such as feelings of loneliness, worthlessness, hopelessness, helplessness, and guilt. Actively engaged, aware, empathetic, and caring leaders can better provide supportive assistance to fight these factors, successfully intervene, and avoid crisis. Covered later in detail, DA PAM 600-24 teaches leaders two of the most important things they can do to help a person, "strengthening an individual's spiritual fitness and building connections with other people is the key to helping individuals."[9]

Before embracing any particular solutions, and following the aforementioned statistical

Figure 2. Concentric Circles Diagram of Suicide Statistical Overlap[6]

reasoning as to the complex difficulty we face, let us look at several additional *Points of Challenge*. Some may be less evident to the reader than others, but they help inform our understanding and shape our eventual approach to the problem.

Points of Challenge

There are factors or points which present added challenge to our SP/I efforts, tendencies which are predominantly generational in nature and more common in the younger generation. This younger demographic makes up the largest portion of the rank-and-file military force, and are those with whom the Army has the most significant suicide-related difficulty. Despite the prevalence of generational studies, this paper takes but a narrow glimpse, drawing most heavily from the works of Dr. Charisse Nixon, a developmental psychologist and *TED Talk* lecturer. Primary focus here is on Gen (generation) Z, those born after 1997. Nothing stated here is meant to be derogatory, nor a critical attack on this wonderful generation of young adults who represent our future. However, some identified trends do have/ include apparently negative aspects to them, and at the very least present significantly added challenge due to the generational differences involved. These *Points of Challenge* include the following:

1) Depression/Anxiety. Today's younger generation have a heightened disposition toward depression, anxiety, and depressive behaviors related to risk of suicide activity. Statistically, one out of every five teenagers suffer a major depressive episode before they leave high school. One out of six have considered suicide in the past year alone, and one out of three who actually committed suicide did so with no direct connection to any one specific pathology.[10] These troubling numbers point to the battle that today's youth have with depression and suicide at an alarming rate. "Overall, Gen Z is growing up more anxious, more stressed, and more depressed than its Millennial counterpart. This makes emotional wellbeing a core need for this cohort."[11] Beyond just promoting resilience, we must seek constructive ways to remove or lessen stress, anxiety and negativity from upon this cohort. Furthermore, not limited solely to our youth, research studies have shown that rates of depression and anxiety have increased over the past 50 years in general, affecting the bulk of our society and impacting the near entirety of our military populace.

2) Impulsivity. Adolescents and young adults go through a period of neurological restructuring, during which time their brains undergo change and reshaping, until they reach approximately 25 years of age. This restructuring manifests itself in various ways, to include: struggling to control their impulses, outbursts, a tendency to express themselves in an explosive manner, and misreading facial expressions by over-attributing anger as the presenting emotion – and responding accordingly.[12] They have trouble controlling their emotions, which in-turn influences their thoughts and actions.

3) Struggle with Identity/Purpose. Despite a propensity to be consumed with self, the younger generation struggles with both identity and purpose, as well as with perspective-taking. Lacking of a sense of purpose, and the inability to meaningfully appreciate life's worth, relate heavily to heightened risk of suicidal behavior.[13]

4) Perceptions of Trauma. The younger generation has unique and broad perceptions regarding trauma, especially interpersonal trauma, and what constitutes such, to include even lesser negative experiences. To be fair, trauma may be in the eye of the beholder, and thus to the one who perceives such it is very real indeed. Nevertheless, their perceived assessment as to what constitutes trauma is very different than in generations prior. Those more senior, and thus generationally older, may not readily share similar mindset, making their attempt to empathetically lead the younger generation all the more challenging. Leaders can potentially fail to grasp this "reality." The old-school "suck it up and drive on" mantra is not as viable an approach with which to lead them, as it is less likely to resonate with them. To many younger people, every trauma

needs empathizing to be affirmed/validated, and therapizing to suitably address or resolve it, at least in their estimation. When trauma is not acknowledged/validated they tend to recoil, withdraw, or feel even more hopeless because by their perception it is very real, yet unaffirmed. The range of what constitutes trauma may vary, but they have grown up in a technologically advanced informational age where interpersonal relationships are heavily digital and where cyberbullying is common, very real, and traumatic, often beginning at a very young formative age. To quote Dr. Nixon, "targets of online harassment reported increased rates of trauma symptomology," and that "cyberbullying was a stronger predictor of suicidal ideation than it was for depressive symptomology."[14] Furthermore, research has found that pre-enlistment experiences such as childhood trauma, or perceptions thereof, can have effect upon post- deployment functioning, including development of PTSD during or after deployment.[15] Therefore, perceptions of trauma weigh heavily on the mental and emotional wellbeing of many junior Service Members and are linked to heightened rates of suicide activity.

5) Poor Coping Skills. One of the most impactful challenges facing today's youth is their common lack of sufficiently developed coping skills to deal with life's challenges and setbacks. This runs the risk of making the otherwise minimal into something major, and a negative experience into a potential trauma/crisis. The inability to cope with setbacks increases the individual's perception of being overwhelmed, and in-turn compromises their ability to respond in a productive, healthy manner. A real-world example experienced by the author working as a chaplain: boy asks girl out on a date, girl declines, boy tries to hang himself from a shower rod – no exaggeration. Proper coping skills enable maintaining perspective, dealing with issues, and moving forward.

However, what predominantly accounts for Gen Z's poor coping skills is not genetics, but rather is a matter of upbringing and parenting. "Even when it comes to the little stuff…when parents fight too many battles for their kids it doesn't allow their children to develop the coping skills they need to deal with adversity" – according to Dr. Scott Bea.[16] Furthermore, "if we're not allowing young folks to solve problems, to develop active coping strategies, we're robbing them of those opportunities…and while we're doing that, in a benevolent way and for a good cause, we may be inadvertently handicapping them at the same time."[17] Thus, despite best parental intentions, Gen Z has had this shortcoming behaviorally conditioned into them via their upbringing.

6) Learned Helplessness. The concern of *learned helplessness* applies not only in academia, but also negatively impacts the social capacity of today's youth.[18]

7) Social disconnection. The result of several factors, not least of which is their modern generational culture to plug heavily into electronics rather than live people, today's youth find themselves socially disconnected. Social media and electronic devices are not sufficient replacements for real-life meaningful relationships, direct human interaction, interpersonal engagement, and true social connection. A life of superficial and/or digital relationships, but lacking deep meaningful connections, further feeds into self-focus. It is no wonder that today's youth often feel isolated and alone. As Dr. Nixon states, the reality is that "we are hardwired to connect" – humans are social beings. Furthermore, Nixon asserts that for people "among the most protective factors is connection to a non-parent adult" – through which a person can satisfy their basic human need for acceptance and belonging.[19] Though sadly, without adequate social connection a person may lose the benefit of this much needed protective factor.

8) Perceptions of Fairness. One of the three top values for Gen Z is fairness, the other two being honesty and kindness. Articulated as "treating all people the same according to notions of fairness and justice" without bias or prejudice.[20] Actions and/or treatment that are perceived as fair resonate strongly with them. Compared to prior generations, the younger generation has uniquely different perceptions of right and wrong, due even if only to fairness, regardless of longstanding principles otherwise. In pursuit of fairness, they show a propensity and willingness to shift away from traditional societal norms and long-held moral values/beliefs. As a result, Gen Z (and to some extent Millennials) differ from older generations in their views on politics, the role of/need for bigger government, and even how they rate the U.S. compared to other countries (e.g., only 14% say that the U.S. is better than all others).[21] Not surprisingly, this generational divide becomes even more clear with regard to Gen Z views on gender neutrality, diversity, marriage/family, public protest (e.g., NFL kneeling), etcetera.[22]

This generational sense of "fairness" is also demonstrated in the widely-held contemporary belief regarding the mandated need for the wealthy to pay their "fair share" (of taxes), even disproportionately so. This affords others with what they would not otherwise have – short of which would not be fair. They bear a strong sense of entitlement, anything shy of which is also unfair. Many of them grew up where everyone who plays on a sports team receives and is entitled to a trophy, whether they win or lose, because that is fair, and no one should feel bad or have to deal with losing, as though it is not part of life. Thus, they are less acquainted with what it means to lose, having to deal with those feelings in a healthy manner, the consequences of such, and the greater life lessons otherwise learned. This ties back into #5 above, related to poor coping skills. Proper coping skills take practice and life experience/exposure, inclusive of setbacks and losing dealt with in productive manner, to help build.

Much of this, however, as mentioned earlier, is a function of the parenting they received from the prior generation, who despite best intentions of protecting their offspring ultimately enabled this generational trait/deficit. Not only parents, but even teachers' non-use of "red ink" when grading papers in order to avoid disappointment, embarrassment, and shame of the student(s) – a noble thought in principle, not to mention

fair and avoiding any/all perceptions of *trauma*, but one which over-protects them and diminishes proper coping skill development. This has instilled in today's youth an overblown perception of fairness, which now serves as a driving imperative and all- important value in their life. However, as the common saying goes, "life isn't fair" – or at least is not always so. The challenge for military leaders, as with any company trying to commercially market products to this generation, is to develop an approach that appeals to their sense of fairness (as well as honesty and kindness), so that SP/I messaging can best resonate with this younger audience. We must "promote wellbeing and wellness with honestly, kindness and fairness."[23]

9) Relative Value of Life. American society (not limited to Gen Z, but the world they grew up in) is more permissive/liberal than ever regarding the overall relative value and/or sanctity of human life, or lack thereof. Examples include: a curtailed/ belated definition of when life begins (resulting in prevailing liberal viewpoints on abortion), and the debate over the right to end life (being sheerly a matter of personal choice). For America, as a "nation of laws" upon which our society is predicated, it is very telling that suicide is not even against the law, and thus is not illegal nor a crime. Today's societal culture maintains a modified and subjective approach to morality. Their ethical viewpoint is often one of moral relativism determined largely by popular opinion/choice. Therefore, it is that much harder to make a logical moral/ ethical/legal case against suicide in our dialogue with Service Members, especially the younger crowd.

10) Secularization. Over recent years, there is a significant trend of secularization within our society, and specifically among the younger generation, though not limited exclusively to them. A generationally-driven societal shift away from organized religion. To quote Pew Research Center findings, "young adults around the world are less religious by several measures. Adults under 40 are less likely to be religiously affiliated." Not only in America, but inclusive thereof, "younger adults are less likely to identify with any religious group than are older adults." This is especially true in North America, and "these findings are in line with the rise of the religious "*nones*" in the U.S., which is being driven largely by high levels of disaffiliation among young generations."[24]

With the secularization shift away from religion/religious affiliation comes a series of second- and third-order effects pertaining to the loss of positive benefits commonly affiliated with religious faith practice/belief. These benefits, discussed in detail later on, include: a heightened personal sense of purpose, meaning, hope, acceptance, belonging, and forgiveness, as well as the positive impact(s) of faith community engagement, connectedness and support. Without these potential benefits, a person may be at an inherent disadvantage when faced with life's challenges and generational complexities. The secularization trend established, let us explore what is for some the next logical step…the prevalence of Atheism, and assess inherent challenges therein.

11) Atheism. Taking secularization to the next extreme, we also encounter the growing trend of Atheism, especially among the younger generation. To cite vocal atheist and humanist Staks Rosch in his article entitled "Atheism Has a Suicide Problem," there are many reasons for concern. Many newer adherents to atheism wrestle with great existential questions of life, often without any support networks. They contemplate what it means to live a *meaningful* life, and without belief in an afterlife seek to determine life's *purpose*. Atheists are generally known for being contrarians rather than joiners, often ostracized by friends and family, and lack a supportive faith community. This philosophical/social loneliness can potentially make atheists more prone to depression and even suicide than religious believers. These views are all from Rosch, who admits "if religion has done anything right, it has been to form actual communities for people to gather and share their struggles" – thereby strengthening one another.[25] A sense of communal belonging is critical for human wellbeing, and the reverse is true. This underscores the importance and timeliness of the Chief of Staff of the Army's (CSA) priority regarding people – "People are always my #1 priority"[26] – as well as the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps related priorities of "People & Community."[27]

The enumerated generational trends aside, there are also inherent and additional challenges related to demographic considerations of the military populace. Military members generally have many of the same personal challenges/issues, for the most part, as the American civilian population from whence they come. Notably mitigated by medical screening efforts which attempt to identify and limit entry of those people with the greatest difficulties, it is not a perfect solution despite best efforts. Many of the deaths by suicide are found to have had pre-accession origins, issues which often continue to exacerbate over time throughout the person's service. Nevertheless, even this advantage (of a well-screened force) is further offset when you factor in certain transitional stress factors which Service Members experience upon joining the military. These may include: culture shock, heightened discipline, constraints/ restraints impacting their sense of freedom, forced compliance with orders/directives, limitations, expectations, and demands of an unprecedented physical, mental, and/or psychological nature. These norms affiliated with military life, versus civilian life norms to which they were accustomed, challenge their previously-held worldview and basic sense of fairness/entitlement. Add to all this the extreme nature of military life itself, which can include: high OPTEMPO (operational tempo), related risk and stress factors, deployments, repeated family separation, combat, life-threatening events, PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder), TBI (traumatic brain injury), moral injury, etc. – and you begin to understand the immense burden upon our Service Members and their families.

Every Service Member in-need is entitled to the best comprehensive care we have to

offer. Indeed, our military medical/behavioral health community in partnership with outside agencies and facilities do their best to heal, restore, improve, or at least (in the more extreme cases) stabilize or mitigate the crises of those in-need. Nevertheless, not everyone can be successfully returned "to the line" for future mission need, and some may not even be capable of substantive rehabilitation at all. As such, and following careful assessment by the medical community, there is beneficial need for separation from military service, sometimes expeditiously so, especially when pre- existing condition is determined. However, the current administrative process is long and often drawn-out, over many months if not years. There is simply no easy or timely (enough) way currently in-place to administratively separate those in need of such, even when they are beyond the possibility of rehabilitation and are a known liability to the force – administratively, operationally, and safety-wise. Such expeditious administrative methods of separation existed in the past, and perhaps their need should be revisited.

There is another and very sensitive issue to address. While the vast majority of our military force conducts itself with unrivaled integrity and a sense of honor that has no peer in society-at-large, there is a small demographic who take advantage of the system. Specifically, there are those who clearly "play the suicide card" (i.e., claimed ideation and apparent gesture or attempt which is anything but truly legitimate) in order to avoid deployment, and who do so in perfectly-timed fashion just before a deployment, not uncommonly within days or even no more than hours beforehand. The author of this paper has witnessed these occurrences time and again, repeatedly so and without fail. Please note, this is not to besmirch in any way the reputations or intentions of the many good and honest people facing legitimate crisis, who thankfully come forward in pursuit of much needed help, for whom the imminent deployment was a tipping point. However, extensive personal experience, statistical assessment, careful review of SIR case reporting details, and dialogue with other caregiver professionals (both medical and chaplains) indicate that there are numerous suicide-related claims (i.e., ideation, gesture or apparent attempt) which are indeed not legitimate. In this context, "not legitimate" means something other than "death not being the actual intended consequence" – i.e., "a cry for help" – which is indeed legitimate. Rather, the intention is to refer to claims that are of an apparently completely staged nature – a fraud.

Nevertheless, the near-automatic non-deployable status often obtained by false suicidal claims, and hence the prevalence of "playing the suicide card," adversely impacts more than just readiness and mission accomplishment. It also compromises the accuracy/validity of otherwise legitimate statistics and related analytical assessment efforts by medical professionals and chaplains. These caregivers track suicide activity and SIR rates for analysis and trend identification purposes with which to best advise commanders regarding health of the force and SP/I strategy efforts. Therefore, intentionally false claims can directly skew the numbers, compromise validity of the analysis, thwart best advice, negativity impact commander decision-making, and in-turn do the biggest disservice to those truly in need – of whom they make a mockery.

However, the challenge is that due to the great liability involved, all claimed incidents of suicidal activity are as a matter of urgency and immediacy taken extremely seriously, presumed to be legitimate, and assessed for treatment. Any further subsequent determination regarding legitimacy of the claim is at the discretion of the professional caregiver, though fear of potential liability remains a constant concern/constraint.

Demographics in their literal sense include another whole host of considerations. We will not go into them individually in great depth, nor cite the multitudinous amount of statistics, but simply mention them for awareness sake and will provide a singular example of one such demographic in limited detail for illustrative purposes. The demographical list includes various segment categories (component and service branch affiliation aside) which comprise the military population, each of which have two or in most cases many more subcategories within it. The list, not all-inclusive, is as follows: sex/gender (definitional differences notwithstanding), race, ethnicity, religious affiliation (if any), age, sexual orientation, MOS, rank, etc. There is statistical data regarding differences in suicide activity rates pertaining to each (or at least many) of the subcategories. This informational data can factor into analysis and decision-making when assessing health of the force, its needs, and SP/I strategy efforts warranted – which can vary significantly between the force as a whole or from one unit/organization to the next based on its respective composition of personnel by ratio. Some examples of differences by demographic category include: male vs. female; white vs. black/African American vs. Hispanic/Latino vs. other minority; young vs. old (by age group or military cohort); enlisted vs. non-commissioned officer vs. warrant officer vs. commissioned officer vs. civilian, or more specifically by individual rank such as privates vs. sergeants vs. captains, etc. Now let us look at possible differences by unit/organization.

An Infantry Company will have vastly different make-up in several of these categories than a Division Headquarters, as will an operational battalion from a Garrison Headquarters. One unit may be predominantly more male, younger, junior ranking, and MOS-specific heavy; while another organizational entity may be quite the opposite with significant female, older, senior ranking, MOS-diffuse and/or civilian personnel presence in its composition…and with an entirely different mission focus. Just as each unit in our example may require a different leadership approach, each may also require a modified SP/I strategy to better meet the needs of its people, mission, and related stressors.

While holding-off on deep-diving into statistics, i.e., higher or lower trends of suicide activity related to each subcategory in comparison with its counterpart(s), we will look at a singular illustrative example. For this we will use sexual orientation, not focusing

on one military unit or another, but generally to the entire force as a more fully integrated whole, inclusive of authorized service by homosexuals/non-heterosexuals since the repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" went into effect in 2011. The increased representation of this demographic within the force when viewed in light of their elevated rate of suicide activity is quite telling, meriting attention. Let us put aside the whole LGB(T) community for a moment, and focus instead only on gay and bisexual men (i.e., men who have sex with men, or "MSM"). Research from the American Journal of Public Health found that they are at elevated risk for suicide attempts, with that risk clustered more so earlier in life. They constitute a "high-risk" group and demonstrate "much greater risk than the general population." "Rates suggest that U.S. gay and bisexual males have more than a 3-fold increased risk…in comparison with their heterosexual male counterparts." Not limited solely to the MSM demographic, the research also references findings showing "the higher prevalence of suicide attempts reported in…gay, lesbian, and bisexual adolescents and young adults."[28] Thus, higher LGB suicide rates also push collective statistics upward.

The transgender community – whose integration into the force started during the Obama administration but is now on hold, merit mention nonetheless – have an alarming rate of suicide attempts (at some point during their life) at a whopping 41%. This is approximately nine times the national average of 4.6% for the general populace.[29] Furthermore, the attempted suicide rate for multiracial transgender people is an astounding 33 times higher than that of the general population.[30] These numbers manifest the extremely high to catastrophic risk faced by the transgender community, and the challenge which their full integration would pose to the force.

Understanding the numerous *Points of Challenge*, both generational and demographical, which present multi-layered difficulty to the task of combating suicide, it is tempting to presume the task as beyond our means. Nevertheless, several existent factors serve as points of strength suitable for leverage in our fight.

Points of Leverage

There are several strengths at our disposal which we can draw upon and utilize as points of leverage in our battle against suicide. They include the following:

1) Connectedness. Ensuring human connectedness and engagement are very beneficial for human wellbeing. This paper already discussed, citing Dr. Nixon (refer to endnote 19), that social connection is one of the most protective factors for a person, and satisfies one's basic need for both acceptance and belonging. This inherently nests very well with the CSA's #1 priority being "people" (refer to endnote 26). Relationships are powerful and real human interaction is critically important, the importance of which is often overlooked or taken for granted in our technologically advanced society. It should thus come as no shock, as mentioned earlier, that "people and community" is the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps' religious support priority, and appropriately so, as chaplains play both a major role in implementing the commander's SP/I program efforts at echelon across the force, and the lead role in "caring for the soul of the Army."[31]

2) Purpose/Meaning/Hope. Instilling purpose, meaning, and hope are critically important. It requires engaged leadership, proper communication/messaging, and more. This falls into the human domain wherein spirituality and religion can also play an active role, as appropriate, thereby facilitating within each person a true sense of their own individual "sacred cosmic significance"[32] – i.e., ultimate purpose and meaning. The individual should see oneself as a part of something far larger and more meaningful than simply a finite self inwardly focused. Dr. Philip Wexler points out the importance of people and community in one's life, and that positive human interaction and integration within society are hugely beneficial for the individual. Coming together in shared purpose creates an almost new entity, one that is stronger and more resilient.[33] "The crowd does not drown out individuals, but buoys and raises them to greater success."[34]

Though a more in-depth explanation of the following related principle is best saved for another place and time, let us now briefly state this exalted ideal to convey its powerful message and conclude our point. Individuals have worth beyond any specific contribution or benefit they either bring to or glean from their community; rather, they are themselves a means to an end, and exist even within their own existence as a complete/entire world (refer back to our opening epigraph), serving as "the very fulcrum through which the whole purpose of creation is realized."[35] Achieving that level of understanding regarding one's own irreplaceable purpose in and meaning of life is to grasp the true sacred cosmic significance of one's role in the world. Yet, even then, communal disengagement is not an option, and social connectedness is no less critical.

Dr. Nixon, in her TED Talk lecture, explains that developmentally a person has four basic needs, two of which we already discussed, namely *acceptance* and *belonging*, but that another need is *meaningful existence*, (the last being *control*). Not surprisingly, when she talks about life's most protective factors, in addition to *connection* previously mentioned, she identifies *spiritual meaning* often affiliated with faith.[36] Therefore, we can see the critical importance of having both purpose and meaning in one's life, serving as a source of hope and positive influence against negativity – which often consumes and challenges today's younger generation.

3) Morality. "A Soldier seriously committed to his or her personal morality, whether grounded in a religious faith or not, is prone more than he or she would otherwise be to live up to the high ethical ideals of the Army…not in spite of, but because of his or her personal convictions."[37] Fostering this morality-grounded mindset could/would have favorable impact in helping reduce the likelihood of suicidal activity.

4) Religion. Don Snider eloquently states the

following regarding the importance of religion and its beneficial impact upon Soldier wellbeing, character and resilience:

> It is simply indisputable that religion is often a key element in the emotional and psychological health of individual Soldiers. While the Army and other Services have struggled with just how to understand and present this spiritual domain of the human moral essence in all Soldiers, its force in the strength of their personal character and resilience, both on the battlefield and thereafter, is not questioned.[38]

"Religion is a tremendous source of strength, inspiration, wisdom, peace, and purpose for many people…"[39] When we talk about religion some people get nervous, but to overlook this would be detrimental, and to avail ourselves of its benefit could reap huge reward. This further illustrates the challenge we face with a modern-day society which is trending further away from religious faith observance in its march toward secularization over the past two decades, and the resultant consequences of such in terms of the otherwise beneficial but diminished qualities enumerated above.[40] Lacking that extra measure of internal strength, inspiration, wisdom, peace, and purpose (as otherwise afforded by religion or spirituality in general) would likely only serve to further heighten the risk of suicidal activity and diminish our ability to comprehensively intervene with people of concern. The bottom line is that religion and its various expressions play a positive role in Soldier fitness for both mortal combat and subsequent recovery from the same.[41]

5) Spirituality. Aside from religion proper, and its benefits for human wellbeing, is the concept of spirituality in general. Particularly in today's world with a generational shift away from religion, many of those very people themselves still vociferously claim that spirituality matters a great deal and is a part of their persona. Army doctrine and regulation repeatedly point out the existence of spirituality, its impact upon our holistic state-of-being, its role in human wellbeing/resiliency, its effect on individual/unit/family readiness, and thus its inextricable importance, including relevance with regard to SP/I.

Two examples of Army doctrine related to spirituality include the following: 1) The Army's Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness (CSF2) program codified in Army Regulation (AR) 350-53 lists the "spiritual dimension" as one of the Five Dimensions of Strength. The AR states that the spiritual dimension is comprised of elements which "define the essence of a person," enables one to "persevere through challenges, and be resilient when faced with adversity," as well as "forms the basis of their character."[42] It is no wonder that this AR points out that the Army's Global Assessment Tool (GAT) annual survey likewise assesses the spiritual dimension of a person for these same reasons. 2) AR 600-63, Army Health Promotion, talks about the need for increasing and enhancing "spiritual fitness," as well as ensuring "the integration of spiritual fitness programs for units, Soldiers, DA Civilians, and Family members."[43] It defines spiritual fitness as "the development of personal qualities needed to sustain a person in times of stress, hardship, and tragedy."[44] It is obviously of critical importance to SP/I efforts.

Dr. Lisa Miller writes extensively on spirituality in her book, *The Spiritual Child: The New Science on Parenting for Health and Lifelong Thriving*. Miller addresses the foundation, development, and surging (during adolescence and midlife) of spirituality throughout the human lifecycle. In her words: "Given the broad and pervasive protective benefits of spirituality found by science…as human beings we are designed with spirituality as the central organizing principle, the *spiritual hub* of our makeup."[45] Miller considers it a person's strongest source of resilience and capacity for thriving. She links spirituality with a variety of character strengths, including: grit/perseverance, optimism, resilience, commitment, and others. Miller addresses the differences of living life with or without a "spiritual core" as related to various human developmental tasks with regard to how people see themselves, their life, and their place in the world. She notes that having a spiritual core results in a self of "inherent worth," an identity of "meaning & purpose," feeling "always connected," and an existential reality of a "purposeful world."[46] It is clear that spirituality is a huge point of strategic leverage in the fight against suicide.

6) Scientific Benefits of Religion/Spirituality. There is empirical evidence from scientific studies that show the beneficial relationship between religion (i.e., religious belief/adherence) and decreased suicidal behavior. Andrew Wu (et al.) led an extensive multi-thousand case study research effort on this correlation, a meta-analysis of religion and suicide. The results decisively support the notion that religion plays an overall protective role against the rate of completed suicide. Findings indicated a significant 62% decreased likelihood of completed suicide when someone has a strong adherence to religion and/or spirituality (R/S); the number goes even higher to an impressive 82% decreased risk for completed suicide when the R/S is in a coherent faith community. The effects varied based on the particular cultural and/or religious context. The study concludes that professionals need to strongly consider the social and religious atmosphere of a given population when designing suicide prevention programs or strategies.[47] The research article cites an impressive list of international academic and scientific resources so extensive that it prohibits further articulation at this point in time.

There is also the research of Lisa Miller, a foremost scientist on spirituality across the lifespan. Miller's team conducted longitudinal studies assessing the impact of R/S with regard to cortical (i.e., cortex of the brain) thickness in relation to depressive illness in people of high familial risk for major depression. Findings indicated that personal R/S may indeed be neuro-protective against depression and "confer resilience to (against) the development of depressive illness" in high risk individuals. The theory is that by expanding a cortical reserve in the brain it counters the vulnerability that cortical thinning poses for developing familial depressive illness. Miller provides numerous additional references to fellow peer research

studies on this topic of R/S being protective against depression.[48] The bottom line is that in addition to all the inherent benefits of R/S upon one's life, wellbeing, sense of higher purpose, and social connectedness – there is scientific evidence as to its physiological impact and protective influence in terms of helping prevent depressive illness and potential suicide- related activity and/or completion. Therefore, any appropriate way in which R/S could be utilized and leveraged might well have potentially far-reaching beneficial results.

A Positive Step

Leaders across the Army at various installations continue to do their best to train, implement initiatives, and take meaningful steps forward in the fight against suicide.

One particular positive step taken in 2018 at the Army enterprise level, thereby favorably impacting the entire force, was the decision to drop the ASIST (Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training) program as the Army's go-to training solution. After many years of near unilateral reliance on ASIST as the Army's interventive tool of choice – despite growing criticism pertaining to the program's limitations, training structure, monetary cost, time requirements, cumbersome implementation, and apparent declining effectiveness – the Army finally and rightly decided not to renew their contract for ASIST. When fighting a persistent problem that only appears to be getting worse, the first phase in seeking a better way forward is simply to realize that what you are doing/using is not working as needed/expected, and making a shift in approach. In addition to all other reasons for dropping the program, the Army needs to get back on the "left-side" of suicidal activity – namely, to posture itself (as much as possible) in a preventative stance prior to the occurrence of at-risk behavior. Revitalized attention need be paid to the age-old legacy focus on *prevention*, rather than just the heavy focus on *intervention* which dominated the last 15 to 20 years.

Focusing briefly in slightly greater detail on some of the reasons for dropping ASIST, the following apply: 1) Suicide activity statistics reflect its reduced effectiveness over time, as the chart in Figure 2 (on page 4) illustrated earlier; refer particularly to years 2006-2018. 2) The program was relied upon too heavily, for too long, as a near stand-alone solution, despite mounting criticisms. 3) The training/certification process was long and cumbersome, making successful implementation at intended levels of expected completion (i.e., % trained) often unrealistic and not obtainable. 4) Over the years, there were numerous version updates of ASIST, each one superseding the prior version's certification legitimacy, resulting in a recurring loop of required recertification time and again. 5) Not that we can put a price on life, but the financial cost of ASIST was very expensive. 6) Finally, it lacked sufficient specificity regarding recommended method(s) of interventive care/response COAs (courses of action) most necessary at the point of crisis assessment.

To be sure, ASIST served a great purpose and saved numerous lives, but after years of over-reliance and declining results it was time to shift to a new approach. Exactly what that should be or will look like in the long-term is a matter of ongoing debate, not yet fully determined. For now, the Army is giving commanders/leaders more latitude in determining the type of SP/I annual training they deliver to their troops. This affords leaders the opportunity to shape the effort as they deem most appropriate in order to best care, empathetically so, for those entrusted to their leadership. Not forgetting about *intervention*, the Army is also making good use of the ACE-SI (Ask, Care, Escort - Suicide Intervention) training model as well. Hopefully, a new approach, empowering leaders, encouraging direct engagement, all based on trust, empathy, and care, while utilizing the aforementioned points of leverage – will yield improved results. To further aid the effort, there are also TTPs, both good and bad, of which to be aware.

TTPs

There are many well-intended SP/I-related methods and TTPs which have been implemented over time, either at a given location or across the force. Some prove to be better than others. Amongst TTPs there are the decidedly good, the apparently bad, and the still to-be-determined. This is by no means an exhaustive list, far from it, but a quick overview of a few TTPs worth implementing, or specifically not, as part of an overall SP/I strategy. Good TTPs with favorable impact include the following:

1) Leadership. There is simply no replacement or substitute for engaged, proactive, and empathic direct first-line supervisory leadership. This is the master key to any successful SP/I strategy effort.

2) Predictability. Providing as much predictability as possible to our Soldiers and families, this equates to creating stability in their lives and thus a more stable mindset, thereby reducing stress. Proper planning and messaging are essential leader requirements in order to ensure that Service Members, DA Civilians, and families understand the battle rhythm, training/operational requirements, and the timing/sequencing with which it all occurs (OPSEC notwithstanding) so they can plan their lives accordingly with a degree of surety and confidence. For Service Members who are married/have families, leaders should encourage the passing-on of information by the Service Member to his/her spouse/partner. Leaders can also leverage use of Family Readiness channels to help disseminate information to family members as appropriate. The expression, "happy wife, happy life" may be cliché and not necessarily gender correct, but how true it is – especially as relationship problems are a leading factor contributing to potential depression and suicide activity.

3) Quality Over Quantity. "Less is more" is the better approach, rather than "more is more" (though actually less effective) – in terms of frequency, length of time, and scope (i.e., keeping to the basics) with regard to SP/I training. This refers specifically to general populace annual training, and not the obvious need for more in-depth and lengthier train-the-trainer or gatekeeper training that we require for those in certain leadership or

functional positions. For general purpose training efforts…too often, too much, and/or too extensive, though well intended, is simply not necessarily better, can build resentment, and may even be counterproductive.

4) Paving the Way. At the unit/organizational level further removing the stigma of getting help, and facilitating enhanced access to the appropriate helping agency resources. This increases the likelihood and willingness of those in need to actually seek the help they require. Antoon Leenaars cites a 2005 study (Regan et al.) which notes that because of stigma, only 23% to 40% of those with mental health concerns sought assistance after serving overseas in Iraq and/or Afghanistan.[49] Thus, reducing stigma is a key component; we are currently doing better, and can improve even further.

5) Timing. Avoid UCMJ-related negative administrative actions and/or heightened disciplinary/punitive adjudication on the last duty day of the week or going into a long weekend. This applies especially with more serious offenses and respectively graver consequences. This avoids lowering the boom on someone, involving embarrassment and stigma, to only then release the person unsupervised over a multi-day period of time as they try to mentally process the comeuppance of it all and cope with the fallout.

There are bad TTPs often practiced with regard to SP/I training, but worthy of avoiding due to their non-beneficial/unfavorable impact. These include the following:

1) Overdoing SP/I training in either frequency (i.e., sheer number of times), length (i.e., amount of time per training session), or scope (i.e., sheer quantity or vastness of content conveyed). As opposed to an annual training requirement of reasonable length and content, some units in the past have conducted "required" training as often as quarterly, while others conducted sessions spanning hours and imparting huge amounts of content.

2) Using a training method/modality which is unsuitable/incompatible – in style, format (e.g., over-reliance on PowerPoint slides), or delivery (e.g., top-down/one-way lecture) – and thus not best-suited to fit the newer generational learning style and method of knowledge intake. Heavily influenced by technology, younger people especially are more apt to absorb and retain information when learned through shorter, quicker, or app-based learning methods. Long lectures delivered en masse in a "death by PowerPoint" manner is a deficient approach, routinely derided by Service Members, and the effectiveness of which is questionable at best.[50] A better approach would be to utilize alternative training methods which focus on smaller group audiences and leverage brevity, rapidity, and are interactive. An example of this brevity/rapidity concept is the recent shift to micro-short and very fast-paced recruiting adds geared toward abbreviated attention span focus and the ability to absorb information very rapidly.

Finally, not all TTPs are clearly good or bad, some are still to be determined exactly where they sit on the scale of merit, with some advocating in their favor, while others greatly critical thereof. For example, what type of memorial event (i.e., a *memorial ceremony* inclusive of military honors vs. a *memorial service* without military honors)[51] is better to do following a suicide, why or why not, and the implications or consequences thereof? The author has seen it done both ways, each with success, though debate continues to assess the respective merits and/or shortcomings of each in light of the other. The bottom line, however, is that most/almost all SOPs (standard operating procedures) direct that a *memorial ceremony* be done. Despite the author's strong feelings on this matter, it will not be resolved in this paper, nor will we deliberate on it any further; though it is worthy of its own deep-dive assessment to be sure.

The fact is that any SP/I program should incorporate as many positive TTPs as possible, while forgoing others known to be counterproductive. While best methods and resultant effects may vary from location to location and audience to audience, the good and bad TTPs outlined above appear rightly assessed for broad inclusion or exclusion, respectively, across the force. Again, this is by no means a definitive list, but simply a starting point to assist leaders in their SP/I strategy efforts. TTPs aside, let us now look at a beneficial tool worthy of consideration for possible broader implementation.

SIAT

Pursuant to the need to utilize supportive program tools that are practical, user-friendly, and (whenever possible) easy/simple in both understandability and applied implementation, the Suicide Intervention Assessment Tool ("SIAT") identified below is recommended as one such viable tool.[52] The beauty of this tool is manifold, to include: 1) it is simple; 2) easy to understand; 3) requires only very minimal training, if almost any at all, though its supporting training slide-deck of limited size can serve as an added opportunity for open dialogue/discussion; 4) user-friendly; 5) a handy hip-pocket tool; 6) visually pleasing; 7) practical; 8) easy to implement; 9) prescriptive/directive in terms of recommending specific options for interventive action appropriate to be taken; 10) logistically easy from a coordinative/training standpoint; 11) extremely low-cost; and 12) a proven success by virtue of contributing towards significantly reduced suicide activity (e.g., a decrease of 37%) over a sustained period of time (see previous endnote #52).

See below Figures 3 and 4, respectively, the front and back of the SIAT Card. It is a tool usable by all, but intended primarily as a leaders' tool with focus on first-line supervisors ranging from Section Sergeant to Company Commander. These are the people who will have the most immediate and extensive day-to-day interaction with the Soldier(s), and are best poised to recognize issues of concern as they occur.

The SIAT model, its usage, and the assessments made therewith, are not any of the following: 1) foolproof, 2) a replacement for common sense, 3) clinical analysis, nor 4) certified by ASIST, ACE-SI, or other commercially-produced program. At the

same time SIAT is also not: 5) complicated, 6) difficult to use, nor 7) a waste of time or effort.

Its beauty is in its simplicity. SIAT utilizes a quick point-based assessment with three easy to answer questions. Spun like a television infomercial, one can call it a handy-dandy piece of hip-pocket wisdom that is easy to memorize, utilize and customize to best meet the needs of the circumstance. This wallet-sized smart card is a powerful tool that presents the user with clear (minimum) suggested courses of action to follow, helping to avoid leader inaction due to either uncertainty or ignorance of the interventive care system. Furthermore, SIAT training does not inundate the recipient audience with tons of statistics, scientific data, etc., delivered over a period of multiple hours if not days, nor is the content conveyed in a lengthy "death by PowerPoint" mode – which is less than ideal for this generation's preferred method of information intake.

SIAT assessment involves answering three questions pertaining to the person's "current plan," "prior factors," and "resources" (i.e., support system or lack thereof, which highlights the importance of relationships and human connectedness) using a simple one-of-three options multiple choice response. Once done, just add-up the numerical value of the responses. Higher mathematical ability is not required. If you can add up to the number three, inclusive of decimals in increments of half-a-point ("0.5") only, you have what it takes to use this tool. Each question is scored as either a zero ("0"), a half-a-point ("0.5"), or one ("1"). Simply add together the numbers of all three answers, and the total point value result can range from a "0" to a "3" with everything in between, differentiated by half-point increments. Then turn the card over, find the assessed total point value (0 to 3) on the left-hand side, and see what the color-coded threat level indicates…either *low*, *medium*, *high* or *critical*. Once the appropriate level of concern/threat is identified, look for the suggested (minimum) course of action found on the right side of the card, and act accordingly. Always err on the side of caution, and never forget common sense and/or your own gut feeling…as cases will vary. There is no perfect tool out there, anywhere, but the SIAT model is a good start. It can also be customized to reflect local installation/unit medical facility and emergency services phone numbers and contact information to further facilitate timely action taken.

This is but one potential way to offer a simple, practical and easily implementable model which can empower both leaders and caring peers at the lowest level on up in order to help avoid crisis. There is no need for a stressful situation to go un-intervened and result in an otherwise avoidable catastrophic act of indiscipline and tragedy.



Figure 3. SIAT Card Frontside



Figure 4. SIAT Card Backside

Summary

In sum: this paper framed and redefined the problem; identified the feasible objective to be achieved; provided ample background information; enumerated eleven *points of challenge* of a generational nature and several demographic-based considerations; provided six distinct *points of leverage*; highlighted a positive first step of significant change already taken; delineated five positive TTPs, two adverse TTPs, and one other; as well as proffered the SIAT model for considered potential utilization.

Conclusion

As daunting as the task before us may be, we best take to heart the following ancient teaching, "You are not required to complete the task, yet you are not free to withdraw from it."[53] Practical and reassuring yet decidedly motivational, the message is clear. We must do what we can, both as individual leaders and institutionally as an Army/military, towards the task of combating suicide. Knowing that it is impossible to completely eradicate suicide (i.e., some will opt for it, though even one is too many), nevertheless, we must do what we can as aggressively as possible to pursue its reduction. Abdication of our responsibility to do so would be inexcusable failure and morally unacceptable. Indeed, every life saved is a huge victory and a world saved unto its own (refer back to the epigraph at the beginning) – benefitting the individual, the unit, the Army/military, our Nation, and humanity as a whole. Engaged leadership is essential, and for which there is absolutely no substitute, especially at the first-line supervisory level. Leadership as described above, equipped with knowledge of the challenges, armed with leverage, and dedicated to using best practices/TTPs, is a recipe for success capable of achieving suicide reduction. The SIAT is a successful tool worth considering for potential force-wide employment to help combat suicide.

Surely our best-conceived lifesaving efforts energetically implemented will receive no small measure of divine assistance, hopefully yielding most favorable results. We will never quit, and never leave a fallen comrade.



Chaplain (COL) Shmuel L. Felzenberg

Deputy Commandant, United States Army Chaplain Center and School

Chaplain Felzenberg graduated from the Rabbinical College of America in Morristown, NJ, with a Bachelor of Religious Studies degree; he earned his Master of Divinity degree and Rabbinic Ordination at Yeshivas Tomchei Tmimim in Kfar Chabad, Israel. Chaplain Felzenberg's duty assignments include: Brigade Chaplain, 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade, Installation Jewish Chaplain, United States Military Academy, Instructor/Writer & Staff Group Leader for the Chaplain Basic Officer Leader Course (CH-BOLC), and later the Training Directorate Executive Officer, Division Chaplain for the 1st Infantry Division, and upon promotion to Colonel in 2018, CH Felzenberg transitioned to be the "Senior Chaplain" at FRKS, responsible for both the DIV and USAG religious support programs. CH Felzenberg presently serves as the Deputy Commandant at USACHCS, Fort Jackson, SC.

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Religious Engagement and State Partnership:

Case Study in Strategic Coordination

by Chaplain (Colonel) David L. Johnson

"Forging and maintaining…partnerships in today's environment is an essential skill and force multiplier the Guard provides like no other."

General Joseph L. Lengyel[1]

The State Partnership Program (SPP) has been in existence since 1993.[2] During that time, the National Guard (NG) has built enduring relationships with eighty-five nations' militaries and security forces (seventy-eight partnerships) in a variety of disciplines in support of the Combatant Commanders' (CCDRs) and the ambassador's security cooperation objectives.[3] "What began as a program of 10 partnerships in Eastern Europe has spread across five continents and currently encompasses approximately one-third of the nations in the world."[4]

Chaplaincy Engagements (CEs) with the respective nations' chaplaincies, as well as those without a chaplaincy, are an essential part of these efforts. While the NG conducts CEs in their partnered country, other CEs take place, as well, at times, from the Combatant Command (CCMD), their subordinate elements, and from civilian organizations conducting similar activities. While many entities are doing good work, collaboratively and individually, NG SPP Chaplains deal primarily with a unique set of challenges, as well as opportunities as they plan and conduct engagements with their partner nation (PN).

To develop and sustain enduring international security relationships, unity of effort is essential from a multi-component and multi-service perspective. Considering that the NG SPP fosters long-term relationships, this study will explore ways that the NG Chaplaincy can bolster strategic unity of effort while keeping in mind America's national security goals and CCDR's objectives. In that regard, this study will use, as an example, information from the North Dakota (ND) NG SPP and its connection to the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM). This study will also explore how the NDNG SPP nests with the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS). Next, this study will examine the strategic challenges and opportunities in planning and conducting CEs. Finally, this study will argue that although CEs are taking place, three vital elements can further strengthen current strategic efforts.

North Dakota National Guard State Partnership Program

Before 2004, The Adjutant General (TAG) of ND, Major General Michael J. Haugen, requested Partner Nation (PN) consideration through the SPP. In 2004, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) assigned ND the country of Ghana, Africa, as its first PN. Immediately, TAG assigned a State Partnership Program Director (SPPD) to begin working the program and all its new details. Concurrently, TAG selected another officer to move to Ghana, Africa, and serve as the first bilateral affairs officer (BAO). While the SPPD works at the state headquarters in Bismarck, ND, the BAO works within the Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) in the Ghanaian Embassy under Chief of Mission Authority. This position coordinates efforts between the NDNG, the CCMD/Country Desk Officer, U.S. Country Team/Chief of Mission, and the Ghanaian Armed Forces (GAF).[5]

In 2005, the NDNG conducted its first two events with its newly formed state partner, the Republic of Ghana. The first engagement was a NDNG senior leader visit to meet the GAF senior military leadership.[6] As a brand-new partnership, the senior leaders met for two reasons. The first reason was to begin building a personal relationship. The second reason was to discuss each country's capabilities and needs to draft the way ahead for the NDNG SPP. Shortly after, the NDNG public affairs office conducted the first official miltary to military engagement in Accra, Ghana.[7] After nine years of successful engagements, the NDNG, under the leadership of a new TAG, asked for and received two more countries as PNs in 2014. With the addition of Togo, Africa, and Benin, Africa, the NDNG became the first regionally aligned SPP state. In total, between all three countries, the NDNG has officially conducted 215 total engagements through fiscal year 2018.[8] As of 2019, the NG SPP has seventy-eight state partnerships (eighty-five nations) around the world. See Figure 1 below for a complete breakdown of partnerships by CCMD and state.

After becoming TAG in 2006, Major General David Sprynczynatyk traveled to Ghana for his first senior leader engagement with the GAF senior leadership. Upon his return, the TAG directed the ND Chaplain Corps to begin planning for the first SPP chaplain engagement with the GAF Chaplaincy. The TAG and GAF Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) decided that although other disciplines were engaging and sharing capabilities, their religious leaders needed to begin engaging with one another, as well. As a result, Chaplain (Colonel) William Ziegler, ND Air National Guard (ANG) Wing Chaplain, conducted the first chaplain engagement with the GAF Chaplaincy. While the first engagement was specifically TAG and CDS driven, all chaplain engagements are vetted and approved by TAG before they leave the state. There are other steps for an event to be approved, but it begins with the TAG's direction.

The SPP is a multi-tiered program and operates as follows:

> The State Partnership Program (SPP) is a joint Department of Defense (DoD) security cooperation program, managed and administered by the National Guard Bureau (NGB), executed and coordinated by the geographic Combatant Commands (CCMDs), with personnel provided by the National Guard of the respective partner States.[10]

As this is an international effort, SPP plans and objectives begin with state/territory

Figure 1. State Partnership Program Map[9]

and with TAG concurrence. The Adjutant General has relationships with the PN, and they plan engagements with their PN in mind. After the plan leaves the state, it undergoes a thorough vetting process to see that the proposed engagement meets CCMD objectives. Ultimately, the PN must agree to the engagement, as well. For any successful engagement to take place, many processes must happen, and planning begins well over a year in advance. For that reason, many states conduct a five-year plan.[11]

Since 2004, the NDNG Chaplaincy conducted seven engagements with Ghana, two with Togo, and two with Benin. Additionally, a twelfth engagement took place in ND with two GAF and one Togolese Chaplain in attendance. Of these multi-component chaplain engagements, four were conducted strictly by NDNG Chaplains, one engagement with U.S. Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA), and three engagements with U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) Chaplains. To enhance unity of effort in the NDNG SPP, the NDNG State Chaplain invited the ANG Assistant to the Command Chaplain (AFRICOM) to join him on an engagement to all three PNs in 2016. The State Chaplain also invited the AFRICOM Command Chaplain and his Religious Affairs Senior Enlisted Advisor to join the NDNG Chaplaincy on the latter engagement. Finally, in 2018, because of a unique request by one of the PNs, the State Chaplain requested that the Deputy AFRICOM Chaplain and his Religious Affairs Senior Enlisted Advisor join him on an engagement.

Overall, these engagements have been successful, not because of one person or entity, but because they have a common purpose and many people working together to achieve that purpose. "The SPP's ultimate purpose is to support the security cooperation goals of the relevant geographic combatant commander (GCC) and the U.S. Chief of Mission (COM) for the partner nation (PN)."[13] Although the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) manages the SPP, all "SPP activities" are ". . . planned, coordinated, prioritized, and executed to achieve the theater campaign plan (TCP) objectives of the relevant GCC, taking into account the objectives of the relevant U.S. Chief of Mission (COM)."[14] However, even though the GCC and the COM approve engagements in the PN, the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) are guiding documents for the GCC, COM, and CNGB, as well.

Figure 2. NDNG-GAF CE with ANG Assistant and AFRICOM Religious Support Team[12]

In that regard, Pillar IV of the NSS is entitled, "Advance American Influence." Although the NSS discusses partners and partnerships throughout the document, Pillar IV of the NSS deals specifically with the foundations of the SPP. For example, in Pillar IV, President Donald Trump writes that "The United States offers partnership to those who share our aspirations for freedom and prosperity." President Trump writes further, "Our alliances, partnerships, and coalitions are built on free will and shared interests. When the United States partners with other states, we develop policies that enable us to achieve our goals while our partners achieve theirs."[15] The SPP was established for this very purpose; to create and sustain allies. General Joseph L. Lengyel (CNGB), says that "the goal of the SPP is developing and maintaining important security relationships between the United States and other nations sharing a long-term view of common interests."[16]

The NDS further reflects the NSS, and discusses, as well, the importance of allies and by connection the SPP. General Lengyel states, in the second line of effort (Strengthen Alliances and Attract New Partners)[17] that:

> Alliances and partnerships provide an enduring, asymmetric strategic advantage over our competitors. Working with allies maintains the favorable balance of power that deters aggression and promotes stability and economic growth. The DoD uses multiple tools to strengthen partnerships and alliances that include security assistance, security cooperation, military-to-military leader and staff engagement, and regional cooperation. The National Guard aligns with the joint force through these activities and adds a unique contribution through the State Partnership Program (SPP).[18]

For every event that is planned by the NDNG SPP, the SPPD and BAO work in concert with TAG, and ultimately the CNGB, to reflect the GCC security cooperation objectives, which, in turn, reflect America's national security goals. The planning and approval process for each SPP event, as described above, is the ideal way to put together a chaplain engagement while meeting the GCC security objectives and America's national security goals. This process does not come without its challenges.

Analysis of SPP Chaplain Engagements

The NDNG SPP chaplain engagements and those conducted by other states have similar strategic challenges. The first challenge is the challenge of culture, the culture of the PN, and the culture of the respective military components. When beginning a partnership with a foreign country, SPPs confront the strategic challenge of a country's culture. American chaplains know their military unit's culture and the culture of their respective military branches. They know, as well, the cultural context of their corresponding part of the United States. Finally, they understand the chaplaincy from an American perspective. Regarding this challenge, Director of the ANG Chaplaincy, Chaplain (Colonel) Mike Sproul, states, ". . . mistakes can happen when you go to your partner country and act like you are working with a fellow chaplain or a member of your American unit."[19]

Often at the beginning of an engagement, a meeting takes place between the SPP Chaplains and the host country. This meeting takes place ordinarily between the senior chaplain leaders and the senior military staff. A chaplain unaware or uninformed about how to meet and interact with a foreign leader, could unknowingly show disrespect or say something improper to the senior leader and thereby end an engagement before it even begins. The same scenario is true of working with any demographic of the population in the respective PN. Because of this, Chaplain (Colonel) Michael Klein, the former AFRICOM Command Chaplain, always warns chaplains of the tried and true adage that, ". . . in these highly strategic meetings and engagements, you never get a second chance to make a first impression."[20] So, preparation efforts are critical when planning for these international engagements.

Another example is that of religion. Although American chaplains volunteer to serve in a pluralistic military environment and train to serve in this type of environment, at times, like any professional, a chaplain can struggle with the very thing they train to do. In any given PN, a chaplain may encounter indigenous religions. In the NDNG SPP PNs, for example, Animistic Religions are prevalent and practiced concurrently with other religions. In these PNs, a chaplain not aware of a country's religious makeup or unprepared to engage in conversation with the PN in their area of faith and practice is a detriment to starting and sustaining a partnership. Instead of mutual learning and respect, the engagement can become challenging and potentially ends further engagements because of how the American chaplain engaged with the PN religious leader. In this strategic context, the chaplain may be conceptually and technically sound, but if they do not have the interpersonal skills that a strategic leader needs, as well, they fail before they begin.[21]

Regarding this challenge and others like it, at times, there are questions about NG Chaplaincy efforts and their preparedness for SPP international engagements. In other words, as a reserve component, how do they have the time and strategic capabilities to interact on the international stage? Additionally, once an engagement is complete, how does the SPP build on these efforts? Despite readiness concerns, the NG Chaplaincy has vital points of contact at the state, national and, international levels that help address these concerns. These individuals and how they support the NG Chaplaincy in this regard will be addressed later in the paper.

Another related challenge in the area of culture is the challenge of working in a military culture and setting that is multi-component, multi-service, and international. Chaplain (Colonel) Laurence Bazer, Deputy-Director - NBG Office of the Chaplain and NGB SPP representative, recounts an experience where he was speaking with new CCMD Religious Support Teams (RSTs) to brief them on the SPP. In his brief, it became apparent that some knew of the program, and others knew nothing of the SPP.[22] Chaplain (Captain) Wayne MacRae, Joint Staff Chaplain, facilitated this CCMD Religious Affairs Team training event for CCMD RSTs. He brought the RSTs together for this very purpose; to make them aware of relevant training and programs like the SPP so that they can function more effectively in their respective CCMDs.[23] With an active force that transitions frequently, there is a continuous need for education on the SPP and its capabilities in security cooperation efforts. Education is essential, as well, for SPP on the CCMD and their engagements. Without ongoing instruction like the one just mentioned, unity of effort will continue to be a challenge.

In the NG, the SPP is a known entity. As such, numerous Soldiers and Airmen have had the opportunity to participate in engagements in their PN. Although the SPP is a known quantity in the NG, the NG functions differently than the other components and services. Chaplain (Captain) MacRae, said that before serving in his current position that he was aware of SPP chaplain engagements, however, coming from a Navy background, he was unaware of a parallel to the SPP. Upon learning more about the SPP, he observed that the coordination of the SPP and CCMD efforts are not evenly nested across the board and deserved more attention.[24] For this reason, the AFRICOM Command Chaplain began conducting annual SPP chaplain training events where states with an African PN come together with their respective PN chaplain, the CCMD, and their subordinate elements in order to create unity of effort.[25]

At this cultural event, the active-duty personnel are exposed to NG SPP operations. In turn, the NG discovers how the active component is represented at the CCMD. Knowledge gained during these exchanges, such as the CCMD's objectives, lines of effort, and planned engagements in Africa, is essential for the NG as they work to synchronize efforts in future CEs. Finally, the African partners learn the differences between the NG and the active force and about the variety of engagements happening in Africa (SPP and Other). Because of the various cultures that the SPP interacts with, militarily, and internationally, there are ongoing challenges when conducting chaplain engagements. It is vital, then, that there are venues and programs like the latter and like the one mentioned earlier by Chaplain (Captain) MacRae to help everyone

involved speak a common language, which, in turn, bolsters unity of effort. As AFRICOM's approach to these efforts suggests, "If you want to go quickly, go alone. If you want to go far, go together."[26]

Working together leads to the next challenge for the SPP. As the NDNG SPP plans a face-to-face event six thousand miles away, how does the SPP work with everyone involved at a strategic level to plan this tactical event? Planning at this level is a constant challenge for several reasons. Although the NDNG SPP begins the planning process at the state level, time and distance are factors to overcome. The CCMD and PN day is ending as the NDNG SPP day is just beginning. To communicate at a basic level takes extra time. Another factor is that the NDNG SPP may begin planning for a chaplain engagement. During this process, it is likely that the CCMD or the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) have engagements scheduled, which are not mutually coordinated. This lack of synchronization creates friction, wastes time, and creates a lack of unity of effort.

Additionally, Chaplain (Colonel) Klein states that there are denominational groups with retired military chaplains conducting events on the African continent. From his perspective, it has not affected CCMD efforts and goals for the continent.[27] The NDNG SPP Chaplains encountered this in planning for two events, and in their case, it did affect planning and engagement. In one instance, a retired chaplain civilian-led group, unbeknownst to the NDNG SPP, conducted a chaplain military engagement with the same group of people that the NDNG Chaplains were going to engage with only five months later. Upon hearing this news, and with very little time to plan, the NDNG SPP chaplain engagement switched focus to build on what the civilian group presented to them. Changing the curriculum created more work, but in doing so, duplication of effort did not take place. The same thing happened the following year. Only this time, the NDNG SPP Chaplains found out ahead of time that this group was going to the respective PN. As a result, the NDNG SPP Chaplains were able to plan once for an event.

Again, strategic challenges abound from a cultural and planning perspective, yet even with these challenges, the SPP is a program of great opportunity. The first opportunity to discuss is that of "soft power."[28] According to Lieutenant Colonel Dawn Nichols, former BAO, and current branch chief in the International Affairs Division - NGB, says that

> Chaplains bring with them a great deal of trust, and chaplains have access where others do not. Soft power is valuable to a command team as they conduct key leader engagements with their PN. It is also valuable in PN exercises. For example, in countries where religion is a significant part of everyday life, bringing a chaplain along is a great way to show the PN that they value the country and their beliefs. It also brings a high degree of credibility to the team that enables further access and trust.[29]

Chaplain (Colonel) Sproul echoes this idea of soft power. He states that "Whenever a chaplain engages with their PN through the SPP, they bring soft power. For example, the chaplain can accompany a unit on a medical exercise or a key leader engagement." On these and other engagements, Chaplain (Colonel) Sproul says that the chaplain brings with them a unique skill set that "breaks down walls" and, better yet, makes powerful connections "that span time. In the end, chaplains build relationships, and because of these relationships, we help foster security for our nation and theirs."[30]

This topic of relationships leads to the next opportunity that the SPP brings, which, the active duty cannot bring. Chaplain (Colonel) Sproul says that a chaplain in the SPP brings, "Longevity. It is not uncommon for a chaplain in the SPP to begin a relationship with the PN Chaplaincy as a junior major. Over fifteen to twenty years, because of the SPP, the chaplain and PN build and sustain a relationship that cannot happen in any other branch of service."[31] The NDNG SPP Chaplaincy has experienced this scenario, as well. In fact, through twelve engagements, the NDNG Chaplains and the PN chaplaincies have engaged in meaningful ways for over a decade, thereby building and sustaining an enduring relationship. Because of the nature of active duty and moving every two to three years, these types of relationships cannot happen. In the SPP, this type of relationship is common. These long-term relationships lend to unity of effort.

Because the respective NG SPP and their PN can build on each successive engagement, they can be a vital resource to a new CCMD Chaplain. When a CCMD Chaplain arrives in their new area of responsibility, utilizing SPP Chaplaincies as a resource to begin planning efforts goes toward achieving unity of effort. First, the CCMD Chaplains have an avenue whereby they find out important points of contact in the respective PNs and SPP. Second, they can find out the history of engagements in the PN, which helps reduce duplication of effort by the SPP and the CCMD. Continuity is a strength that the NG SPP can bring to the respective CCMD Chaplains and their subordinate chaplaincies as they support the security cooperation goals of that geographic region and country.

Three Vital Elements to Enhance Unity of Effort

Although continuity is a strength of the SPP, three specific elements are vital to enhancing continuity of effort and, by connection, unity of effort from a multi-component and multi-service perspective. The first is the significant role and function of the BAO. Second, are some critical points of contact that are extremely important in making connections across the components and services. Finally, there are some tools which would augment continuity and unity of effort.

While Chaplain (Captain) MacRae does not question the engagements themselves, he questions the unity of effort and coordination between SPP efforts and CCMDs to achieve optimal results and decrease duplication of efforts.[32] The reality is that duplication of effort in engagements happens on occasion because chaplaincy relationships are not in place at the various levels. Although engagement coordination and connection efforts vary, a vital common denominator to help unify this effort is the BAO.[33] The BAO is an expert concerning the capabilities and

limitations of the NG and the SPP. The BAO understands the NG and is a field grade officer with extensive operational experience who is ready to work at the strategic level.

In the case of the NDNG SPP, the current and former BAOs are from the Judge Advocate General Corps. Although they do not have extensive operational experience like other BAOs, they have the conceptual, technical, and interpersonal capabilities to interact at the strategic level.[34] Due to this level of experience and knowledge, they are a force multiplier. In that regard, because they are the face of the NG SPP in the PN, they are conduits of information back to the state regarding the needs of the PN and how they match up with the SPP. They are an integral part of every engagement.

When an event finally comes together, the BAO shepherds the event from beginning to end while working with SPP, active duty, or joint team engagements. They are also vital in that when the engagement team arrives in the PN, they brief them on cultural aspects of the engagement so that the team has a successful event, which directly addresses the readiness concern mentioned earlier. They inform the team of protocol when meeting with military leaders, as well as the security aspects of the PN. Many times, the BAO will introduce the engagement team, as well as participate in the opening and closing ceremonies. Finally, on every engagement, the BAO is a resource to step in or call at any time to work through challenges that may arise.

The BAO is equally essential to the country team in the embassy where they work. In the case of the NDNG SPP, the BAO works in one embassy daily and frequently travels to the other two embassies to coordinate engagement efforts in those countries. The BAO is the vital link and face of the SPP to all these entities throughout the planning process. The BAO works as a part of the respective country teams and then interfaces with the PN to coordinate engagement efforts.[35] Throughout these efforts, the BAO is also the face of the NG to the country teams and the PN. They carry the responsibility of being the bridge of information to a variety of different people and teams.

Finally, the BAO is an essential connection to the desk officer at the CCMD.[36] This connection addresses the multi-component challenge of planning and conducting events. When the NDNG SPP chaplain engagements are in the planning process, the chaplains rely on the BAO and their connection to the desk officer. Because of this relationship and connection, the BAO can find out information on the status of approved engagements and what other chaplain engagements are on the schedule and relay that information to the NDNG Chaplains. This connection also helps to deconflict the planning and coordination of events.

The BAO is a vital connection in significant ways when planning and directing SPP chaplain engagements. They also address the concern of NG Chaplaincy preparedness in that they are one tool whereby the NG Chaplaincy is made ready to engage in the PN. Their work has, and continues to make strategic impacts. There are other critical points of contact, as well, when an SPP chaplain is planning and conducting events across the components and services.

The SPP chaplain engagements do not happen in a vacuum. Many people play a role. The ANG Assistant to the Command Chaplain (AFRICOM) is one of the most significant and has been in existence for several years through the National Guard Assistance Program (NGAP) for AFRICOM. This position's equities in AFRICOM are largely SPP and working that program from a national and international perspective. This ANG Assistant is valuable for several reasons. First and foremost, the ANG Assistant is a traditional guardsman. Because of this, they speak the language of the NG, understand the NG culture, understand their capabilities, and where the NG faces challenges.

Most importantly, however, this position understands the challenges of balancing a full-time position outside of the NG while engaging as a chaplain on a part-time basis, as all traditional NG members must do. Because of this knowledge and understanding, this position is well suited to serve as an advisor and point of contact for NG SPP and their respective chaplain engagements. This position, like the BAO, can and do aid tremendously in preparedness and unity of effort for SPP Chaplaincies.

Relatedly, in addition to the information and advisory this role plays for the SPP Chaplains, the ANG Assistant's direct connection to the AFRICOM Command Chaplain is also significant for unity of effort. Recently, at the direction of AFRICOM Command Chaplain, Chaplain (Colonel) Jack Stumme, the ANG Assistant is now the prescribed link through which all SPP coordination will take place. Chaplain (Colonel) Stumme writes that the ANG Assistant ". . . is the SPP touch point," for SPP Chaplains "to the AFRICOM Chaplain's office for strategic and operational issues and information."[37] From the NG chaplain perspective, this is beneficial guidance that focuses chaplain efforts through one point of contact. As indicated earlier, when strategically planning for an event across time and space, efforts can be challenging. Having a designated point of contact at the CCMD is essential, and utilizing this position for all NG SPP chaplain efforts will benefit all service components in planning and coordination throughout the CCMD.

Ultimately, this position will continue to support NG SPP Chaplains as they engage on the continent. In this capacity, the ANG Assistant can represent AFRICOM during the engagements and carry this information back to AFRICOM. Concurrently, the PNs see unity of effort from the American military.[38] From the NDNG SPP Chaplaincy perspective, when the PN sees separate engagements from the American military, this creates the appearance of division. In the words of the African proverb quoted earlier, "If you want to go quickly, go alone. If you want to go far, go together."[39]

Another key figure that is vital in the goal of achieving unity of effort and preparedness for SPP CEs is the Deputy-Director, NGB - Office of the Chaplain. This position, like the ANG Assistant, is an essential point of contact for NG SPP Chaplains. The Deputy-Director works at NGB and, like the ANG Assistant, speaks

the language of the NG, understands the NG culture, their capabilities, and where the NG faces challenges. For example, the ongoing challenge of balancing state chaplaincy efforts with the additional SPP events overseas.[40] Also, the Deputy-Director knows the NG SPP Chaplains conducting engagements throughout the CCMDs. Additionally, the Deputy-Director can join NG SPP Chaplains on their respective engagements. The Deputy-Director joined with Chaplain (Colonel-Retired) Andrew Aquino (Ohio NG) on an engagement to their PN Serbia. Like the ANG Assistant, this position not only knows about NG SPP chaplain engagements; they participate in them. Their participation is well received by the PN and models unity of effort for everyone involved.[41]

The Deputy-Director is a vital source of information and connection for SPP Chaplains, as well as a critical advisor to the NG SPP Chaplains as they plan and prepare for and conduct engagements. Consequently, throughout the planning process, the Deputy-Director should be appraised so that they can be aware of the event, give advice where needed, and make the vital linkages to key supports (people and information) along the way.

One of these vital links is to the CCMD Chaplains. The Deputy-Director regularly connects with the CCMD Chaplains both individually and collectively. As mentioned earlier, the Deputy-Director recently engaged jointly with the CCMD Chaplains at an education event facilitated by the Joint Staff Chaplain. At this meeting, he shared with them the premise of the SPP and how NG Chaplains are an asset to them as they work throughout the respective CCMDs. Mainly, he shared with them the SPP and how NG Chaplains can engage with them to meet the security cooperation goals of the GCC and COM.[42] Through these connections, this position creates and sustains vital contacts that benefit both the CCMDs and the SPP, thereby fostering unity of effort.

The one disadvantage to these positions is that they only consist of one person. The ANG Assistant is a traditional guardsman and has another full-time position outside of the NG. The Deputy-Director is full-time, but only has a staff of one person to help him with a myriad of responsibilities. While adding personnel in the office would help with NG SPP chaplain engagements strategic efforts, this office remains a vital conduit for NG SPP Chaplains in all readiness efforts. Despite their small footprint, these positions are invaluable to achieving unity of effort and ultimately conducting quality events. Most importantly, because of their strategic connections, they can shepherd the NG SPP Chaplains through the planning and coordination process, making all the necessary connections.

In addition to the necessary connections, there are some tools, which would augment continuity, unity of effort, and preparedness for engagements. Because NG Chaplaincy efforts run the continuum, a tool that would help SPP CEs in AFRICOM, or any CCMD for that matter, is a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). Whether new or established, an SOP would be a helpful tool for the NG chaplain to use as a guiding effort. While an SOP cannot spell out every detail, the SOP can provide guiding rules, principles, and strategies to follow when beginning or sustaining efforts with a PN. For example, when the NDNG SPP Chaplaincy began conducting engagements, it took them time to learn the process, procedures of putting together an engagement, the key people to coordinate with, and how to align these efforts at a strategic level with the CCMD.

NG Chaplaincy efforts in AFRICOM are at varying stages of development, as well, from new to enduring. Chaplain (Colonel) Myrtle Bowen states that of the "fourteen partnerships on the African continent, some are just beginning, and others are well established in the SPP. This reality is very exciting for all parties involved."[43] An established SOP would go a long way towards providing continuity and unity of effort in CEs.

The SOP should be put together through the joint effort of the Deputy-Director, the ANG Assistant, and SPP Chaplains of the respective CCMD. This document should be reviewed bi-annually for inputs and updates so that, whether new or seasoned, the NG Chaplaincy has a reference whereby they can conduct quality events. With the help of these guiding rules, principles, and strategies, the NG SPP chaplain can begin on the right azimuth, all the while keeping at the forefront the strategic nature of each event. Such a document would bolster continuity and unity of effort in all engagements.

The final way that the military chaplaincy

can achieve unity of effort is through a shared repository of information to include a calendar of potential events. AFRICOM Chaplains and their subordinate elements conduct engagements on the continent. With fourteen NG SPP Chaplains also conducting engagements in Africa, unity of effort is necessary so that whether these events happen jointly or individually, everyone is aware of what is going on and can prepare accordingly. A repository of information would help in several ways to achieve unity of effort.

First, when planning an event, everyone involved can look at what might be happening and can better coordinate efforts. Knowing the plan, this might also include joining efforts with another component to conduct a joint engagement. Second, if one component knows that an engagement has taken place, they can find information on the event and what took place. They can then use that information to tailor their event accordingly so as not to duplicate effort. Duplication of effort, even if unknown at the time, does not help strategic efforts in the respective PN. Finally, a repository of information would give chaplaincy components ideas of curriculum and capabilities that they could use as they prepare to engage in another country. In this case, duplication of effort is a positive thing. Since the active force moves every few years, this repository would help them build on past efforts. For NG SPP Chaplains, this repository would serve as a place to glean information and a place to put historical data. Because of the transitory nature of the active force, this repository of information should reside on a military website where all parties can give and receive information.

Conclusion

In the end, information and communication are vital in all efforts to plan and conduct NG SPP Chaplain engagements throughout the CCMDs. For the NG Chaplaincy to succeed in these efforts, it will take great intentionality and coordination to meet and overcome challenges that arise. Despite the challenges, since 1993,[44] the NG SPP has had the opportunity to successfully build enduring relationships with eighty-five nations' militaries and security forces (seventy-eight partnerships) in a variety of disciplines in support of the CCDRs and COM security cooperation objectives.[45] CEs with PNs chaplaincies and even those without a chaplaincy continue to be an essential part of these efforts. While the NG conducts CEs in their partnered country, other CEs take place, as well, at times, from the CCMD, their subordinate elements, and civilian organizations conducting similar activities. While many entities are doing good work, sometimes together and sometimes separate, unity of effort is essential to developing and sustaining enduring international security relationships. Three vital elements can further strengthen current strategic efforts.

The first is the significant role and function of the BAO that fosters connection, preparedness, and unity effort for NG SPP CEs, the PN, the CCMD, and the Ambassador/ Country Team. Second, are some critical points of contact that are vital in making connections for SPP Chaplains. These points of contact are the ANG Assistant to the Command Chaplain (AFRICOM) and the Deputy-Director - NBG Office of the Chaplain. They serve in crucial roles where they can advise and prepare SPP Chaplains for PN engagements and interactions with the respective Services. Finally, this paper discussed developing an SOP for CE efforts, as well as a repository of information that will help reduce duplication of effort. Most importantly, they will foster readiness and unity of effort for any CE. These three things, if followed, will bolster CE efforts in any CCMD.

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Joint Force Headquarters Chaplain/Staff Chaplain, North Dakota Army National Guard (NDARNG)

CH Johnson assumed his duties as the Joint Force Headquarters Chaplain in October 2018. For more than 16 years, he has also served as Staff Chaplain for the NDARNG. While serving in this capacity, CH Johnson has led NDARNG Chaplaincy State Partnership Program (SPP) efforts to coordinate and lead engagements to the African countries of Ghana, Togo, and Benin. CH Johnson is a 2020 graduate of the United States Army War College. While at War College, he wrote his strategic research project on the challenges and opportunities regarding these strategic engagements. In his paper, he also explores ways to improve coordination of SPP efforts with partner countries and multi-component and multi-service efforts.

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From Morality to Lethality:

Moral Development Training's Role in Increasing Soldier Resiliency

by Chaplain (Major) Daniel A. Chase

The Global War on Terrorism and other unique challenges over the past few decades have compelled government and military leaders to redirect strategic efforts to meet emergent threats. Through valuable input from leaders at both the tactical and organizational levels, strategists have begun an earnest focus on training for Large-Scale Combat Operations and equipment modernization to enhance survivability and lethality on the battlefield. This focus has naturally led to an increased emphasis of Soldier resilience, which continues to stimulate discussion throughout the Army. As one senior leader observed, "Our most valued assets, indeed, the Nation's most valued assets, are our Soldiers….Our collective strength depends on our people—their mental and physical resilience is at our core."[1] Army strategy must expand its emphasis on resilience by introducing moral development doctrine and implementing comprehensive moral development training in the institutional domain.

Issue

After stepping off the bus at Basic Combat Training, new recruits immediately greet determined and unforgiving drill sergeants who rudely welcome them with a barrage of unpleasantries: "Stop talking! You'd better hurry up! Drop and give me 20!" Designed to command and instill discipline while recruits are young and impressionable, this approach gradually simmers down over the course of training as they increase in their humility and teachability. In a way, it seems that the common objective of those entrusted to train our future Soldiers is to "break" them as a cowboy would "break" a horse. In other words, strip them of their selfishness and prejudice and mold them into obedient machines. While Basic Combat Training generally seems to accomplish these purposes—as evidenced by an annual attrition rate of less than 15 percent[2]—it seems that it just cannot master Soldier resilience. This deficiency or gap has confounded leaders at all levels and compelled them to invest large amounts of time and money in understanding how resilience enables individual and collective combat readiness.

The Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness program, established by General George Casey in 2008,[3] represents one such investment. Designed to help Soldiers and Families develop preventative strategies and life skills to overcome adversity,[4] the program encourages individuals to build on five dimensions—the "Five Dimensions of Strength"—which include physical, spiritual, emotional, social, and family.[5] Through periodic self-reflection and online assessments, individuals appraise themselves in each of these dimensions and make adjustments as necessary to achieve balance and holistic fitness. The most identifiable component of the program is Master Resiliency Training, which the Army launched in 2009[6] to help participants develop competencies and skills such as goal setting, problem solving, and constructive responding.[7] Though the Army reported that the program is working well,[8] others have concluded that the training has only had small[9] to moderate[10] effects. The dissonance between these findings suggests that a more comprehensive evaluation is needed. More importantly, it stresses the need for the Army to magnify its efforts in identifying readiness gaps and proposing feasible and suitable solutions to overcome those gaps. The Army Modernization Strategy represents a means to do so.

Established in the beginning of Fiscal Year 20, the strategy highlights six priorities in which the Army will invest.[11] One of these priorities is Soldier Lethality, the goal of which is to "enhance the Soldier and squads [sic] ability to fight, win, and survive through increased lethality, mobility,

protection, and situational awareness in order to facilitate rapid acquisition of increased capabilities."[12] Though current solutions of streamlining equipment such as squad weapons and night vision devices[13] will undoubtedly make Soldiers more deadly on the battlefield, true lethality materializes only when Soldiers are prepared and confident to respond positively to adversity. Simply put, the more resilient a Soldier, the more lethal he will be. Developing resilience, though, is easier said than done.

The Army Values represent a valuable blueprint that Soldiers can use to not only guide their military service but facilitate resilience that can lead to this lethality. If regularly heeded, they can reinforce or build on Soldiers' individual values and magnify their ability to succeed. Figuratively speaking, they symbolize solid cornerstones, which collectively represent the foundation upon which Soldiers develop themselves as leaders. To obtain *high* resilience, a Soldier must build upon that foundation through the process of moral development, which "refers to age-related changes in the thoughts and emotions that guide individuals' ideas of right and wrong and how they and others should act."[14] As we see from the following examples, however, many Soldiers tend to lay their foundation of Army Values but then simply put down their hammers and leave the worksite.

For many, the most glaring example of moral development deficiency is the missteps made by seemingly infallible leaders like General David Petraeus, former 101st Airborne Division commander and Central Intelligence Agency director, whose infidelity and mishandling of classified documents[15] resulted in an unexpected fall from grace. Such evidence explicitly underscores "the many examples of men who show great determination as junior officers, but lose it as they rise in rank."[16] A second example of moral deficiency is Soldier delinquency and misconduct, which can range from minor offenses such as insubordination and substance abuse to criminal activity such as sexual assault and violence. Such indiscipline compels commanders to mete out punishments to Soldiers, often returning them to the civilian workforce with discharges that prevent them from securing competitive jobs and salaries. More importantly, though, it creates a vacancy in the unit and negatively affects cohesion and morale. The suicide epidemic[17] represents yet another piece of evidence that points to a moral development deficiency. The Army reported 139 suicides in 2018, or 43 percent of the 325[18] total servicemembers who took their lives. With trends moving in the wrong direction,[19] the Army Chief of Staff recently pledged to make people his main priority.[20] These examples are only a handful of the many moral development deficiencies within today's Army. It is critical that Army officials and strategists examine these and other deficiencies and take deliberate steps to correct them.

Recommended Approach

Developing a practical solution to increase the moral development of Soldiers may seem rather lofty. Providing an inclusive definition is hard enough. Even then, the definition may inevitably prompt some to philosophize about its ambiguity instead of moving on to more important matters. Others might question the motive, arguing that morality is relative and the Army should not subject Soldiers to moral development training and/or experiments. Despite these and other limitations, moral development remains a relevant topic that has significant implications for Soldier Lethality. The Army must begin now to prioritize it as an effort and proactively seek ways to make it inherent in Soldier readiness. In other words, it must become as much a part of their character as the Army Values on which they rely to guide them in their holistic learning and growth. The end state is to generate an Army whose Soldiers are more lethal because of their moral resilience and fluency.

Two DOTMLPF-P domains can assist Army strategists in developing solutions for this gap. Using the training domain, they can develop potential solutions pertaining to when, where, and how formal moral development training should occur. Using the doctrine domain, they can determine whether existing doctrine is sufficient and whether the Army should augment the guidelines and regulations or replace them altogether. While both domains would enable strategists to propose attainable solutions, I would recommend the training domain for two primary reasons. First, looking at the gap through a training lens would enable solutions that reinforce the importance of collective moral development training. In other words, teaching moral development would be more effective in a group setting, where Soldiers would be able to share experiences and insights with one another. Second, it would enable solutions that focus on bringing moral development to the forefront of readiness conversations—ultimately making it as trendy and popular as the buzzword "resilience."

Training Solution

Training is a part of a Soldier's daily regimen—he does it every day. From conducting Physical Readiness Training (PRT) to performing preventative maintenance on a vehicle to participating in a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) at one of the Army's Combat Training Centers (CTCs), a Soldier has a daily opportunity to increase in knowledge and proficiency. Indeed, "unit training and leader development are the Army's life-blood,"[21] to the extent that the Army remains "committed to training, educating, and developing its leaders…to lead units in the complex and challenging operational environments of the twenty-first century."[22]

Learning occurs throughout a Soldier's enlistment and career through one of three training domains. The institutional domain includes initial entry training and professional military education provided at venues such as centers of excellence and schools and installations affiliated with Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).[23] In the operational domain, a Soldier receives training as part of a unit which engages in tactical and non-tactical activities either at home station or in a deployed environment.[24] Finally, the self-development domain includes individual efforts to set and achieve personal goals, increase competency and proficiency, and supplement learning

obtained in the other two domains.[25] The comprehensive moral development training I propose will focus on the institutional domain and include several objectives—the achievement or failure of which will determine the solution's efficacy.

First and foremost, the training must reinforce and build on the Army Values. It is essential that the Soldier recognize that the Army Values are just a foundation—that there is more to learning and growth than adhering to attributes such as Loyalty, Duty, and Respect. The training must clearly emphasize that moral development represents the continued building process which shapes and forms one's character. Second, the training must help Soldiers understand that moral development is inherent to their growth as social beings. It must provide them with opportunities to reflect on how their virtues, beliefs, and attitudes have influenced and will continue to influence them as leaders. While failure to achieve these two criteria will render the solution ineffective, the following considerations are not catastrophic. However, they represent means by which training can obtain its desired effect.

For example, training should include discussions of and case studies about leaders who have demonstrated exemplary duty and service in their personal and professional lives. It should urge them to identify and emulate leaders or other individuals whose positive attributes epitomize good leadership. In addition, the training should instill a desire in Soldiers to pursue further growth. It should motivate them to engage in self-development opportunities such as pursuing civilian education, reading military and leadership literature, and developing extracurricular skills. Finally, the training should help Soldiers understand the necessity of moral accountability. In addition to teaching them the importance of accepting responsibility for their actions, it should stress the benefit of having accountability partners who consistently model good behavior and discipline.

Considering what must and should result from moral development training is only part of assessing the proposed solution. Another important step is to determine the potential benefits. For example, the training could increase individual and collective resilience. Though the trainee would have to apply the training he received to do so, the process of using the training at work or at home would undoubtedly make him and his unit stronger. Similarly, application of the training could increase combat readiness: it would enable Soldiers to prepare themselves and their units in the five domains mentioned earlier: physical, emotional, spiritual, social, and family. Finally, it has the potential to increase trust, which doctrine defines as the "bedrock of our profession."[26]

Doctrine Solution

Since the inception of our nation, doctrine has been fundamental to the Army's efforts to pursue peace at home and fight battles abroad.[27] Defined as "the body of professional knowledge that guides how Soldiers perform tasks related to the Army's role,"[28] it remains critical to our readiness and the way we fight.[29] Without it, the Army cannot achieve key objectives as prescribed by documents such as the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and the Army Strategic Planning Guidance.

Doctrine, then, is not merely reference material kept on a shelf and consulted only when a question or problem appears. Neither is it exclusive literature or philosophy designed only for senior leaders. Too many Soldiers, however, view doctrine in this light. Those who consider doctrine as complex, irrelevant, or boring often do not choose to put it on their shelves. For those who do, many must figuratively and literally blow the dust off the cover that has accumulated because of neglect. Efforts to simplify and condense doctrine—such as publishing Army Doctrine Publications (ADPs)—have helped change some of these perceptions, but it is only a start. The Army must continue to place increased emphasis on doctrine so that Soldiers and leaders understand what it is, why it's important,[30] and how it can enable them to become more proficient and ready. In short, "the lives of the men and women who make up the Army—not to mention the security of the state—rely on all Soldiers and leaders to be proficient in the Army's body of professional knowledge: doctrine."[31]

In addition to encouraging the employment of existing doctrine, the Army must also continue to develop and introduce new doctrine in areas that need clarification or lack professional knowledge altogether. Moral development is an area that certainly falls into the latter category, evidenced by resiliency doctrine's surprising omission of the subject. To facilitate readiness, the Army must recognize moral development as an essential ingredient to resiliency and develop comprehensive doctrine that lays

the foundation for individual and collective growth. As it implements the doctrine, several measures will indicate whether the solution achieves or falls short of the intent.

First, the doctrine must provide an unambiguous definition of moral development—one that not only simplifies the often-nebulous concept of morality, but connects it to the concept of development. In other words, it must carefully integrate the two constructs to prevent confusion and misunderstanding. The doctrine must also describe how moral development is critical to decision making. It must explain the correlation between moral maturity and the ability to make decisions based on sound judgment— especially in the context of ethical decisions. The doctrine will need to discuss in detail the process of moral development and perhaps even offer step-by-step instructions of how to reach a desired level. If doctrine fails to achieve these purposes, it will inevitably fail to accomplish its goals. That is not to say, however, that it will fail completely. Doctrine implementation could benefit the force in at least two ways.

First, it could help leaders better understand their subordinates. As leaders engage in meaningful discussions with Soldiers and become aware of their background, personalities, and ambitions, they will recognize how their moral development has shaped them over time and how it may enable their future growth. Second, doctrine could prompt further research of the correlations between resilience and moral development as well as stimulate discussion to anticipate future challenges and solutions.

Operational Concept

A dialogue on moral development is both relevant and timely as Army leaders have identified gaps in Soldier readiness and taken steps to correct them. One report, for example, highlights efforts to extend Initial Entry Training instruction to produce Soldiers who are more disciplined and fit.[32] With leaders fully engaged and concerned about institutional learning, the time is now to make the case for formal moral development training. It is time to invest in the Soldier and his career by providing comprehensive moral development training in the institutional domain then reinforcing it through periodic training in the operational domain.

Offering moral development instruction during Initial Entry Training would require fewer fiscal resources and would capitalize on the Soldiers' willingness and eagerness to learn. However, it would also provide the instruction out of context—without Soldiers experiencing the "real" or operational Army. A better, but more costly, approach would be to return them to their respective Centers of Excellence or equivalent at the 12- to 24-month mark to discuss moral development within the context of their duties and responsibilities. Though Soldiers would receive periodic refreshers in the operational domain throughout their career, this one-time institutional training would provide 30-40 hours of instruction delivered by experts from both the civilian sector and operational Army. Civilian experts might include social scientists such as psychologists and sociologists or even civic leaders, clergy, and law enforcement personnel who interact daily with people and their moral development challenges. Military experts might include chaplains, JAG officers, and other officers and NCOs who have gained expertise through years of experience and observance. Instructors will receive certification after they complete the existing Master Resiliency Training as well as a local moral development course taught by faculty of an adjacent college or university.

The training will begin with a discussion of frameworks, such as Piaget's Theory of Moral Development, which examines the way people understand rules, moral responsibility, and justice.[33] Students will discuss in depth the theory's two types of thinking—moral realism and moral relativism[34]— and will reflect on personal experiences in which these principles have informed their decision making for good or for bad. They will also study Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development, which centers on the decision process with regards to a moral dilemma.[35] Students will explore Kohlberg's three levels of moral reasoning and will test themselves using the Heinz Dilemma, a vignette that prompts the learner to determine if the fictional Heinz should receive punishment for breaking into a drugstore to obtain a drug that would save his dying wife from cancer.[36] Both of these frameworks would undoubtedly help Soldiers assess their level of moral reasoning and understand that moral development is a critical part of their growth. After discussion of these frameworks, the training will highlight leader attributes and reinforce the virtues that Soldiers have learned through their personal experiences. The training will deliberately and methodically introduce fundamental principles with careful consideration for Soldiers who came from disadvantaged backgrounds where virtues and morals may not have been taught.

Soldiers who complete the training with a resolve to embrace moral development as a resilience tool may provide an initial indication that the training was successful. To determine true efficacy, however, the Army would need to conduct longitudinal research, following Soldiers throughout their career to learn if applying the principles of moral development has helped them become better leaders.

Concept of Change

Implementing this type of training will undeniably raise many eyebrows and provoke criticism, skepticism, and doubt. With an increased focus on force modernization to rapidly build an Army with more skilled and lethal Soldiers, some may argue that a resource- and time-constrained environment simply does not allow for such training. Yes, it will require fiscal resources, to include compensation and disbursement for curriculum materials, instructor employment, certification, and research. It will require physical space at a TRADOC-based location whose students may compete for classrooms and other needs. It will drive a requirement for qualified instructors such as chaplains and Master Resilience Trainers, and compel comprehensive assessments and longitudinal studies by experienced researchers. Each of these requirements will inevitably produce second- and third-order effects, which may

have a significant impact throughout the force. The potential need for more chaplains is a good illustration.

The second-order effect of such training, for example, would likely compel the Chaplain Corps to send chaplains out of cycle to become certified instructors. That, in turn, may necessitate the creation of more chaplain billets, which not only affects chaplain recruiting but other priorities as well. Employing Force Integration Functional Area (FIFA) analysis, this seemingly simple consideration yields significant implications. First, it will impact manning, which involves painstaking efforts to not only identify chaplains to fill the newly-created billets, but also to maintain Unit Ministry Team readiness at the unit level. Achieving a balance between the two may become especially difficult during times of high operational tempo, in which the Army places higher priority on ensuring units meet MTOE (Modification Table of Organization and Equipment) authorizations. Second, it will impact organizational structuring, which would necessitate further efforts such as an additional DOTMLPF analysis and Force Design Update to modify personnel authorizations at training venues.

Despite FIFA analysis results, proper justification can demonstrate that the proposed training is not only feasible, acceptable, and suitable, but that it has the potential to enable Soldier Lethality and meet other objectives as outlined in the Army's Modernization Strategy. Such justification should come from stakeholders and investors of the training, who must develop a persuasive impact statement and communicate it throughout the Force Management process. From a training solution perspective, the impact statement is rather straightforward: the inattention and indifference to comprehensive moral development training will limit and hinder individual growth and prevent Soldiers from becoming capable and resilient leaders on the 21st century battlefield.

Understanding the Players

Developing and implementing training that will make Soldiers more lethal, more prepared, and more capable of meeting the challenges of an ever-evolving military will require a collaborative effort by a number of individuals and organizations. These include, but are not limited to, policymakers and strategists at the national level, experts in the educational and research communities, and Soldiers and leaders at the Army's tactical level.

TRADOC's efforts are key to the beginning of the process. After it identifies the moral development training gap through the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System (JCIDS) process, TRADOC sends its recommended solution to the HQDA G3/5/7 and Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) for respective validation and approval.[37] After the Army staff determines during FIFA analysis that the solution is feasible, acceptable, and suitable,[38] and after approval by the CSA, TRADOC begins its work applying the solution in cooperation with moral development experts. As mentioned earlier, these experts will likely include social scientists and other researchers who have studied moral development within the military context and can collaborate with the Army Research Institute (ARI) in developing a comprehensive curriculum. They would then examine the efficacy of the training through cross-sectional and longitudinal studies.

The next step would include instructor training and certification, wherein trainees not only learn how to teach the material, but how they can leverage resources such as chaplains and behavioral health professionals to reinforce their instruction and provide other perspectives. With G-8 analysis, budgeting, and funding, and with Congressional endorsement and support, TRADOC would then implement the training at Army Centers of Excellence, regularly apprising Army Futures Command of its efforts.

Sustainable Readiness

Though moral development training will provide a framework through which Soldiers may build upon existing virtues and attributes, it can and will do much more. From a Sustainable Readiness perspective, one can assume that if Soldiers apply what they learn from training, they decrease the likelihood of making poor moral decisions. That, in turn, will likely maintain or increase morale and reduce strain on commands who must often devote time and effort to administering non-judicial punishment. It will also reduce costs associated with human resource support and the provision of health care such as behavioral health treatment and substance abuse counseling. The overarching benefit of the training, however, is that it is universal—it applies whether a Soldier and his unit are in the mission module preparing to deploy or if they are in the ready module conducting day-to-day activities. That is not to say, however, that training does not present Sustainable Readiness concerns. Funding over the long term will likely prompt scrutiny and criticism if it fails to deliver on its promises to increase Soldier readiness and lethality. Additionally, Soldiers may become disinterested and apathetic over time if instructors fail to adapt the training to their current needs and circumstances. Training must continue to solicit feedback and implement innovative changes if it desires to remain relevant.

Hasty Solutions

Because approval and implementation of moral development training may take time, the Army must begin now to employ hasty solutions to initiate the training at the Soldier level. One hasty solution is to solicit white papers and research that may augment and/or clarify existing moral development theory and provide direction for curriculum development. Another hasty solution is to coach Master Resilience Trainers in moral development fundamentals and then encourage them to apply those fundamentals during their resilience briefings and classes. Yet another hasty solution is to enlist the help of chaplains or other professionals—to include retirees and military spouses—who would willingly devote their personal time and expertise to conducting research, developing curriculum, and even leading training. Though such solutions would not enable the training to immediately bridge the moral development gap, they would unarguably stimulate leaders to reconsider

and revamp the Army's approach to building a more competent, lethal force.

Conclusion

The Army needs Soldiers who can confidently endure the challenges of Large-Scale Combat Operations and who remain ready to engage near-peer threats in multiple domains. To support this effort, the Army must incorporate moral development doctrine into its resilience training and deliver moral development training in the institutional domain. As Soldiers apply this doctrine and training using moral development as a framework, they will grow into leaders of character who can become catalysts for change. Ultimately, they will help generate a lethal force that remains poised and prepared to "deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat."[39]

Chaplain (MAJ) Daniel A. Chase

Chaplain, 1st Infantry Division Sustainment Brigade

CH Chase assumed his duties in June 2020 as the Sustainment Brigade chaplain in Ft. Riley's 1st Infantry Division after graduating from the Army's Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, KS. During his 2018-2019 assignment as the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery chaplain, he attended the week-long Strategic Leader Development Course at Ft. Hamilton, NY, where he and his team developed a proposal to address holistic care across the Corps. His company-grade assignments include battalions in the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade (Republic of Korea) and in the 1st Cavalry Division and 25th Infantry Division. CH Chase is endorsed by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.

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Past and Present Issues Facing Women in the Military Chaplaincy:

Historical Progress that Calls for Continued Change

by Chaplain (Major) David Christensen

There is no doubt the laws and policies providing women equal opportunity to serve in the U.S. military are a complete reversal from the historical laws and policies preventing their service. However, official regulations cannot and often have not changed how men in uniform think about and behave towards women in uniform. The U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy Chaplain Corps struggle with this incongruity between policy and practice. While history shows a significant positive change in the opportunity for women serving as chaplains, the women who serve today still perceive significant discrimination from their male peers. Research on the story of the first woman to serve as a chaplain during the Civil War, the reflections of one of the first women serving after policies changed to enable service in the 1970s, and an anonymous survey of women serving today substantiate this incongruity between historical progress and behavioral change in the Chaplain Corps. There is no reason to accept this inequity of treatment. Building on the historical change in policies, the Chaplain Corps can and should make changes to improve the treatment of women in the ranks.

The First Female Chaplain

Ellen E. Gibson Hobart was the first woman to serve in the U.S. military as a chaplain. Ella, as she was known, married John Hobart shortly after the Battle of Bull Run in 1961. Both were former Methodists that converted to spiritualism, and both desired to provide service to the United States war effort. John was elected chaplain for the 8th Wisconsin regiment and served with the unit through the end of the war. Ella did not initially seek the opportunity to serve as a chaplain. Instead, she threw herself into work for soldiers' aid societies and the U.S. Sanitary Commission. It was through this work that Ella caught the attention of Wisconsin Governor James Lewis.[1]

In 1864, Lewis offered Ella a commission as a chaplain if she could find a Wisconsin unit that desired her service. Ella took the governor at his word, did her research on the various Wisconsin units, and found her best chance would be with the 1st Wisconsin Heavy Artillery. She immediately went to work serving the soldiers filling the companies of the regiment at Camp Randall. When the commander arrived, she presented him with a denominational endorsement. Having already heard of her work with the soldiers, COL Meservey confirmed the governor's offer of a commission and Ella began to serve as their chaplain in an official capacity just prior to the regiment moving south to Washington.[2]

The ministry of Hobart was not without issues. Her issues were not with the command or soldiers accepting a woman as their chaplain. All accounts point to the unit fully accepting and supporting Ella as their chaplain through the discharge of the unit at the end of June 1865. Ella

distinguished herself with tireless ministry due to the spread-out locations of her companies.[3] Her issue was with the war department recognizing her as a chaplain and paying her for her service. Hobart went so far as to meet personally with President Lincoln to plead her case. Lincoln wrote her a note implying, but not explicitly stating, his support. Yet the Secretary of War barely recognized her request and then denied it because it could set a precedent.[4] The officers of her unit then unanimously voted to elect her their chaplain, and COL Meservey appointed her by general order. Unfortunately, Governor Lewis refused to commission her without the support of the War Department. The War Department continued to refuse to muster Hobart and even the attempt of Lewis to get Congress to pass a special law permitting her to serve failed.[5]

Ella continued her honorable service with the unit as their chaplain until the discharge of the soldiers regardless of the lack of an official commission or any pay. After years of petitioning, Congress finally passed a resolution to recognize her service in 1869 and granted her back pay. Yet her pay was still held up by the War Department until 1876 due to at least one officer who disagreed with the decision. Even after receiving payment, it was not the full amount due to her.[6] It was not until 2002 that Ella was finally recognized as an official chaplain of the U.S. Army and appointed to the rank of captain.[7]

Chaplain Hobart's story is illustrative of the primary issue faced by women who served in the U.S. Military Chaplaincy until the early 1970s. While women served as clergy in our civilian population, regulations and policies did not exist to enable them to serve as military chaplains. Even though there was evidence of Chaplains Hobart's honorable service and acceptance, the implementation of these policies did not take place until almost 100 years after Ella's compensation for her service.

The First Women Officially Commissioned as Chaplains

The subject of women serving as chaplains in the U.S. military would not resurface for another century. LTC (R) Charlotte Kinney desired to be a chaplain in the 1960s and joined the Army for that purpose. While she was never able to serve as a chaplain, she did help to rewrite the Army Chaplain Corps doctrine to allow women to serve in the early 1970s.[8] Navy Chaplain Diana P. Bell was the first woman officially commissioned as a chaplain in the U.S. military in 1973.[9] She was followed shortly thereafter by the first woman commissioned as a U.S. Army chaplain, Alice M. Henderson.[10] Their trailblazing service was the reversal of the primary issue Chaplain Hobart and all women before the 1970s faced. However, this did not mean the women faced no other issues while serving as military chaplains. While writings by these women on their experiences are challenging to find, another woman serving as a chaplain in those early years wrote about her experiences.

John Brinsfield notes, Chaplain (Captain) Janet Horton published an essay in 1981 entitled "Women in the Chaplaincy: New Challenges and New Life."[11] In the piece, she describes several difficulties for a woman serving as a chaplain at that time. The first difficulty she describes is the problem of accepting the idea of a woman as a chaplain. She explains women themselves experienced this difficulty because the concept was so new at the time that they did not even consider it a possibility. She also reported that others, especially other chaplains, consistently questioned the validity of God calling women to serve as chaplains. She then goes on to describe the exhausting quest for women chaplains to prove their worthiness on an almost daily basis.[12]

Another issue Horton brings up is spoken and unspoken resistance to serving with a female chaplain. She notes that some chaplains refused to serve with her. Horton attributes this issue to the newness of the idea of women serving as chaplains and encourages others to do their best not to take it personally. She also encourages others to pick their battles wisely if the resistance is ongoing.[13] Furthermore, she describes the resistance that shows up in self-unaware attitudes as the most challenging issue. Horton writes,

> What others fail to realize is that this continuing resistance on a day-to-day basis is very much like Chinese water torture. Constant questions and insensitive or insulting remarks are not big issues, but they're like tiny drops of water on a person's forehead, one after another, after another, after another. The repetition is at first annoying, then frustrating and finally maddening to the point of making you become angry or bitter. People don't realize you're asked the very same questions literally hundreds of times over a very short period.[14]

Horton is incredibly gracious about these attitudes in her encouragement to find humor in the situation and try to grow personally as a result.[15]

The final two issues Horton brings up relate in that they seem to be opposite extremes. One problem is that some commanders like to show off their female chaplains for publicity purposes. This problem causes the women to feel like they are on display. The other issue is that others have "negative expectations" and seem to find ways to realize these expectations. This issue can cause the women to feel like targets. Horton concludes her thoughts by encouraging women to figure out who they are as chaplains, be that person, and not worry about the opinions of others.[16]

The issues described by Chaplain Horton are illustrative of the primary problems faced by the first official female chaplains in the 1970s and 1980s. The existence of enabling regulations and policies were no longer an issue. The new problems were the negative perceptions and behaviors of others with whom they served.

Issues Female Chaplains Face Today

It would be easy to assume the eradication of these issues after almost 50 years of women serving as chaplains. There are many examples of female chaplains serving equally as well as men. Female chaplains now serve in maneuver units and are regularly recognized for exemplary service. However, 12 years of

personal experience led to a suspicion that these historical issues are still issues today. An anonymous survey of women serving as chaplains today or recently retired confirmed these suspicions.[17] All the chaplains were asked, "In your opinion, what are the greatest issues or challenges for women serving as military chaplains today?" The most common response is a lack of respect from male chaplains. Respondents specifically pointed out more than once that this lack of respect is not from other service members. It is only from male chaplains.[18]

This lack of respect is identified several times as the result of another issue. That issue is the Chaplain Corps consists of mostly conservative male chaplains who hold a theology that does not believe women should serve as clergy. One chaplain noted that many of these male chaplains do not think women should serve in the military.[19] Another stated that "many male chaplains claim on paper that they are open to serving in a diverse pluralistic space, but that is a lie."[20] The noted results of this lack of respect varied among respondents. Several identified male chaplains as treating them as less capable, not assigning them to difficult positions, and giving them less work. Another chaplain went so far as to note she believes, "Evangelical male army chaplains don't want us in the corps and they sabotage us."[21] While the lack of respect is a serious issue, the other major problem noted is even more severe.

Many of the chaplains specifically used the word "sexism" in their responses. One chaplain indicated in her response that "religion remains the last safe bastion of sexism; and the conscious and unconscious biases that then create the gale-force wind into which they must walk each day—resulting in, ultimately exhaustion from the emotional energy spent rather than the ministry delivered."[22] Others claimed systematic sexism is prevalent throughout the corps. This systematic sexism shows up in small ways and significant ways. Some chaplains noted the annoying comments made about never having met a female chaplain before or not knowing there were female chaplains. Others reported issues as serious as sexual harassment. All these issues support the initial suspicion. There has been significant historical progress in regulations supporting the service of women as chaplains. However, as one chaplain put it, "regulations do not line up with practice."[23]

Ways to Move Forward

Where does the Chaplain Corps go from here? Are there ways to improve the current issues facing women serving as chaplains? It is easy for us just to say there is nothing we can do until societal mores change. That may be the case, but let us consider three possible ways to improve the current issues. These possible ways include increasing the requirement for formal education, creating policy to force the support of women in practice, and male chaplain allies speaking out against these issues.

Chaplains already have one the most significant educational requirements of any branch in the U.S. Armed Forces. Chaplains must have a Master of Divinity or an equivalent master's degree of at least 72 credit hours. This requirement, though, is less than other fields of professional chaplaincy. In almost every case, civilian hospitals and correctional facilities require chaplains to have at least two units of Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE), and they often will not be competitive for a job without four units. Why is military chaplaincy any different? Some will claim that the entirety of the military is not in the "clinical" environment, so only military hospital and prison chaplains need CPE. However, all unit chaplains will spend significant time visiting service members in the hospital and counseling those caught violating regulations. Therefore, this is a weak argument against the requirement for CPE across the board.

Others will claim the decision on CPE should be left to the denominational endorsers. Endorsers, however, exist to say a chaplain is in good standing with a denomination or faith group. They do not exist to validate educational requirements. Accrediting agencies certify the educational requirements for chaplaincy and CPE is no different. CPE also has accrediting agencies.

CPE stresses the value of working in a pluralistic environment. It will undoubtedly open the eyes of potential chaplains to the reality of ministry as a chaplain. This experience could result in prospective chaplains realizing the chaplaincy is not for them. It could also result in a change of view on women in ministry. I speak from personal experience on this matter. I entered the chaplaincy as a conservative

chaplain, endorsed by a denomination that did not endorse women and did not permit me to serve in chapel services with female chaplains. I was selected for an Army CPE residency early in my career. The experience resulted in a change of my beliefs on women in ministry and many other things, ultimately resulting in a change of endorser. For this reason, I recommend requiring no less than two units of ACPE accredited CPE for all military chaplains. With the advance in technology, there is no reason that those serving today cannot complete two extended units given a reasonable amount of time.

As noted by many of the respondents above, many of the issues arise due to male chaplains claiming their beliefs prevent them from working with female chaplains. Chapel ministry is the most common context for this issue. Frequently, if a female chaplain seeks to serve on the pastoral team of a chapel service and there are male chaplains who do not believe females can serve as clergy, she is not permitted to serve in that service.

This practice of exclusion is backward and contradictory to other policies. Due to the repeal of DOMA, LGBTQ couples can now marry and enjoy all the entitlements of any married couple. As such, they can attend Army Chaplain Strong Bonds events. Restrictions exist for some chaplains to facilitate training when a nontraditional couple attends due to their endorsements by denominations and faith groups who do not support these marriages. Rather than tell the couple they must attend a different event, the chaplain corps finds an unrestricted chaplain to facilitate the training.

Chapel services should work the same way. If a chaplain cannot serve on the same pastoral staff as women, he is the one that is restricted. He should have to find another service. This case is especially true in the case of general or collective Protestant services intended to serve all Protestants. Since many Protestants ordain women clergy, women must be permitted to serve in these services. This change should include any service not explicitly identified with a denomination or faith group that excludes women chaplains. For example, Chapel Next services have nothing in their name that identifies them as exclusively led by male clergy. If male chaplains desire to exclude women from their pastoral teams, they need to identify the service with a denomination that does so (i.e., Southern Baptist or Presbyterian Church in America), or put something in the subtitle of their service that it makes it clear (i.e., Chapel Next: A Contemporary Conservative Evangelical Chapel Service). Clear policy enforcing this change of practice is a way forward.

The final, and perhaps most important, recommended way forward is consistent public support from male chaplain allies. While there are many male chaplains openly opposed, silently opposed, or indifferent to female chaplains, there are also male chaplains that support women serving as chaplains. Too often, these men are publicly silent in their support. They may lament with trusted peers and others over the lack of respect and outright sexism expressed towards female chaplains. Still, they are often incredibly careful to never bring up the topic outside those trusted circles. I know this because I, unfortunately, count myself among those men. Too often, I have witnessed my peers and leaders in the chaplain corps treat female chaplains as second-class citizens and remained silent. I failed to speak up because I was afraid of retribution for doing so. I was more concerned about my career than speaking up about injustice. I tried to rationalize this by telling myself that I would never be able to affect real change if I did not reach a high enough rank to do so. I cannot and will not do so any longer.

However, one or two voices from male allies are not enough to affect change. Every male chaplain who considers himself an ally to the women of our corps must speak up every time we encounter the issues of disrespect and sexism to move forward to a place where we treat female chaplains as equals in the Chaplain Corps. Furthermore, the Chaplain Corps must support those who speak up in two ways. The offending chaplains need to be held accountable for their actions with significant consequences, and the reporting chaplains need recognition for doing the right thing.[24] This kind of support will bring lasting change.

Conclusion

Women serving as chaplains in the U.S. Armed Forces today enjoy opportunities for service representing significant historical progress. They benefit from the struggles of Chaplain Ella Gibson Hobart to serve her soldiers even when the War Department would not officially muster her into the army. They profit from the perseverance of the women serving during the 70s and early 80s who refused to let the constant questioning of their calling to stand in the way of their service. Yet, even during a time when opportunity abounds in official policies and regulations, discrimination is ever-present in practice. However, the tremendous historical progress for women in the chaplaincy provides hope for a way forward. That hope, though, only becomes historical change with the intentional implementation of additional education requirements, further policy reform, and public support from male allies. May the chaplains of today embrace that hope and become that change for the women of tomorrow.

Chaplain (MAJ) David Christensen

Brigade Chaplain, 2d Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division

CH Christensen assumed his duties as BDE CH for 2ABCT, 1CD in July, 2020. Prior to this assignment, he was a student in the Command and General Staff Officer Course at Fort Leavenworth, KS. He has also served as a community chaplain, as well as a battalion chaplain for Engineer, Infantry, Warrior Transition, and Military Police units. CH Christensen's civilian education includes a BA in Bible and Pastoral Ministry, an MA in Theology, an M.Div., and four units of Clinical Pastoral Education.

NOTES

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14. Ibid., 29.
15. Ibid., 29.
16. Ibid., 29-31.
17. I conducted an anonymous online survey using https://www.surveymonkey.com/ from May13-24, 2020. Eighteen currently serving or recently retired female chaplains responded to the survey. Twelve Army chaplains, three Navy chaplains, and three Air Force chaplains responded. Nine women had 0 to 10 years of service, seven women had 10-20 years of service, and two women had more than 20 years of service.
18. Ibid
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20. Ibid.
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Religious Support During COVID-19

by Chaplain (CPT) Jameson M. Williams

I have grown up in an Army of transitions. When I entered the Army, fresh on the heels of 9/11, the organization was meeting new challenges and rising to meet new demands. The transformation quickly led to a more lethally-trained force equipped for the War on Terror. Fast-forward to early 2020, when we were hearing from Punxsutawney Phil about the cessation of winter weather, another challenge, COVID-19, crept into our nation. This new war on COVID-19 is bringing sweeping challenges and transitions to our fighting forces, yet again.

US Army Chaplains and Religious Affairs Specialists have risen to meet every challenge in every battleground that the world has thrown our way. Our history is full of heroes for God and country. Kapaun, Waters, Capodanno, and Titus are names that toll the song of heroism in battle. Our current conflict will bestow no combat medals but will measure success in lives saved from the devastating effects to the human spirit in isolation. Our Corps has given accentuated importance to our core tenant "nurture the living" during this period. As Army Chaplains in this time, how can we successfully ride this tsunami of changes into the next era of military religious support? As a battalion chaplain in the Army's First Division, I see that religious support is changing in three dimensions and I offer a prescription for continued success.

The metrics of success for Army Chaplains are hard to narrow down into a single dimension. However, one measure of ministry prowess highlighted by this crisis is connection. Chaplains maneuver in the realm of trust. Building trust is achieved by many things; showing up, being competent, being proficient in warrior skills, attending skills, professionalism, caring, and many more. My short list is clearly just representative of my personal evaluation criteria for trust. Each Soldier decides to trust or not to trust based upon his/her own criteria. Some Soldiers lack capacity for trust due to injuries, moral and emotional, which prohibit connection in any medium.

COVID-19 places a spotlight on trust. We struggle to connect, as well as to build trust, in our analog methods as we did previously. Analog connection is dangerous because it places us within range of contamination. The decision to take on that operational risk is not mine to make. When approved, masks and other PPE place important barriers on the spread but also hindrances on fully communicating. We have used person-to-person connection to do every portion of our ministry. Prevention of viral infections has moved us into our homes and hunkered us down in our offices; yet I maintain the commission to enhance spiritual fitness through building trusting relationships. Analog methods that build trusting relationships, even tried and true staples, are much harder to utilize if not impossible due to COVID-19 restrictions.

Chaplains have shifted our efforts to digital mediums to connect. I have scoured my company phone logs and sent scores of texts to essential personnel deemed necessary in the office or necessary at home. I have called to find wrong numbers and people who don't want to talk and Soldiers who are "fine," when I know that they are not. Only a small minority of Soldiers texted actually returned my texts. I have been discouraged and then moved on to other methods. This is not new to our work as chaplains. We recognize and resign ourselves to the fact that we will not connect with everyone. But we cannot stay in our analog world and let the months of minimum manning close us to our work- which is people. This task has challenged us to be creative.

Connecting in our distance has moved us to digital methods and this is challenging us in different ways. The first being that chaplains attempt to maintain professional boundaries while on a primarily personal medium. Facebook friends, up to this point, have tended to be limited to acquaintances that I would not counsel in the unit setting. This has been a boundary that I have placed for myself to maintain professional

distance. Counseling stand-off distance for chaplains has always been closer than our care giving counterparts. We tend to provide counseling to people with which we have other relationships. This new digital formation creates additional challenges for chaplains to maintain and close professional distance.

I, along with the average chaplain, suffer from being old. We tend to be more than ten years older than our peers, even for the youngest of chaplains. Age is all the more accentuated in the digital formats that Soldiers use to connect. Snapchat, Instagram, and TikTok are not my normal modes to communicate. I am not sure that even if I did that it would be received as authentic. I feel as if I am an imposter on these mediums.

Caring for our Soldiers and Families is our mandate, so chaplains across my brigade have been making huge efforts to build connections digitally. Facebook seems to be the most accessible method of transmitting chaplain messages. This is due to generational appeal, government approved pages, and capabilities for video, text or live messages. According to the Pew Research Center in 2019, 76% of 18-24 year olds use Facebook regularly.[1] The Fort Riley Religious Support Office produced daily devotions that have included every chaplain from the non-deployed Fort Riley team.[2] These three minute messages have strong but limited reach.[3] Currently, this young adult demographic makes up only 4% of Facebook engagements[4] for the Fort Riley Religious Support Office page. On an installation with so many young people[5] this is quite low. Clearly, our reach on this example is less than desired.

We do not stop at Facebook. Podcasts, Zoom, WebEx and other applications have assisted in our attempts at connection but digital means are inherently limited. Much like our analog connections, they take place in the shared space. Work spaces are common ground that allow chaplains to work within personal boundaries. We do not use the private space of our Soldiers and Families to conduct our work. Digital spaces do not carry the same rules of shared and private spaces. The rules of engagement are not yet codified. The issue

of connection is not as simple as changing mediums from analog to digital. Each of these platforms presents another culture and method of communication, or language, which requires proficiency. Additionally, utilizing these methods offers different levels of depth in connection. I believe that most of these will not offer enough depth to connect for deep soul strengthening that we desire.

Evaluating our level of connection in analog or digital modes should measure not only output but also depth of communication. Let us not go back to business as usual. Our old methods did not necessarily work just because they were analog. As analog methods safely return, I encourage each of us to explore the depths of those face-to-face connections. It is essential for our ministries to strive for depth in those connections. As we continue to use emerging digital methods we cannot count emoji thumbs up as a measure of effectiveness as they measure only one dynamic of our communication. Digital methods are lacking important feedback when used in fire and forget mode.

The second big change for chaplains during this crisis is the rising necessity of chaplains as caregivers. Isolation is a great concern for the issues of suicide, spousal abuse, substance abuse, and sexual assault. Our most senior commanders have identified these areas of concern during our current lockdown. To meet these identified threats, leaders have relied on the expertise and availability of chaplains more and more. While many staff areas at the battalion level have seen reduction in work loads and reduced requirements, UMTs have risen in importance. We find ourselves more deeply imbedded in our units than before.

Chaplains stand uniquely in the organizational structure for crises like these. We are special staff officers who typically have an open door to our command teams. Although we typically brief one slide at meetings and gather information in the wings of meetings, we are now seated firmly among our staff officers as uniquely equipped for crisis. Spiritually, chaplains experience a call from God that equips them for crisis as well. Most chaplains come to the Corps as former church pastors, hospital chaplains, or other ministry settings where calamity is the opportunity for ministry. Not that any of us are pandemic chasers, but that we, by God and country, are called to stand in the gap when the things of life start to unravel. Coronavirus has unraveled much.

It is my belief that this pandemic will be known for one thing, loss. Loss and grief permeate this pandemic. Thankfully, at the point that I write this, our nation has not realized the projections initially given for loss of life. The loss of life has been significant but I find that the more universal losses will be due to isolation. The isolation and loss

from this crisis is international in scope. Typically, we have the diversions of sports, family gatherings, and holidays to break tensions. Each of these is now loss. Each of us now carries more grief and loss due to the lockdown. Many of us thought it madness when the NCAA cancelled the 2020 basketball tournament. Florida and Arizona baseball diamonds are silent for spring training. Sports pitches and ball fields untrodden.

Yet, there have been heartbreaking stories, introduced by mass and social mediums, in which the solitude of death in this pandemic takes center stage. Family members have not been allowed into hospital rooms of positive COVID-19 cases. Mothers are giving birth masked and without family in the name of safety. In the greater American culture this has highlighted the care of those who serve as chaplains. Especially in hospitals, those who are properly equipped to handle both the medical risk and the pastoral care responsibility, have increased burden and opportunity. Grief is an area in which chaplains have unique abilities to provide care. At Fort Riley, there have been limited COVID infections but plans for each level of care have included primary and secondary chaplain caregivers.

I suggest that religious support teams take a hard look at ways to continue to support, through relationships, with increased imbedding as this crisis will not end with reduced restrictions. Our entire nation has experienced prolonged isolation to include our Soldiers and Families. There will be continued grief due to these months of seclusion. It is my belief that grief that was unresolved due to this crisis will be more profound when released. We may see this next wave of grief in the near future or even years down the road. Prescriptively, each formation may benefit from sessions similar to traumatic event management to mitigate this unresolved emotion. As religious leaders, I suggest that our congregations take part in a collective celebration of the end of the virus that includes a ritual of emotional healing as we have all changed significantly in this time.

That brings me to the last of the tectonic shifts in the Chaplain Corps due to this virus. Our chapels are going to be very different when they return to full participation. As a background, our chapels are organized to fulfill the Title 10 obligation of our commanders to provide weekly religious services.

This mandated service has a long tradition on military posts across the nation. In garrison, this takes on an ecumenical face that pairs chaplains of many different endorsers into teams that provide weekly worship services. Some low density faith groups may have only one representative who conducts weekly services, such as our Rabbis and Catholic priests. Unlike churches on the outside of the post, chapels are not theologically homogeneous. Chapels are necessary, diverse, and change often.

The most recent change has shifted our services to digital mediums. On this installation, each chapel team has not stopped providing its weekly service with the exception of staff sickness. It is against the state mandate and commanding general's orders to gather as a community in person. For weeks now, chapels have conducted Facebook Live services for the communities of faith. At first, teams pieced together personal equipment and data plans to accomplish the mission. Chaplains at echelon fought for equipment and service to allow our chaplains to accomplish the commander's mission of religious support with excellence. Equipped and practiced teams conduct these digital services weekly until our congregations gather again in-person.

The digital medium is a very different process from in-person worship. I theorize that this medium is dissimilar enough from our established practice that targeting energy in making a persisting digital service available for Soldier and Families has merit. I believe that this may bridge a gap to our younger population that has little to no representation in our established service offerings. For our low-density faith groups, this method may allow for wider availability of services allowing those chaplains to reach more than one installation with services. I believe that protestant chaplains may have the most margin to create an additional digital service.

We all hope and pray for a rapid end to this pandemic. It has changed our formations. The pandemic has changed our families. The Chaplain Corps will move on from this crisis but the aftermath will find us stronger as we

interact with the next generation of Soldiers. COVID-19 renews our purpose as religious support professionals called to nurture the living, care for the wounded, and honor the fallen. As we move forward from this crisis, I encourage our teams to remember that digital mediums are not the only answer for the problem. Authenticity is the Chaplain Corps greatest strength in any medium. Remember that it is essential to our Army that we maintain trust as we communicate the messages of hope, For God and Country.

Chaplain (CPT) Jameson M. Williams

Brigade Chaplain, 111th Military Intelligence Brigade

CH Williams was assigned to serve as the Brigade Chaplain in the 111th Military Intelligence Brigade in July of 2020. Most recently he served as the Battalion Chaplain for the 101st Brigade Support Battalion, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division in Fort Riley, Kansas. Prior to serving in the Army, CH Williams worked as a television production assistant and videographer.

NOTES

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2 Fort Riley Religious Support office began producing videos on March 20, 2020 and currently produces five, three-minute devotionals per week.
3 In the period from 20 April, 2020 to 17 May, 2020 the Fort Riley Religious Support Office Facebook had an average daily reach of 1395 people. The maximum per day was 7,222 on 12 May, 2020 and the minimum was 275 on 9 May, 2020.
4 This data comes from Facebook insights of the Fort Riley RSO page. The number of People Talking About the Page by user age and gender. This number is an estimate. Data taken on 18 MAY, 2020.
5 Based on The FY 2019 Economic Impact Summary of Fort Riley, KS, there are approximately 6,200 barracks rooms available for E4 and below on the garrison. This number is only a portion of the 18-24 year old potential audience. https://home.army.mil/riley/application/files/1415/7961/8415/EIS_FY19.pdf

Enhancing Mission Command Through Increased Army Chaplain Trust-Building Capabilities

by Chaplain (Colonel) Mark Stewart

"Trust—or the lack of it—is at the root of success or failure in relationships and in the bottom-line results of business, industry, education, and government."

Stephen R. Covey[1]

Many academic researchers and leadership theorists echo Stephen Covey's confident assertion that positive organizational trust levels correlate to positive results. If Covey's hypothesis proves true, organizations should prioritize efforts to increase trust. The United States Army promotes unit climates of high trust. Army doctrine codified efforts to increase trust within the force by establishing trust as an essential element for successful Mission Command.[2] This paper provides academic understanding of trust and its impacts within organizations, then relates these discoveries within the U.S. Army command philosophy. Moreover, this work considers the Chaplain Corps' potential role in Army trust-building, as Army chaplains explicitly occupy an important role concerning command climate and moral advisement.

More specifically, this paper explores why trust serves such a key role in command effectiveness, while also examining the downsides of trust violations, as evidence analyzed will show that even one breach of trust requires a great preponderance of positive, demonstrative, trustworthy actions to restore trust. The paper proposes that the Chaplain Corps stands uniquely positioned to address trust issues across the Army enterprise given its two primary doctrinal capabilities of providing religious support, and advising commanders on impacts of religion, morals, ethics and morale on all aspects of military operations.[3] The U.S. Army Chaplain Corps contributes daily to strengthening trust in formations, suggesting that chaplains may benefit from an explicit branch effort to further expand trust within the Army. Thus, this strategy research paper explores the following research question: should the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps initiate an intentional strategic effort to build and export trust across the Army enterprise?

Ultimately, this paper argues that the Chaplain Corps should make a pointed effort to increase chaplain capabilities to build and repair trust within the Army by using a two-step approach: first, by fortifying trust among chaplains; then second, by building Army chaplain professional capabilities to increase trust outcomes within Army units. The argument follows this progression: (1) understanding trust and behavioral praxes impacting trust; (2) developing trust internally within individual chaplains and corporately throughout the branch; (3) exporting trust throughout

the Army. The argument then coalesces by proposing strategic adaptations to initiate chaplain trust building across the broader enterprise.

Understanding Trust

In order to comprehend trust's impact within the U.S. Army, this paper turns its attention toward establishing a common familiarity with trust and its relationship to creating an effective work climate. First, this section establishes a working definition of trust, then describes behaviors that support or erode trust, Next, it highlights trust's effect upon organizational effectiveness. Finally, the section examines trust more narrowly, and pragmatically, as it explores trust within the mission command environment.

Trust Defined

The word "trust" invites abstract conceptualization—it provokes a wide variety of definitions in the reader's, or hearer's, mind. The Army defines mutual trust as "shared confidence between commanders, subordinates, and partners that they can be relied on and are competent in performing their assigned tasks."[4] This definition serves as a starting point, and ongoing touchpoint, for this essay. A survey of extant academic definitions validates the Army's definition and provides insights helpful for in-depth considerations of the multiple influences that create or diminish trust.

Earlier research by Rousseau and colleagues set forth a lasting, influential definition of trust as "a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another." [5] Additionally, this definition persists in Tan and Lim's argument upon which they built their model of organizational trust.[6] Fulmer and Gelfand, in their extensive survey of scholarly research, examined trust across multiple disciplines and organizational levels. Their research revealed that Rousseau's "positive expectation and vulnerability" definition of trust remains widely accepted.[7] The authors found also that trust relies on the trustee's expectation of trustworthiness with respect to the one who granted trust, the trustor. In this case, one makes judgment about the moral character of another. They also found that trust involves vulnerability, in that a person must rely on another person despite ultimate uncertainty of outcomes.[8] A caveat regarding word choice helps understand Army writing. Vulnerability, by definition, implies risk on the part of the one who trusts. Thus, in Army writings and doctrine authors also use "accepting risk" to describe operational or tactical vulnerabilities.

These trust components, positive expectation and vulnerability (accepting risk), work multi-directionally. The trustor and trustee must both possess a positive expectation and accept risk. When asked what he considered the top conditions for effective units, Major General Eirik Kristoffersen, Norwegian Army Chief of Staff, said, "tillit" (the Norwegian word for trust). He went on to explain that he prefers using tillit because it easily illustrates this principle: tillit remains unchanged whether spelled backwards or forwards, much like trust works in both directions within units.[9] Trust in every direction facilitates task accomplishment within a unit.

Additionally, trust does not occur in a vacuum; it requires relationships as the conduit for enactment.[10] Individual trust issues multiply within the context of bilateral or multilateral relationships.[11] The Army acknowledges the role of relationships by its use of "shared confidence" within the doctrinal definition of trust. So then, trust occurs within relationships and extends influence upon organizational performance through relationships.

Trust-Enhancing Attributes

How people behave influences trust levels within their professional relationships. This research found a wide range of trust-enhancing personal characteristics and behaviors. Mollering posited four widely accepted trust-producing characteristics to capture the continuum of trust-producing behavioral themes; these four include competence, benevolence, integrity, and predictability.[12]

Of note, since 2019 the Army lists competence as their first element of mission command, followed by mutual trust.[13] This separation amplifies the enterprise's value of competence. Competence stands apart from the following three categories in that it captures the state of personal or corporate skills and abilities, rather than behaviors. The later three categories (benevolence, integrity, and predictability) focus on specific behaviors most relevant to chaplain duties, the subsequent focus of this writing.

Benevolence stems primarily from the follower's belief that their leader holds the

follower's best interest in mind.[14] Elangovan asserts that benevolence increases follower trust more than the leader's technical skills.[15] Benevolence includes behaviors such as kind acts, acknowledgement, demonstrating respect, recognition, and empathy. Benevolence diminishes when leaders act uncivil through insensitive, impolite words and actions that fall outside common social decorum.[16] When individuals feel a leader or team member has no concern for their well-being, the individual's performance and motivation decline.[17]

Integrity generally describes one's adherence to a set of ethical standards, regardless of situational influences. Integrous behaviors linked to ethical standards elevate trust. Researchers found significant statistical evidence that "ethical leadership has a significantly positive influence on the trust in the leader."[18] Defining the expected ethical behaviors requires careful thought, as the social group or organization establishes or codifies the acceptable behaviors.[19] For example, the Army Values set forth expected soldier behaviors.

Leader predictability reflects stability, consistency, and reliability of leaders. An example research criterion measuring predictability helps explain predictability: "Others display predictable and stable behavior?"[20] Given high leader predictability, the follower may reasonably form expectations of their boss' intent and behaviors.

Trust Effects Upon Organizations

Advancing the argument, this paper offers evidence of trust's considerable impact on organizational effectiveness. The following paragraphs will provide understanding about the negative outcomes after trust breeches, followed by positive outcomes related to high trust environments. These consequential considerations magnify the value of building and maintaining trust, and they provide logical connection and motivation for people to achieve trust-producing behaviors.

Leaders take note: from a pragmatic perspective, broken trust leads to many team problems. These difficulties translate to poor work performance and disrupted work relationships.[21] Compounding matters, trust breaches form deep roots and prove difficult to amend. The Army understands the cost of broken trust and invests in programs that mitigate and prevent incidents that form trust breeches within units. These include focused expertise and help via Equal Opportunity, Sexual Harassment and Prevention, and the Inspector General.

Why do trust violations linger? Trust violations tend to evoke intense emotions that remain at the forefront of the mind. Harvard professor and decision making theorist, Max Bazerman, explains: "An event that evokes emotions is vivid, easily imagined, and specific will be more available than an event that is unemotional in nature, bland, difficult to imagine, or vague."[22] Roy Baumeister and his colleagues found through an extensive survey of psychological research that bad emotional experiences far outweigh positive ones.[23] Thus, broken trust takes far more effort to repair than trust maintained, and the consequences sometimes prove irreparable. As a result, trust violations create long-lasting or permanent damage to relationships within organizations.

Conversely, positive organization outcomes due to heightened trust climates contrast sharply with negative results of mistrust. Experiments consistently find positive outcomes where work environments support mutual trust. Paul Zak's studies revealed high payoffs for leaders who foster trusting environments as compared to low trust climates. Zak found workers within high trust settings exhibited 74 percent less stress, 106 percent more energy, 50 percent higher productivity, 76 percent more engagement, 13 percent fewer sick days, and 29 percent higher satisfaction.[24] Omar Kocak tested his hypothesis that organizational trust positively impacts employee ability to thrive at work, finding statistically significant evidence supporting his hypothesis.[25] Another study found that trust in leadership antecedes job performance, motivation, and organizational commitment.[26] Richards tested and proved a positive correlation between trust levels and morale within Army soldiers and civilians.[27] Using focus groups and interviews, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Jesper Stubbendorff found convincing evidence that military leaders who increase trust in their formations create high performance units through elevated individual and group functioning.[28]

The previous discourse contributes to the academic understanding of trust and indicates that extant research arguments back the Army's definition of mutual trust. Trust, being somewhat nebulous, requires parsing within a specific group context. This paper seeks to move beyond definitions now and create insight and motivation for positive trust shifts specific to the Army environment. Therefore, examination of trust within common Army command models follows.

Trust's Role in Mission Command

Trust viewed through the lens of mission command links the above academic discourse to the Army command philosophy. The profession of arms amplifies the emotional reality of trust given the existential mortal consequences of combat.[29] The relationship between team trust and performance becomes more significant in high stress situations.[30] This section clarifies trust's contribution to effective leadership through the lens of leadership philosophy and related historical examples.

Mission command plays an essential role within Army command and control of forces. Trust plays an essential role within mission command as it sets an essential condition for commanders' efficient task delegation. [31] To this point, historical considerations illuminate the historical integration of trust in mission command doctrine and provide deeper understanding of its military application.

From its inception, mission command relied on trust. Donald Vandergriff traces Mission Command philosophy to its profession of arm's genesis, finding that the Prussian Army intentionally cultivated this approach in response to their loss to Napoleon in 1806. Ultimately, the Prussians' Auftragstaktik realized its greatest effect by the end of the nineteenth century.[32] He discovers the

genesis of Mission Command in the Prussian approach to command, Auftragstaktik. In 2019, Army doctrine reaffirms Aufragstaktik as the historical root for present day Mission Command.[33] Vandergriff makes the case that Prussia depended upon both empowerment of well-trained subordinates, and also a culture of trust: "By 1860, the Army had taken up the practice of trust through strenuously selecting and rigorously developing subordinates."[34]

The Army defines Mission Command as "the Army's approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation."[35] But does it agree with Vandergriff's view that trust serves as a key enabler of mission command? Simply put, yes, the Army lists mutual trust as the second principle of mission command. This mutual trust refers to the shared, two- way interpersonal dynamic. The senior must trust the subordinate; the subordinate must trust the senior, and this trust must flow throughout the unit laterally and at echelon.

In recent decades, transformational leadership emerged as one of the preeminent leadership aspirations. Transformational leadership fits well within mission command philosophy in that trust empirically correlates to transformational leadership results. To this point, Bass and Steidlmeir's research and literature survey led them to conclude that, "trust is the single most important variable moderating the effects of transformational leadership on the performance, attitudes, and satisfaction of the followers."[36]

Transformational leadership shares common ground with mission command as both depend on a climate of trust. Transformational leadership moves well beyond the limited capabilities of transactional leadership's "praise, promise, reward, and discipline" ways. Transformational leadership, at its heart, inspires others to want to follow, through charisma, inspiration, intellectual stimulation, and consideration for individuals.[37]

History records examples of military leaders who both succeeded, and failed, to extend mission command through mutual trust. While the Prussians practice of Aufragstaktik peaked in the later nineteenth century,[38] the American military leadership philosophy approaches remained less focused on trust climate, leaving room for individual discretion in command philosophy. Hence, the Civil War provides a historical means to observe trust's consequences on the battlefield. For example, case studies of battles at Pea Ridge and Little Round Top show marked contrast of outcomes, attributed to trust climates by some historians. Thomas Hanson concluded that Confederate forces lost at Pea Ridge in large part due to failure to form cohesion, mostly due to low trust within their team. Hanson noted that Major General Van Dorn failed to trust his highly capable subordinate, Brigadier General McCulloch, and "commanded through brute force of will rather than by understanding his subordinates and seeking to secure their support."[39] On the other hand, when summarizing his case study of Little Round Top, McGrath credits a climate of leader mutual trust as an essential part of the Union's successful defense.[40]

A Word of Caution: Trust Requires Prudence

This paper does not advocate for "blind faith" trust in organizations or people. Though high trust levels must remain present within an organization, trustors should still exercise reasonable caution about the trustworthiness of the trustee. Misplaced trust will not lead to the desired end state of highly performing teams; trust must be properly placed in trustworthy sources. Fulmer's research survey discovered that too much, or misplaced, trust created liabilities such as suppressing professional growth and overlooking flaws.[41] Under certain conditions, maleficent leaders or followers manipulate others in order to increase trust. The leader, peer, and follower must exercise prudence when ascertaining who, and how much, to trust. Some people do not possess the adequate requisite trustworthiness.

A quick consideration of history reinforces the need for caution, especially with respect to charisma and affinity biases.[42] Charismatic leaders gain trust more easily than leaders with low charisma, but charismatic leaders also pose more potential to misuse trust and generate "pseudo transformation."[43] Perhaps most prominent in the minds of Americans, Hitler's fascist rise to power within Nazi Germany, Joseph Stalin's autocratic iron fist approach to Russian communist governance, Mao Tse Tung's transformation of Chinese communism, and Pol Pot's imposed agrarian socialism through his Khmer Rouge party example clear cases of misplaced and exploited trust.[44] At a turning point of the Civil War, Robert E. Lee invested enormous trust in charismatic JEB Stuart as the Confederate forces invaded Pennsylvania. Stuart failed to provide Lee with critical vision of the enemy as he pursued his own interest. All considered, Lee accepted risk and vulnerability that strategically contributed to Lee's loss at Gettysburg.[45] U.S. financial frauds, intentional stock and housing market inflation, and price gauging also remind people that blind trust may lead to misfortune. For example, Bernard Madoff exploited trust among family, friends, and Jewish contacts to fuel a fraudulent Ponzi scheme totaling more than 65 billion dollars.[46] Unfortunately, more examples may be found. These extreme cases, of course, make an exaggerated point for the purpose of instilling caution when gauging trustworthiness. This discussion by no means argues against efforts to increase workplace trust. The central point of this section may now be stated with added nuance: increased trust creates positive outcomes, especially when members invest trust in trustworthy leaders, followers, and peers.

This paper has thus far defined and offered deeper understanding of trust, established trust's empirically valid correlation with unit effectiveness, and explained trust's essential role with respect to mission command philosophy. Research reviewed argued that certain behaviors correlate with successful trust building within teams and relationships, while other behaviors harm trust. Analysis concluded that leaders may attain increased team trust by intentionally increasing

trust-building behaviors and decreasing trust-eroding behaviors. Finally, this section cautioned people to maintain a balanced approach by prudently considering the trustworthiness of others.

Forming Chaplain, Chaplain Corps and Army-Wide Trust

At this point, this argument shifts to prove chaplains are essential trust-building agents within the Army force structure, while also proposing pathways to improve chaplain trust-building efficacy. This discussion begins by examining Army doctrine and essential clergy qualifications to establish why chaplains should serve as essential trust builders and trust repairers. Information presented then clarifies how the Chaplain Corps can modify existing means to increase individual chaplain and branch trust-enhancing capabilities. The section closes by suggesting four structures through which chaplains may employ their improved trust-building capabilities across the force, while also encouraging strategic reinforcement to aid chaplain endeavors.

The Chaplain's Unique Trust-Building Role

Army chaplain professional skills and calling support using chaplains as key agents for enhancing unit trust. Consider the current Chief of Chaplain's clarifying statement, "Taking care of the Army's people is our sacred duty. This is what we are for. It is why the Chaplain Corps exists."[47] Chaplains possess implicit and explicit roles in trust-building efforts as they care for people. Since Army leaders carry immense responsibility loads, they benefit greatly from staff members who help enable trusting command climates.[48] Army doctrine prescribes the two core chaplain capabilities as provide religious support and advise the commander.[49] The religious support capability not only refers to religious services, rites, and sacraments, but also to pastoral counseling. Within their pastoral counseling role, chaplains employ trust-building skills on behalf of soldiers and family members. Furthermore, chaplains "advise the commander and staff on religion, ethics, morals, and morale, and their impact on all aspects of military operations."[50] This role more specifically points to the chaplain's part in providing commanders with assessments of unit trust-related indicators.

Chaplains enter service with professional and academic values-based grounding. The accessioning requirements necessitate that Army chaplains possess ecclesiastical credentials as religious leaders. Moreover, chaplains enter active duty possessing graduate level education inherently grounded in religious philosophy and ethics.[51] Ethics pairs well with trust-building awareness because ethicalness and values-based behaviors lead to improved trust.[52]

Plainly put, trust building and repairing resides inherently within the chaplain's professional domain. Chaplains clearly possess the mandate to, at a minimum, contribute to trust building and apprise the commander on environmental trust indicators within the unit. The argument thus far advocates utilizing the chaplain's trust role for the benefit of the enterprise—but how can the chaplain branch assist with this endeavor?

Increasing Chaplain Corps' Trust-Building Capabilities

Having noted that chaplains possess professional and doctrinal attributes valuable to trust building, this section advocates using Army training domains to increase chaplain trust-related understanding, assessment, and intervention skills. The following approach provides an adaptable launching point to assist branch efforts to increase baseline trust-building capabilities, but does not suggest a tight, prescriptive methodology.

The Army's institutional, operational, and individual training domains[53] offer the framework to reinforce trust-related understanding, advisement, and intervention skills set forth above. The institution domain reinforces training objectives via Army schools, training centers and Professional Military Education. The U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School stands especially well-suited for this effort given its central mission. Current institutional programs of instruction could expand the training to include integrated trust content. Trust-building skills could be added to common core values training, ethics reasoning coursework, and common tasks. Additionally, the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School could evaluate the value and possibility of industry or academic school partnerships. The operational training domain refers to leader-scheduled events.[54] Thus, technical supervisory chaplains should ensure that trust-building training objectives are included in command training guidance and synchronized through the operations process for exercises. Senior Mission Chaplains may reinforce trust building using case study analysis and discussion during installation-wide Unit Ministry Team training.[55] Within the individual training domain, supervisors may encourage subordinate chaplain self-development by suggesting trust-building professional reading and coursework goals within the chaplain's individual development plan. With training domains serving as the existing framework for growing Army chaplains' trust-building skill, the following paragraphs recommend subject matter foci for these training efforts.

First, expanding the chaplains' understanding of trust would benefit the Chaplain Corps, whether any further adaptations take place. This paper's proposition hopes to see the inculcation of trust as a core value for all Army chaplains and incorporate these behaviors into the Chaplain Corps. The U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School (USACHCS), along with the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Chaplain could evaluate prospects for deepening trust value, talents, and awareness within the institutional training domain core curriculum. The principles set forth in the first major division of this thesis may serve as a launch point for further study and implementation through USACHCS. The curricula should emphasize the definitions, organizational impacts, and essential relevance of chaplains in the trust-building process. Current institutional ethics coursework creates a logical opening for curriculum integration, in that ethical behaviors empirically heighten trust within relationships.[56] Professional Military Education (PME) can then sustain and support

chaplains' understanding that trust serves as a central currency for all chaplain activities and provides relevance for pastoral and staff inputs.[57]

Second, enhancing the chaplains' assessment aptitude would benefit the Chaplain Corps' trust-building capabilities. The Army's mandate that chaplains will advise command personnel on moral, ethical, religious, and morale issues infers that chaplains need assessment talent. Trust assessment relates closely to trust's relationship with ethics and morale, as previously argued above.[58] Army chaplains must not operate isolated from available staff and installation program resources. Instead, chaplains should synchronize with these entities to help develop a command level view of local trust indicators. This paper recommends that chaplains consider analysis of trends provided by SHARP metrics, Department Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (DEOCS), and records of judicial and nonjudicial actions taken by commanders. Such indicators may give the chaplains insights about trust within units.

Chaplains' trust assessment skill should benefit from increased understanding as described in the start of this section, however, providing chaplains with a specific assessment resource also enables chaplains to provide metrics. Three battalion chaplains developed and initiated an effective approach to accomplishing advisement tasks in the 1st Armored Division.[59] Currently, 1st Armored Division chaplains and religious affairs specialists use the Morale Assessment and Advisement Tool (MAAT) to assess unit morale in three focused areas: Army Values, unit communication, and mission command. These three foci directly contribute to organizational trust levels. This writing does not advocate for a programmatic approach to assessment. The MAAT referred to herein serves only as a tool that Unit Ministry Teams (UMT) use during routine operations, and without compulsion. The MAAT helps the UMT develop an evidence-based understanding of the unit climate. The UMT then advises the command on possible courses of action to improve morale based on current unit needs. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists issue a simple face-to-face twenty-question survey to soldiers in their units. The soldiers remain anonymous and the UMT's statutory confidential communication protects soldiers' privacy. The UMTs use an Excel-based scoring tool to produce a unit morale score for each company and battalion. The UMTs may combine this feedback with their quarterly counseling data to give command teams a one-page snapshot of unit morale and suggestions for actions to address any areas of concern. The MAAT implicitly measure unit trust, but this paper recommends integrating scientific trust measurement scales into the MAAT going forward. The institutional training domain would serve as the start point for training and implementation. Ultimately, the MAAT, or similar adaptation, should improve chaplain relevancy in their key role as command advisors.

Third, developing Army chaplains' trust repair skills will help expand branch trust- building capabilities. The two trust components of "positive expectation and vulnerability"[60] uncover the potential for disrupted trust. The trustee vulnerability occurs due to their positive expectation that the trustor will act in the trustee's interest, therefore, trust violations ensue when the trustor acts in a manner that harms the trustee.[61] Academic studies reveal that trust breaches can be repaired, though not without concerted effort.[62] Chaplains may find structure helpful when approaching trust repair. The highest counseling competency levels generally reside within the Family Life Chaplains, who possess master's degrees in Marriage and Family Therapy. Current research-based trust repair models provide options for professional interventions and may inform the Family Life Chaplain training program. However, all chaplains could benefit from familiarization with common structural elements for trust repair and use them as a triage, or first level, intervention. Generalized trust repair components found during research include apology, forgiveness, and action.[63] Importantly, the trustee must reinforce interpersonal measures with tangible trust repair actions such as policy change, process refinement, request for external assistance, and reputation repair.[64]

Exporting Trust Army-Wide

This paper now asserts that chaplains can export trust across the Army by employing their trust-building skills in their workplace using four means and reinforcing these efforts through Chaplain Corps strategic pathways. As chaplains' baseline trust-building competencies increase, chaplains can then employ these skills across the Army's entire footprint. Due to the Office of the Chief of Chaplain's increased strategic capabilities in recent years,[65] the Chaplain Corps can effectively bolster this plan through one or more branch strategic roles.

The following paragraphs first suggest that counseling, training, intervening, and advising form the four broad methods through which chaplains export trust to the enterprise. The four categories are presented to provide academic comprehension and provoke further thought with respect to potential adaptations moving forward. Following discussion of the suggested methods, this writing will give attention to available strategic means for reinforcing trust-building across the Army.

Within the chaplain counseling role, chaplains in units may employ their understanding of trust to protect and enhance their relationship with counselees. Chaplains can employ their increased trust-building knowledge to set session goals and achieve healthy outcomes. Additionally, chaplains will have opportunities to integrate these concepts through everyday interactions. As chaplains teach and model the basic trust-building concepts to soldiers, the soldiers can, in turn, influence trust at echelon as they apply lessons learned back to their squad, team, sections, and more. In their instructor capacity, chaplains stand to influence many people efficiently. Chaplains serve as relationship, suicide prevention, communication, and life skills trainers within their organization. Thus, without creating an entirely separate class or briefing, chaplains could simply reinforce trust within the existing structure. Strong Bonds training curriculum would benefit from newly increased learning as well. Chaplains could also conduct trust violation interventions based on their

improved capacity to understand root problems and work toward resolution. Further, chaplains could better communicate regarding these interventions should the situation require professional collaboration with, or referrals to, Family Life Chaplains or behavioral healthcare workers. Finally, the chaplain's advisor skills would increase significantly due to elevated trust assessment knowledge and access to a metrics-based approach to morale data analysis. Stated succinctly, the combined effects of counseling, training, intervening, and advising using higher levels of trust competencies should help achieve Army-wide improvement.

Strategic implementation considerations now also inform this research. In fact, this paper calculates that strategic measures will ensure an increase in Army-wide trust levels. The Chaplain Corps operationalizes religious support strategically across four religious support lines of effort LOEs: Recruit, Lead, Align, and Revitalize.[66] This SRP proposes "Increase and Integrate Army Chaplain Trust-Building Capabilities" as a supporting objective (SE) to the Chief of Chaplains Religious Support Strategy. This proposed SE supports LOE2 entitled "Lead," and LOE4, "Revitalize."[67] LOE2, Lead, focuses upon efforts to "develop our talent by improving the ways we educate, train, and credential the Corps;" LOE4, Revitalize, aims to empower chaplains to generate "vibrant local Army communities to support and help retain all members of the Army family."[68] This research will serve as the groundwork for discussion within current branch strategic input processes, which begins with an Executive Leadership Council (ELC) forum review and discussion. The ELC outputs inform the Army Chief of Chaplains Strategic Initiatives and Integration Group (DACH SIIG), who may then request General Officer guidance, consider further actions, request refinement, or appoint an initial proponent.

Discussion

This paper has defined trust, established its critical role in organizational effectiveness and explained trust's essential tie to the Army's leadership mission command philosophy. Research reviewed backed the validity of the Army's mission command view of mutual trust. Research also indicated that certain behaviors contribute to successful trust building within teams and interpersonal relationships, while other behaviors diminish trust. Thus, leaders may attain increased unit trust by intentionally increasing trust-building behaviors in their respective formations.

Narrowing the focus, research discoveries provided evidence that individual and corporate behaviors may change through intentional structure, education and reinforcing measures. Toward this purpose, the data indicated that Army chaplains can, and should, play a substantial trust-enabling role to assist commanders in their efforts to establish, build, and repair trust within teams. The paper advocated for Chaplain Corps efforts to deepen individual chaplain and branch baseline trust-building capabilities through Army training domains. The argument next presented a recommended strategy to export improved trust-building knowledge through chaplain counseling, training, intervening, and advising roles. Finally, the paper explored strategic pathways available, suggesting ways to reinforce the trust-building effort across the Army enterprise.

Although this paper enthusiastically argues for increased chaplain trust-building measures within the Army, limitations and counterpoints warrant discussion. The first counterpoint argues that trust can go too far. This paper addressed this valid concern in detail during the former "Word of Caution" section and concluded that the trust benefits outweigh the potential risks associated with malapportioned trust. Also, the Chaplain Corps should exercise caution not to become the sole stakeholder with trust-building efforts. Chaplains must keep their enabler role in mind as they support the commanders. Chaplains operate under the authority of commanders. Commanders must buy in to trust building efforts and provide the backing required for success. Next, the Army's intense operations tempo rightly creates an environment where leaders and staff must filter the myriad of new ideas and programs. Time and manpower constraints create such necessary impediments. This paper counters the "not another program" argument by establishing the research-based high value of trust increase, then laying out multiple ways to exploit existing ways and means to accomplish trust-building.
Finally, this research conducted no surveys across the force and therefore recommends further research regarding perceptions of Army trust levels.

Conclusion

This research paper envisions expanding the numbers of engaged, motivated, satisfied, and productive soldiers as chaplains facilitate increased trust within Army units. If the Army accepts that trust enables and increases mission command, and that chaplains possess the means to assist commanders with cultivating trust within units, then this paper provides a lens through which to examine options going forward. The author hopes the arguments presented will stimulate strategic consideration of chaplain

corps trust-building measures and lead to related adaptations. Ideally, this evidence would also gain traction within the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, thus ensuring that branch institutional expertise incorporates trust into Army chaplains' Professional Military Education. At a reader level, this Strategy Research Paper hopes to encourage individuals to immediately integrate trust-enhancing measures within their professional and personal spheres of influence. Admittedly, trust building requires intentionality and effort, but high recompense makes the endeavor worthwhile.

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Leadership and the Profession of Arms

Commandership: A Fresh Look at Command by COL(R) Kevin Gentzler and Ken Turner, Ph.D.

On the afternoon of Monday June 5, 1944, General Dwight D. Eisenhower penned a note to the Allied Expeditionary Force as it readied itself for the largest amphibious assault in military history. “Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based on the best information available. The troops, the air, and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone. --June 5.” Eisenhower faced immense pressure as he alone held ultimate accountability for the decision to launch Operation OVERLORD. Weather delays, operational security lapses, and training fatalities compounded the stress and uncertainty. The pressure took its toll. Eisenhower was smoking four packs of cigarettes a day and drinking pot after pot of strong black coffee. Facing enormous uncertainty, he was probably a little irritated when, after the weather decision Sunday night June 4, his driver Kay Summersby poignantly commented, “If all goes right, dozens of people will claim credit. But if it goes wrong you’ll be the only one to blame.” While the comment did not likely improve Eisenhower’s mood, Summersby was right. As the commander, Eisenhower was ultimately responsible and the Allied Nations would hold him personally accountable for any failure. While the success of the operation relied on the efforts of thousands of men and women, the responsibility for failure was his alone. Eisenhower never had to issue his note.

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/commandership-fresh-look-command

The Father of My Spirit: Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, and the Value of Mentorship by Bryan Jones

A constant point of emphasis in the realm of personal and professional development within any military service is that of mentorship. Some of the greatest leaders in military history owe much of their reputation and success to committed and experienced mentors. From a young age, Alexander the Great was imbued with the lineage of Greek philosophy and analytical thought through his relationship with his tutor, Aristotle. Two of the greatest military leaders in American history—General George S. Patton and General of the Army Dwight D.

Eisenhower—were both indebted for much of their intellectual and professional development to Major General Fox Conner, who served as the Allied Expeditionary Force's Operations Officer for General John J. Pershing during World War I. The foundation of mentorship within any military rests upon the transfer of intellect, experience, and trust. These factors help to mold a successful relationship between individuals and provide for the development of future generations of leaders. In short, the greatest factors in the creation and eventual success of a military leader are the lessons and professional development a dedicated mentor has to offer.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/04/20/the_father_of_my_spirit_scharnhorst_clausewitz_and_the_value_of_mentorship_115216.html

Reflections on Being a Colonel by Kevin Benson

It is colonels who really run the Army, and it is tough to earn promotion to this rank. I know, as I was passed over the first time considered for promotion. I was one of two armor officers selected above the zone for colonel on the 2000 U.S. Army promotion list, and, in reflecting on that time, I thought I should write about the advice I received prior to pinning on the rank and share some lessons I learned along the way. I offer these thoughts in the spirit of a retired soldier passing knowledge on to those still in uniform. Much of what the military does is shaped and pre-decided by colonels; the final decisions come as a result of the few slides a council of colonels present to General Officer Steering Committees. What colonels must know and do is important.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/08/20/reflections_on_being_a_colonel_114681.html

A Sergeant Major's Advice for a Field Grade Officer by Carl Cunningham

The transition to Major is probably the most difficult in the officer corps. The officer's power and influence drastically increase despite typically serving on a staff. Most senior officers maintain that Major is the first rank in which one becomes a "Company man/woman" where the focus is about the organization. And depending on the branch, the initial assignment may be the first time working above the battalion level. These changes in the officer's power and influence require an altered approach to relationships, systems and processes, and the mentoring of subordinate officers. Because the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) does not provide many Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) engagement opportunities for its students, I offer some thoughts for new field grade (FG) officers moving back out into the force. The paper's focus applies to Majors in any branch and at any echelon, but especially those who will lead a staff section at the brigade level or above.

http://fieldgradeleader.themilitaryleader.com/advice/

The Greatest Leadership Article I've Ever Read by Kevin Kruse

Recently, my friend Carl got a new job with the task of quickly building a 600-person pharmaceutical sales team, and leading that team as the company enters a new therapeutic market. He's an industry veteran who excels at strategy, execution and motivating his team. But he gave me a call because there was one leadership area he wasn't as comfortable with: diversity & inclusion. "My CEO is big on culture and this place is very different than all the other companies I've worked in," Carl explained. "He told me that he expects me—from day one—to walk the talk on inclusion and to create a strengths-based culture. How do I do that? How should I start?" We agreed to meet up for coffee to talk about it, and the first thing I did was hand him a printout with my scribbled notes in the column. "What's this?" Carl asked. "This," I said, "is the greatest leadership article I have ever read."

https://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinkruse/2019/11/05/the-greatest-leadership-article-ive-ever-read/amp/

Reflection on Reading Great Books with Colonels by Jacqueline Whitt, Ph.D.

Once, in a conversation with a colleague I said casually, "All I really want to do is teach Henry V to colonels." Shakespeare's play has some of the most profound insights on leadership and strategy available — plus, I like asking students to do things that make them just a little uncomfortable. And just like that, I became an instructor for an elective course, "Great Books for Senior Leaders," at the United States Army War College. I co-taught the course for two years, and this year, I taught it on my own. Some of my favorite teaching moments and most profound insights have come simply through the act of reading great books with colonels.

Reading great books, and more importantly, reading them in community, pulls us out of our comfort zones. And military officers need to read more whole books, from a variety of genres, and then talk about them. Reading epic poetry and Russian novels and ancient philosophy is hard. Confronting and understanding the mental models and worldviews of people from other times and places and cultures is challenging work. Thinking about how books that are not explicitly about war and military affairs might nevertheless have something to say about leadership, strategy, or the contemporary environment requires critical and creative engagement. Ultimately, reading broadly, and reading outside of one's field of expertise, encourages the range, emotional intelligence, creative thinking, self-awareness, reflection, empathy, and openness to experience that are critical for senior leaders, but which are difficult to assess and develop and are, according to many, notably deficient in the military's top ranks. Reading great books together makes the journey that much more meaningful.

https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/reflections-on-reading-great-books-with-colonels/

Military Virtues by Major Joseph Chapa, Oxford Ph.D Candidate

Though professional military organizations rely upon strict chains of command and cultures of rule following, the justified application of violence in war consists of art as well as science. There are many times subordinates ought simply to obey the orders they have received. There are other times, however, that it is not so simple. There are many circumstances in which combatants must use their best judgment to apply standing guidance to the individual case presented to them, and this is no easy task. Any mere system of rules will fail to capture this sense in which refusing to deliver on a teammate's request can be a moral good—and yet virtue ethics can capture it quite well.

https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/10/9/reviewing-military-virtues

Virtue Ethics and The United States Army by Caleb McCary

In 2003, I reported to Basic Combat Training. I knew as soon as the bus pulled onto the post late in the evening that the next ten weeks of my life would like very different from anything I had experienced before. When the bus pulled up to the reception building, a forbidding looking NCO boarded and began barking instructions at the group of nervous young men. Most of us were barely out of high school. As we stumbled off the bus and into the reception building, we were surrounded by posters of soldiers engaging in various challenging physical activities. Each poster was accompanied by a letter which, when all the posters were viewed together, spelled out the acronym "LDRSHIP." Loyalty. Duty. Respect. Selfless Service. Honor. Integrity. Personal Courage. These Army values would be drilled into each of us over the next ten weeks as the Army sought to instill in a group of raw recruits a shared and consistent idea about the values needed to be a soldier in the United States Army. By the time we reached the end of the crucible of Basic Training and our final training exercise, we stood in formation in front of our drill sergeants. The drill sergeants walked down the line of new soldiers and handed each of us a small pendant to hang on our identification tags. It was a tag that had the Army values stamped on it. Symbolically, this ceremony meant that we had completed Basic Combat Training and now, in the eyes of the Army, had the Army values ingrained into us. We were not civilians anymore. We were not recruits anymore. We were soldiers. The expectation was that we would leave Basic Training ready to live out the Army values as soldiers, whether in or out of uniform. Unfortunately, ten weeks of Basic Combat Training is insufficient for inculcating the kind of values the Army wants to see in its soldiers. This article will describe the need for ongoing character development training in soldiers using a modified system of virtue ethics based on the Army values that nests with current Army doctrine and training soldiers already receive.

https://blog.usejournal.com/virtue-ethics-and-the-united-states-army-5702fef93990

The Two Questions We Should Ask Ourselves Every Day by LTC Ryan Hill

President Dwight Eisenhower is credited with saying, “The things that are urgent are seldom important, and the things that are important are seldom urgent.” His statement hits on a problem that haunts all leaders; we often spend too much time on things that seem to be important, but really are not.

One of the most significant lessons I’ve learned over my military career is that urgent matters have a way of dressing up like they are important and then sneaking in and stealing time. As leaders, we are inundated with countless daily distractions: phone calls, emails, pop-up meetings, and drop-in visits. Even without these interruptions, our calendars are full, and our to-do lists are long! All these little things scream for our attention and combine to form a ‘cloud of busyness’ that prevents us from identifying what is really important.

I have found that the minutia can sometimes consume me because I simply fail to take the time to break through that cloud and think about my priorities; I fail to slow down enough to see what I’m really doing with my day. To counter this lack of reflection, I began to ask myself two basic questions on my drive into work each day. These questions not only help me prioritize my day, but have helped keep me centered on what is important.

https://fromthegreennotebook.com/2020/03/03/the-two-questions-we-should-ask-ourselves-everyday/amp/

Three Ways to Improve Your Cultural Fluency by Jane Hyun and Douglas Conant

On Doug’s first trip to visit Campbell’s Mexican production facilities during his tenure as the new CEO, he held a large group meeting with employees. In his earnest but brash way, he pressed them to engage in candid dialogue with him. It didn’t go well. The employees were visibly uncomfortable and it was clear that they felt the forum was disrespectful. Doug later learned that the employees thought it was inappropriate to speak so openly to leadership in a group setting. He apologized to the local management and acknowledged his lack of understanding. It was an early — and humbling — lesson in the importance of cultural fluency.

Cultural fluency in leadership is critical for building trust, and is a competency that has been repeatedly linked to financial performance. Building long term cross-cultural relationships leads to increased creativity and out-of-the box thinking. It is an essential ingredient for driving productivity and innovation while also staving off the kind of uniformity that can lead to “groupthink.”

https://hbr.org/2019/04/3-ways-to-improve-your-cultural-fluency

Finally Getting Serious About Professional Military Education by James Lacey, Ph.D.

Two years ago, much of the professional military education community was startled by the National Defense Strategy's declaration that its wares had stagnated and that the community had lost focus on lethality and ingenuity. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recently responded with a new vision and guidance statement for professional military education: Developing Today's Joint Officers for Tomorrow's Ways of War. As the document is signed by each service chief, it neatly erases tensions between what the Joint Chiefs as a corporate body believe is necessary to educate officers capable of leading in a joint environment and each individual chief's responsibility to educate officers within their own services. Most crucially, the new vision signals that the services are "all in" on the need to reform professional military education.

Take a moment to consider the implications of this "buy-in."

The Joint Chiefs are not only agreeing that professional military education has stagnated but also boldly stating the system is not currently optimized to give them what they need to win future wars. In perusing the document, it becomes clear that the Joint Chiefs are casting almost all the blame for this failure at senior-level professional military education. This valuation is probably an on-target assessment, as — for over seven decades — the U.S. military has won nearly every tactical battle it has fought without translating this battlefield acumen into the strategic results desired by policymakers.

https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/finally-getting-serious-about-professional-military-education/

Mission Command: A Senior Enlisted Leader's Perspective by MSG Fred Tolman

At the 2010 Joint Warfighting Conference, then-commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, retired Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis, caught the attention of senior-level leaders by saying, "I don't care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if you cannot create harmony on the battlefield based on trust across joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational lines, you need to go home, because your leadership is obsolete." Mattis was clear that military leaders should not base leadership proficiency solely on tactics and personal experience, but also on the ability to relay tactics and orders accurately to subordinates to be executed properly. This builds trust that the commander's intent will be executed properly down the chain of command. The Army-wide philosophy of command and control is known as mission command. This article analyzes the concepts of mission command and uses contextual examples from the perspective of a senior leader.

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/2020/May/Mission-Command/

The Importance of Broadening Our NCO Corps by CSM John Murray (1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment) & SGM Jason Mosher (XVIII Airborne Corps)

As young Soldiers going through basic training in the late 1980s, we were taught that when given an order by an officer or a noncommissioned officer, you executed that order without question. You didn't ask why you needed to do it, and you certainly didn't argue about the justification for doing it. You simply did it because you knew, unequivocally, that it was the right thing to do. I believe that this lack of questioning was based on an internal trust and respect in our leadership, which was taught to us at an early age. To change with the times and to bring the NCO Corps in line with what is expected of us in the future, we must be better prepared to answer the "why" in any question that is asked of us. To do this successfully, we must become relevant by broadening ourselves though more education and training.

Today, when giving a Soldier tasks to complete, the Soldier often will ask "why" and question the validity of the task or detail. We do not believe that this is because of a lack of trust or to be disrespectful. One must remember the culture in which our young Soldiers have grown up. They do not know a life without immediate access to knowledge; they have grown up with smartphones, computers and social media. If they need to know something, they do not have to find a book to look it up as we were often told to do. They simply looked it up on the internet. Because of this instant knowledge, they have a stronger desire to know the "why" of things. Both the officer and the NCO Corps need to understand their jobs in ways that were not required 20 years ago. If they cannot answer or explain the "why," their Soldiers will get the "why" somewhere else — perhaps from other Soldiers, the internet, or from a source outside their chain of command. When a Soldier seeks answers in this manner, can we really control the validity of the answers received, and more importantly, passed along as truth? Each of these solutions takes away from the trust building between Soldiers and leaders.

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/2015/April/The-importance-of-broadening-our-NCO-Corps/

Good Strategy, Moral Strategy, and the Presumption of Ways by Robert Mihara

At some risk of misrepresenting previous authors, I revisit the place and nature of morality in war that several contributors to The Bridge have already commented on. Thus far, the arguments have approached the subject from three alternative points of view that I believe deserve further context drawn from the theory and art of strategy. Michael Lortz in "National Security Goals and the Dancing Boys of Afghanistan" began the discussion by defending a form of hard pragmatism, arguing that morality must serve the object in view and not hinder the pursuit of that end. Simplistically summarized, he argues that the ends do in fact justify the means, articulating an "ends-determined" view. Nate Wike, in a later post, rejects the premise of Lortz's ends-determined view by asserting that moral thresholds can and should be applied as independent criteria for determining methods and policies for military operations. In "What Would We Lose by Winning," Wike argues that operations consistent with our moral norms are both more effective for the ends we claim to seek and also less corrosive to the moral fiber of US troops witnessing abuses such as the bacha bazi in Afghanistan that Lortz and Wike describe. Wike presents a "normative-constrained" view that establishes morality as an imperative. Most recently in "National Security, Pragmatism, and Human Rights," Justin Lynch posted an argument that is similar to Wike's but focused on the efficacy of normative-constrained methods. Lynch's rejoinder holds that permitting or

condoning immoral practices naturally threatens indigenous support in the conflict area and undermines domestic public support at home. All three arguments are potentially misleading in that they overlook the strategic foundation to such complex questions of morality and the determination of means and methods in war. I will present my criticism in two parts, continuing their focus on Afghanistan.

https://thestrategybridge-org.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2015/12/27/good-strategy-moral-strategy-and-the-presumption-of-ways?format=amp

Military Bearing - Projecting Confidence and a Command Presence by CSM Naamon Grimmett

An Army's ability to fight and win its nations wars is not solely dependent on weapons and training alone. It also rest on the attitude or climate of units, leaders and Soldiers. Find a winning Army and you will find a positive climate; the opposite is true about a losing army. While an Army's climate is comprised of many factors, the most predominate is its military bearing, the way it conducts business from the top officers and noncommissioned officers down to the most junior Soldier. If an army possesses a positive climate at its heart, you will find a strong military bearing. Soldiers and leaders, who conduct themselves as professionals and do what is right regardless of the situation in which they find themselves, go the extra mile even when it would be easier not to in both peace and war.

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/2018/January/Military-Bearing/

13 Signs of High Emotional Intelligence by Justin Bariso

In 1995, psychologist and science journalist Daniel Goleman published a book introducing most of the world to the nascent concept of emotional intelligence. The idea--that an ability to understand and manage emotions greatly increases our chances of success--quickly took off, and it went on to greatly influence the way people think about emotions and human behavior. But what does emotional intelligence look like, as manifested in everyday life? For the past two years, I've explored that question in researching my forthcoming book, EQ, Applied. In doing so, I've identified a number of actions that illustrate how emotional intelligence appears in the real world. Here are 13 of them.

https://www.inc.com/justin-bariso/13-things-emotionally-intelligent-people-do.html

These Six Intelligences Will Drive Smart Leadership in Disrupted Times by John Kao, M.D.

Sometimes it takes a crisis to reveal gaps and discontinuities. The coronavirus pandemic has revealed how some leaders are challenged by the unexpected and the need to innovate "ahead of the curve." The crisis heightens our need to re-evaluate prevailing models of leadership that have sometimes been found wanting. Coronavirus is an extreme wakeup call, but it is emblematic of an era whose very essence is disruption. Even before the current pandemic, we lived in a perfect storm of accelerated innovation, geopolitical uncertainty and black swans. Noted science fiction author William Gibson captured the singular nature of our times with one comment, "We have no future, because our present is so disrupted." Unfortunately, our leadership playbooks often remain largely frozen in time, originally designed for the authority and control needed to keep industrial bureaucracies functioning efficiently. But we are in the midst of a fourth industrial revolution that requires agility, rapid innovation and fluid, networked organizational designs.

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/03/six-essential-intelligences-shape-smart-leadership-in-disrupted-times

Power & Influence: Emotional Intelligence Matters by SGM Sean M. Horval

Learning how to be an effective leader is not acquired in a college course. It is an emotional process that requires personal credibility, empathy, and logic. Clinical psychologist and leadership expert Steven Stein (2017) defines leadership as "the behaviors used in any situation where you influence the thoughts, behaviors, or feelings of one or more people"" (p. 14). Greek philosopher Aristotle described this as ethos, pathos, and logos (Covey, 2013). Consequently, it is fair to say that if one approaches leadership from within, development can occur in cycles of insight, humility, and rediscovery. To be an effective organizational leader, sergeants major must have the capacity and emotional literacy to influence the attitudes and beliefs of others. To do this they must not only emotionally understand themselves, but their subordinates, peers, and superiors as well.

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/2020/January/Power-and-Influence/

The US Army Will Experience Battlefield Surprise: Here's How to Prepare Leaders and Organizations to Overcome It by Jim Greer, Ph.D.

On October 6, 1973 the Israel Defense Forces were surprised when the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces commenced what would become known to Israelis as the Yom Kippur War and to Arabs as the October War. The true surprise, though, was not when and how the

war commenced. The Israelis had had some indications that war was coming soon. They had seen the buildup of Egyptian and Syrian forces and capabilities, the increasingly warlike rhetoric of the senior leaders of both Arab countries, and the pattern of activity indicating that war was imminent. The true surprise came a few hours after the war began, when the Egyptian and Israeli forces made contact. After decisive victories in 1948, 1956, and 1967, the IDF leaders and units were confident that they could rapidly overcome the Egyptians in the air and on the ground and defeat their forces. They maintained that confidence even when initiation of the conflict on a Jewish holy day slowed reactions and mobilization. But reality turned out to be far different from their expectations. In previous wars, in particular the Six-Day War only six years earlier, the Israeli Air Force had dominated the skies and Israeli armored forces had destroyed and humiliated the Egyptian Army on the ground. But, instead of a quick and decisive victory, the IDF was subjected to a battlefield surprise the like of which they had never encountered.

This example confirms what most of us already know: that in almost every conflict some sort of battlefield surprise emerges. In this case battlefield surprise refers to the surprise generated by new technologies or unexpected doctrine. This is particularly true in twenty-first century warfare, when the pace of technological change is so great and therefore the opportunities to employ combinations of new technologies to create surprise is greater than in the past. Understanding this fact requires us to prepare to encounter battlefield surprise in our future conflicts. Leaders at every echelon have a requirement to prepare their soldiers, subordinate leaders, and organizations to anticipate that surprise will occur, and adapt to and overcome such surprise when it does.

https://mwi.usma.edu/us-army-will-experience-battlefield-surprise-heres-prepare-leaders-organizations-overcome/

The Military Leader's Role in Mitigating War-related Moral Injury by LTC(R) Pete Kilner, Ph.D.

War is a breeding ground for moral injury. Even in a justified war that is fought justly, combat soldiers are likely to intentionally kill enemy soldiers, unintentionally harm civilians, and witness levels of violence and senseless suffering that challenge their assumptions about their own moral goodness and the goodness of the world. When soldiers commit, fail to prevent, or witness acts in war that violate their own moral codes, they become susceptible to suffering long-term shame, anger, alienation, loss of religious belief, and other effects known as moral injury. In this article, I argue that moral injury in combat veterans can be mitigated by effective small-unit leadership. There are actions that leaders can take before, during, and after their units' combat deployments that reduce the likelihood and magnitude of morally injurious experiences. Ethical leaders can train and lead their soldiers in ways that reduce the likelihood that their soldiers will commit immoral acts in war. Pro-active leaders can also educate their soldiers to make sense of their justified and excusable actions in war[4]—to see themselves as good people who did their best to act honorably in the tragic, morally complex circumstances of war.

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/military-leaders-role-mitigating-war-related-moral-injury-pete-kilner

The Psychological Intangibles of Soldier Readiness by Christopher Vowels, Ph.D. and Steven Aude, Ph.D.

The U.S. Army has traditionally excelled at preparing its Soldiers, tactically and technically, for the rigors of combat. Yet the trend in contemporary warfare demands that attention and importance also be paid to the human dimension, as well as the tactical, in order to best prepare for the future fight. Recent doctrine continues to emphasize the need to maximize human potential and to understand the human factors/elements for multi-domain operations. These articles describe research conducted to help define the requisite Soldier attributes needed for sustained mission performance during combat operations.

The U.S. Army's ADP 6-0: Mission Command describes war as the following:

War is a human endeavor—a clash of wills characterized by the threat or application of force and violence, often fought among populations. It is not a mechanical process that can be precisely controlled by machines, calculations, or processes. Nor is it conducted in carefully controlled and predictable environments. Fundamentally, all war is about changing human behavior. It is both a contest of wills and a contest of intellect between two or more sides in conflict, with each trying to alter the behavior of the other side.

For the purposes of conducting the research, the authors used the adjective intangible to describe psychological concepts that contribute to Soldier mission readiness across the human dimension. Intangible psychological concepts include adaptability, self-awareness, sense-making, warrior ethos, confidence, resilience, moral ethical judgment, among others.

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/2019/November/Measuring-Intangibles-Part-1/#bio

Poor Leadership During Times of Disease: Malta and the Plague of 1838 by Andrew Zwilling, Ph.D.

Disease ravaged the population. Thousands died and those who survived were forced to isolate themselves in their homes as medical officials attempted to purge the pestilence from the area. The economy, previously growing and sound, came to a standstill. Blame for the disaster was widespread, but it was an absence of leadership that bore the brunt of responsibility. The government officials charged with protecting the population were lax in preparation for a possible disaster and were often insufficient in their response to events. While the above description could apply to any number of countries suffering from the current COVID-19 viral outbreak, the opening paragraph describes another historical example when pandemic brought a country to the brink — the outbreak of plague on the islands of Malta in 1813. By far the most covered historical incident has been the Spanish flu pandemic of 1918, though it is by no means the only other example. Reconstructed from official correspondence, private letters, and investigatory commissions, Malta's experience with the plague provides a good example of how poor leadership decisions can exacerbate an already bad situation and the consequences for an unprepared population.

https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/poor-leadership-during-times-of-disease-malta-and-the-plague-of-1813/

Leadership during Large-Scale Combat Operations by Major Jeremy Smith

It is the year 2025. Russia is pressuring a country in Eastern Europe to rejoin the former Soviet motherland. As tensions rise, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization requests that the United States deploy an Army corps and a Marine expeditionary force to join a newly formed coalition in U.S. European Command, sending the message that it will not tolerate further intimidation or aggression from Russia. The United States has been drawn into a large-scale conflict.

For the past twenty-five years, the United States had invested all of its defense spending into counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations all over the world, with a focus on U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Pacific Command. While this deployment to Eastern Europe came as a surprise, vast communication and logistical resources allowed the United States to send troops overseas quickly, with no outside interference. Once the combined joint task force entered the "dominate phase" of operations, division and brigade commanders started relying heavily on the only combat experience they had: limited contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Were they ready to lead in large-scale combat operations?

The scenario above summarizes a very realistic possibility based on the current national security strategy, which will require a force that can fight in all types of warfare. When 2025 comes, will our military leaders be ready to lead in large-scale combat operations? Of course they will. However, to be ready to lead in this type of warfare, we must adopt a few strategies.

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2020/Smith-Leader-LSCO/

What Can Military and Civilian Leader do to Prevent the Military's Politicization? By Risa Brooks, Ph.D.

When Capt. Brett Crozier's memo detailing the spread of COVID-19 on the USS Roosevelt leaked to the press on March 31, it painted a picture starkly at odds with the Trump administration's claim that it was firmly in control of the pandemic. Crozier described a dire situation and called for the Navy to get the sailors off the ship. Acting Navy Secretary Thomas Modly — a civilian political appointee — questioned Crozier's judgment, accused him (inaccurately) of recklessly copying his email to "20 or 30" recipients, and relieved him of command before an investigation by the military was complete. According to his own account, Modly was worried about President Donald Trump's reaction if he didn't act quickly. The president "wants him [Crozier] fired," Modly reportedly told a colleague. The acting secretary also feared for his job. Navy Secretary Richard Spencer, Modly's predecessor, had "lost his job because the Navy Department got crossways with the president," and he "didn't want that to happen again." Modly lost his job anyway — he was forced to resign after telling sailors assembled on the Roosevelt's flight deck that Crozier was "too naive or too stupid to be the commanding officer of a ship like this." Crozier, however, might yet get his command back. Navy leaders have recommended he be reinstated as the Roosevelt's captain, although the Pentagon appears divided on this.

https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/what-can-military-and-civilian-leaders-do-to-prevent-the-militarys-politicization/

Who Gets a Brown Beret? Rethinking Assignment to the Security Force Assistance Brigades by Jon Tishman

During planning for what became Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994, a prescient conversation occurred between planners from United States Atlantic Command and members of the Department of Justice. Despite establishing the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program under the Department of Justice to train a new Haitian police force, when told of how the political-military plan envisioned the department's execution of the operation, the Justice representative stated that the department "could not handle the mission." At the last minute, an Army infantry battalion was handed the responsibility to train, advise, and assist a newly created Haitian police force. This foreshadowed what would become the standard during America's post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—infantry and other combat arms units converted to advisors in an ad hoc fashion. That would begin to change with the US Army's new security force assistance brigades (SFABs), which are designed to provide conventional force training, advice, and assistance to foreign security forces.

https://mwi.usma.edu/gets-brown-beret-rethinking-assignments-security-force-assistance-brigades

The Evolving Operating Environment

Peering into the Crystal Ball: Holistically Assessing the Future of Warfare by RAND contributors Raphael S. Cohen, Nathan Chandler, Shira Efron, Bryan Frederick, Eugeniu Han, Kurt Klein, Forrest E. Morgan, Ashley L. Rhoades, Howard J. Shatz, and Yuliya Shokh

Where will the next war occur? Who will fight in it? Why will it occur? How will it be fought? This brief summarizes a series of reports that sought to answer these questions—looking out from now until 2030. The reports took the approach of examining these questions through the lenses of several trends—geopolitical, economic, environmental, legal, informational, and military—that will shape the contours of conflict. Military history is littered with mistaken predictions about the future of warfare that have left forecasters militarily unprepared—sometimes disastrously so—for the conflicts ahead. The United States has suffered its own share of bad predictions. Why do predictions about the future of warfare usually fall flat? More often than not, poor predictions stem from failing to think holistically about the factors that drive changes in the environment and the implications of those factors for warfare. Such considerations go well beyond understanding the operational implications of technology and include geopolitical, environmental, and economic changes. Furthermore, such factors as international laws, public opinion, and media coverage can constrain how states use force and, thus, how wars are fought.

Although successfully predicting the future of warfare is notoriously difficult, the U.S. military, for better or worse, is deeply invested in the forecasting business. All the armed services want to understand what the future of conflict holds for them because, given how long it takes to develop capabilities, they must gamble today on what kinds of technology and people they will need to win tomorrow's wars.

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/RB10000/RB10073/RAND_RB10073.pdf

The Missing Element in Crafting National Strategy: A Theory of Success by Dr. Frank Hoffman

There are fervent debates today about strategy, especially U.S. grand or national-level strategy. The study of grand strategy is a conceptual minefield. Gallons of ink have been spent on definitions, but these debates have done little to enhance U.S. strategic thinking or performance. Some academics dismiss national strategies as vain and hubristic, more grandiose than practical plans to obtain goals. Others criticize the tendency in U.S. policy circles to confuse grandiose objects and rhapsodic prose with pragmatic plans and appropriate means. But others contend that policymakers and their military advisors cannot escape the need to intelligently craft strategies to advance the Nation's interests. As Hal Brands notes, "grand strategy is neither a chimera nor an elusive holy grail, but rather an immensely demanding task that talented policymakers have still managed to do quite well." Yet scant practical work has been offered to help the next generation of practitioners create strategies in the midst of a disruptive strategic environment. Many books have been written, and numerous laments about lapses in U.S. strategy have been published. There is more art than science to designing a grand strategy, but the practice of strategy has always been a pragmatic art. Scholars at professional military education (PME) schools admit that more needs to be done to educate the joint community about the basic process and central, causal logic inherent to sound strategy. Most schools teach a general and linear process model, and there is a growing recognition about the need for an explicit causal logic in strategy formulation. As noted briefly in this journal two years ago, a theory of victory or success should be central to national planning processes. This is an overlooked element of strategy today both in the classroom and in the U.S. Government. Filling that gap will materially enhance our odds of gaining strategic success in the future and solve the puzzle for strategic practitioners. It is not a panacea to strategic competence, which involves many elements, but it is central to strategic success.

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2106508/the-missing-element-in-crafting-national-strategy-a-theory-of-success/

It's a Journey, Not a Destination: Seven Lessons for Military Planners by Mark Gilchrist

Planners never achieve perfection. Rarely do they meet their own exacting standards. The cumulative impacts of time, circumstance, and the adversary require constant iteration and revision. No plan survives contact with the enemy (or the commander, for that matter), but good planners understand that planning is an unending journey and the production of a plan is rarely the final destination. The best planners also understand that every opportunity to plan offers an opportunity to learn, as well.

Where opportunities to execute plans in full may be limited, military professionalism is honed through relentless and often thankless planning activities. But planning is far more than rigid adherence to a process. At its best, it is a human endeavor that aims to create shared understanding through the effective visualization and description of both the environment as well as possible approaches that can be applied to shape the environment in our favor. It is both art and science, can be deliberate or hasty, and always benefits from the intimate involvement of the commander.

https://mwi.usma.edu/journey-not-destination-seven-lessons-military-planners/

Expanding the Battlefield: An Important Fundamental of Multi-Domain Operations by LTG Eric Wesley and COL(R) Robert Simpson

Since its birth in 1775, the U.S. Army has often been at the forefront of battlefield innovation—once war begins. Its history of initial preparedness, however, is mixed. From the Revolution through Vietnam, America lost the first battle of many of its major wars. Bunker Hill, Fort Mackinac, Manassas, Kasserine, Task Force Smith, and Ia Drang underscore the cost of a failure to prepare between wars. In fact, the type of military dominance that the U.S. has enjoyed for the past 30 years is historically rare. Such dominance is also short-lived. This is especially true of great powers that miss major changes to the character of war. If the Army wants to avoid returning to the tendency to lose its first battles, it must transform. The potential, if not the imminent prospect, of war between the U.S. and one of several possible peer states represents the greatest threat of a catastrophic first battle loss; it has driven a renaissance of thinking about great-power competition and warfare. At the forefront of these discussions within the defense community has been the Army's Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept. As other services have begun to grapple with the same challenges addressed in this new operating concept, interest in both the problem and in MDO's proposed solutions has grown. Understanding, however, has unfortunately not grown as fast as interest. This article seeks to increase the depth of understanding of MDO in general and to describe some specific implications for modernizing the U.S. Army.

https://www.ausa.org/publications/expanding-battlefield-important-fundamental-multi-domain-operations

Transforming DOD for Agile Multidomain Command and Control by COL Douglas Creviston

Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous systems offer enhanced military capabilities to those nations that adopt and operationalize these technologies. Much like the airplane or nuclear weapons, these technologies are so significant that the Department of Defense should expect to transform in order to fully realize their benefits. Without data, neither human nor artificial intelligence has a basis for effective decision making. While human intelligence is capable of operating in a sparse data environment, many AI applications require big data sets to come into existence and continuous data flows to effectively operate. Unlike the airplane and nuclear weapons, AI and autonomy will be best operationalized not by a dedicated Service or force structure devoted to their employment, but by their incorporation into the existing forces in all domains. How might DOD need to change policy, leadership structures, and culture regarding data in order to enable the adoption and maximum benefit of AI and autonomous system technologies? From the academic and business communities, data science is defined as a "multidisciplinary field that concerns technologies, processes, and systems to extract knowledge and insight from data and to support reasoning and decision making under various kinds of uncertainty." The field of data science may be divided into two primary activities: managing the data and using (analyzing) the data. Many of the activities of data science use AI and in turn support the development and operation of autonomous systems. Advances in AI, autonomous systems, and big data analytics are especially relevant to emerging concepts of multidomain battle and associated multidomain command and control (MDC2). Existing C2 systems and concepts should be reconsidered in light of the transformative potential of AI and autonomy. Such a reevaluation should start with proven C2 theory, modify existing C2 doctrine if needed, and redesign C2 concepts and systems in order to gain additional capability.

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2106522/transforming-dod-for-agile-multidomain-command-and-control/

Army Multi-Domain Wargame Reveals C2 Shortfalls by Sydney Freedberg

Robotic mini-tanks. High-speed scout aircraft. High-powered jammers. Long-range artillery. More than 16,000 simulated troops and 13 locations. Last month's Unified Challenge wargame modeled a host of current future Army weapons, but the 400 human players found one thing painfully lacking: a real-time digital picture that could track their fast-moving, far-flung forces over the land, air, cyberspace, and the airwaves. As the Army hastens to turn its nascent concept for future conflict, Multi-Domain Operations, into a real-life way of war, it urgently needs a command system that can keep up with the complexity. It was actually the Air Force that figured this out first: They've been focused on Multi-Domain Command & Control (MDC2) as the critical piece of the problem from the start. But the two services are collaborating closely — there was a sizable Air Force contingent playing in Unified Challenge — and the Army is increasingly convinced MDC2 is critical. The problem is that Multi-Domain Command & Control isn't even a formal development program yet, let alone a working system you can try out in an exercise.

https://breakingdefense.com/2019/09/army-multi-domain-wargame-reveals-c2-shortfalls

Will New Doctrine Fix Mission Command? by COL(R) Doug Orsi and COL(R) Bobby Mundell

It is no secret that the U.S. Army has struggled to implement mission command in garrison or non-tactical environments since the rollout of the 2012 Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) and Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, Mission Command. The authors confirmed this by analyzing 52 U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Projects related to mission command. Students identified overly bureaucratic garrison processes as one of the trends that inhibited mission command. In April 2019, General Stephen Townsend, Major General Douglas Crissman, and Major Kelly McCoy wrote, "Reinvigorating the Army Approach to Mission Command: It's OK to 'Run with Scissors,'" which highlighted the underlying and persistent issue of "garrison bureaucracy often [being] at odds with our Army's mission command doctrine." Their July 2019 follow-up, subtitled "Leading with Mission Command" with Major General Gary Brito, addressed the need to practice mission command daily, "whether in garrison, during training, or while deployed for operations around the world." The recent publication in July 2019 of the updated ADP 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, shows the Army is moving forward in a new direction to address this problem.

But is updating the doctrine sufficient to answer its critics? Persistent execution challenges may go beyond what any doctrine can address. These challenges include a lack of trust and risk aversion engendered by bureaucracy, which hinder the application of mission command principles by Army leaders in garrison environments. Resolving these issues could allow the Army to make mission command something substantially valued by the force.

https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/new-doctrine-mission-command

The Joint Force Needs a Global Engagement Cycle by LTC Gregory M. Tomlin, Ph.D.

Step into any joint or coalition operations center and you will find planners, intelligence analysts, and operators bustling between working groups and decision boards related to the synchronization of joint fires. From developing target systems that support the commander's objectives, to validating and prioritizing individual targets, to assigning forces and assessing mission execution, the Joint Targeting Cycle (JTC) often drives the battle rhythm for combat operations. This process enables a staff to match available capabilities with desired lethal and nonlethal effects against an adversary, and it synchronizes intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) efforts with the deployment of ground, maritime, air, and cyber assets responsible for executing joint fires Since its inception after Operation Desert Storm, the JTC has been a critical methodology for integrating fires with other joint functions to achieve military objectives. Codified in Joint Publication (JP) 3-60, Joint Targeting, the six-phased cycle facilitates deliberate and dynamic targeting, regardless of time constraints, and provides the flexibility to conduct some phases concurrently. Unfortunately, its success in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, Odyssey Dawn, and Inherent Resolve has led some commanders to adopt the JTC to integrate other joint functions—particularly information—during planning and operations. This misconception has caused serious challenges by conflating the information and fires domains and forcing the distinct information function into the confines of the phases and tempo of a targeting cycle intended to generate air tasking orders and fire support plans. Below the threshold of armed conflict, the Department of Defense (DOD) must be prepared to support whole-of-government efforts or operate unilaterally to counter disinformation by influencing foreign individuals and populations.

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2106514/the-joint-force-needs-a-global-engagement-cycle/

A Better Idea Can Win the Next Big War for the Ground Forces by MG (R) Robert Scales

For old Cold Warriors like me, it's Groundhog Day. For the first time since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the ground services are beginning to emerge from two decades of fighting insurgents to refocus on fighting a big war against Russia or China. The Army in particular has been successful in founding an institution, Army Futures Command, specifically tailored to the task of future-gazing. The command is beginning to resurrect an empirical process by which the military looks into the future. This process has a provenance that goes back 30 years to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the onset of the Gulf War. The American ground services won a crushing victory against Saddam Hussein's army by following a game plan, AirLand Battle, that the Army devised in the late 1970s to halt a Soviet invasion across the inter-German border. Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf's hundred-hour "Great Wheel" maneuver succeeded in part because the inept Iraqi army put up little resistance. Further, the billiard table terrain of Iraq and Kuwait was perfectly suited for large-scale blitzkrieg warfare reminiscent of the German Ardennes offensive in 1940 and Patton's armored rush across France in 1944. Desert Storm was a catharsis for the Army. The victory cast off the stigma of Vietnam and reestablished the respectability of the Army among America's warfighting institutions. Buried in the rush to embrace multi-domain operations is an all-but-forgotten future-gazing effort the Army began soon after Desert Storm. In 1996, General Dennis Reimer, then Army chief of staff, created the Army After Next program to look deep into the future to about 2020 to 2025. I was Army After Next's first director. Casting that far ahead led our group to question many of the accepted tenets derived from the Army's experience in Desert Storm. To understand the future, we looked deep into the past to identify patterns and shifts in warfare induced principally by technology. We reached several conclusions that differed considerably from the accepted tenets of the time.

First, we came to accept the heretical insight that the revolution wrought by precision weapons and manned and unmanned aerial sensors shifted the classical warfighting balance between firepower and maneuver strictly to the former. A firepower-intensive battlefield always favors the defensive. History told us that stalemate, attrition, and catastrophic losses were the inevitable consequences of a firepower-dominant battlefield. We concluded that the only way to avoid costly attrition was to increase the speed of movement across the deadly zone that separates warring sides.

https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/a-better-idea-can-win-the-next-big-war-for-the-ground-services/

The Lost Art of Deterrence Education by Curtis McGiffin

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) have fundamentally reset the strategic direction of the United States military. Most notable is the underlying shift from terrorism to inter-state strategic competition as "the primary concern in U.S. national security." Additionally, the NDS portrays a long-term environment of "rapid dispersion of technologies, and new concepts of warfare and competition that span the entire spectrum of conflict…" Moreover, the Secretary of Defense noted in the NPR that "we must look reality in the eye and see the world as it is, not as we wish it to be." He also emphasized that the DoD's top priority is to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent capable of deterring both a nuclear attack against the U.S. and its allies as well as "preventing large-scale conventional warfare between nuclear-armed states for the foreseeable future." This sobering shift in national security focus reminds us of Brodie's axiom that "the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/10/03/the_lost_art_of_deterrence_education_114785.html

Information on the Twenty-First Centure Battlefield: Proposing the Army's Seventh Warfighting Function by Captain Charles M. Kelly

In May 2013, Ukrainian artillery officer Yaroslav Sherstuk designed a smartphone application to decrease the artillery targeting process from minutes to less than fifteen seconds. The application experienced initial success with upward of nine thousand Ukrainian soldiers using it to conduct fire missions against Russian forces. However, the independent security firm CrowdStrike reported a Russian information attack on the application via malware offered Russian forces "the potential ability to map out a unit's composition and hierarchy, determine their plans, and even triangulate their approximate location." Russian forces presumably used the malware to target Ukrainian artillery units employing the application. This example aptly demonstrates the character of war confronting modern militaries in the information age. The U.S. Army's current warfighting model does not adequately reflect the reality of this evolution. The Army should adopt information as the seventh warfighting function because the rapid change in the character of war brought about by the advent of the internet enables the weaponization of information. Furthermore, the information warfighting function would enable the adequate integration of information in operational planning and execution and provide an improved ability to apply force below the threshold of lethal effects.

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2020/Kelly-Info-warfighting/

Harnessing Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems Across the Seven Joint Functions by CH (COL) Brian Ray, Ph.D., COL Jeanne Forgey, and MAJ Ben Mathias

Although the 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes technological innovation as well as the way it will change the overall character of war, the joint force is not adequately positioned to share best practices and lessons learned among key players in the artificial intelligence/autonomous systems (AI/AS) space. To address this shortcoming, joint manning documents across the force should add an AI/AS cell made up of officers, warrant officers, and senior noncommissioned officers in order to effectively incorporate technological best practices across the seven joint functions. This increase of specialized staffing is similar to the approach that the Army took in 2003 at the brigade level with the creation of knowledge management as a distinct discipline and staff function. With knowledge management, the Army sought to "help commanders drive the operations process through enhanced understanding and visualization . . . thereby enabling them to envision a set of desired future conditions that represent the operation's end state." Embracing similar new approaches and techniques in the AI/AS space is in keeping with advice offered by Rear Admiral Andrew Loiselle, the deputy director for Future Joint Force Development on the Joint Staff J7, who stated, the joint force "cannot expect success fighting tomorrow's conflicts with yesterday's weapons and equipment. Neither is modernization defined solely by hardware. It requires changes in the way we organize and employ forces."

This article explores the most likely impacts of AI/AS on each of seven joint functions: command and control (C2), intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, sustainment, and information. These functions represent groups of related activities that provide commanders and staff with the ability to synchronize and execute military operations. Each of the functions, which is aligned with the Joint Capability Areas and Functional Capability Boards, allows for effective assessment and investment decisions by policymakers.

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2076668/harnessing-artificial-intelligence-and-autonomous-systems-across-the-seven-join/

Artificial Intelligence is the Future of Warfare (Just Not in the Way You Think) by LTC(R) Paul Maxwell, Ph.D.

Artificial intelligence is among the many hot technologies that promise to change the face of warfare for years to come. Articles abound that describe its possibilities and warn those who fall behind in the AI race. The Department of Defense has duly created the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center in the hopes of winning the AI battle. Visions exist of AI enabling autonomous systems to conduct missions, achieving sensor fusion, automating tasks, and making better, quicker decisions than humans. AI is improving rapidly and some day in the future those goals may be achieved. In the meantime, AI's impact will be in the more mundane, dull, and monotonous tasks performed by our military in uncontested environments. Artificial intelligence is a rapidly developing capability. Extensive research by academia and industry is resulting in shorter training time for systems and increasingly better results. AI is effective at certain tasks, such as image recognition, recommendation systems, and language translation. Many systems designed for these tasks are fielded today and producing very good results. In other areas, AI is very short of human-level achievement. Some of these areas include working with scenarios not seen previously by the AI; understanding the context of text (understanding sarcasm, for example) and objects; and multi-tasking (i.e., being able to solve

problems of multiple type). Most AI systems today are trained to do one task, and to do so only under very specific circumstances. Unlike humans, they do not adapt well to new environments and new tasks.

https://mwi.usma.edu/artificial-intelligence-future-warfare-just-not-way-think/

The Ethics of Acquiring Disruptive Military Technologies by C. Anthony Pfaff, Ph.D.

Technological innovation is proceeding at a rapid pace and is having a dramatic effect on warfare. Not only do technologies such as artificial intelligence, human enhancement, and cyber reduce risk to soldiers and civilians alike, they also expand the kinds of actors who can pursue policy goals through military means. As a result, their development can make the use of force more likely even while reducing individual risk. Moreover, by changing how soldiers fight, they change who a soldier is, which has broad implications not just for military recruitment and training, but also the military's relationship with the society it defends. Managing this change will require not only an understanding of disruptive technologies but also the establishment of norms to govern their development. Disruptive technologies change how actors compete in a given venue, whether in a market or on a battlefield. What makes such technologies disruptive is not their novelty or complexity, but rather how their particular attributes interact with a specific community of users in a particular environment. This interaction can raise moral concerns through its impact on human autonomy, justice, well-being, and social disruption. These categories thus offer a framework for assessing the moral effect, necessity, and proportionality of disruptive technologies to determine whether and how they should be developed.

https://tnsr.org/2020/01/the-ethics-of-acquiring-disruptive-military-technologies/

Guiding the Unknown: Ethical Oversight of Artificial Intelligence for Autonomous Weapon Capabilities by Gretchen Nutz

It is not news that autonomous weapons capabilities powered by artificial intelligence are evolving fast. Many scholars and strategists foresee this new technology changing the character of war and challenging existing frameworks for thinking about just or ethical war in ways the U.S. national security community is not yet prepared to handle. Until U.S. policy makers know enough to draw realistic ethical boundaries, prudent U.S. policy makers are likely to focus on measures that balance competing obligations and pressures during this ambiguous development phase. On the one hand, leaders have an ethical responsibility to prepare for potential threats from near-peer competitors such as China. But leaders also face a competing obligation to ensure increasingly autonomous systems do not spark or escalate an unnecessary conflict that would violate Americans' understanding of the appropriate use of force. The following hypothetical scenarios illustrate some of the competing obligations and pressures U.S. technology experts suggest national security leaders must balance and address now.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/09/11/guiding_the_unknown_ethical_oversight_of_artificial_

intelligence_for_autonomous_weapon_capabilities_114735.html

Developing Readiness to Trust Artificial Intelligence within Warfighting Teams by CH (MAJ) Marlon Brown

We are at the beginning of a rapid integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into military operations. The National Security Strategy of the United States lists the rapid progression in the field of AI as one of several emerging technologies critical to national security. The Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America echoes the concern and addresses the need to "invest broadly in military application of autonomy, artificial intelligence, and machine learning, including rapid application of commercial breakthroughs, to gain competitive military advantages" as part of modernizing key capabilities to build a more lethal force.



Currently, AI integration is limited and has yet to alter warfighting significantly, especially at the tactical level. Humans are still in full control. Because civilian and military leaders are cautious about entrusting any AI analysis and decision-making that may directly affect human life, many expect this norm to continue. However, this type of human and technology partnership is likely to change because adversaries will challenge the United States with their own robust use of AI. No matter how many prominent science and technology heavyweights propose banning autonomous weapons or how reasonable arguments against AI development may be, the "AI genie of innovation is out of the bottle: it cannot be stuffed back inside." Adversaries are investing highly in the technology and so is the United States.

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2020/Brown-AI-ready/

From Our Foxhole: Empowering Tactical Leaders to Achieve Strategic AI Goals by James Long

The race to harness artificial intelligence for military dominance is on — and China might win. Whoever wins the AI race will secure critical technological advantages that allow them to shape global politics. The United States brings considerable strengths — an unparalleled university system, a culture of innovation, and the only military that bestrides the globe — to this contest. It's also constrained by shortcomings. Washington's most serious problem isn't a shortage of ideas. It's a shortage of talent. And this shortage is large enough to threaten national security. While the current administration has publicly recognized the need to invest in AI talent, a senior defense official admitted that "finding, borrowing, begging and creating talent is a really big challenge for all of us." Institutions like the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center and university research labs are central to the Pentagon's development strategy; however, challenges ranging from data collection to refining operational concepts place huge burdens on existing technical talent.

https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/from-our-foxhole-empowering-tactical-leaders-to-achieve-strategic-ai-goals/

59 Percent Likely Hostile by Daniel Eichler and Ronald Thompson



Rucking with his platoon, a future reconnaissance soldier stops for a moment to flip down his chest-mounted tablet and unpack his nano drone. He launches the Artificial Intelligence (AI)-powered Squad Reconnaissance application, and taps "Perform Defensive Scan." The pocket-sized drone whizzes out of his hand and races down the trail in search of threats. Fifteen minutes later, the soldier feels his tablet vibrate — the drone found something. The application warns him that a group of three adult males are one kilometer ahead and closing. It assigns them a 59 percent chance of being hostile based on their location, activity, and appearance. Clicking on this message, three options flicker onto his screen — investigate further, pass track to remotely piloted aircraft, or coordinate kinetic strike. Depending on the soldier — his instincts, his temperament, his experience — "59 percent hostile" will either be interpreted as an even coin toss, or considered well over 50 percent and bound to happen. The language of probability lends itself to relatively easy interpretation. Yet sometimes common sense can oversimplify. It's tempting to distill these decisions into a binary option (e.g., the group is or is not hostile), but the outcome is more complicated. For example, the probability function in this case means that while 59 times out of 100 the group will be deemed hostile, 41 times they won't be. Moreover, the addition of new variables increases uncertainty.

https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/59-percent-likely-hostile/

2020 Strategic Note on Religion and Diplomacy

The Transatlantic Policy Network on Religion & Diplomacy (TPNRD) released its 2020 Strategic Note on Religion & Diplomacy. This annual resource is designed to help diplomats, policymakers, and other foreign policy professionals to recognize and understand the intersection of religion and the most pressing issues today in world affairs. The document highlights key recent developments pertaining to the religious dimensions of major topics in foreign policy, offering a brief analysis of how religion fits into the picture, how religion may affect future developments, and suggestions about how to learn more. It includes the contributions of several scholars and covers a wide array of topics: COVID-19 and Religion, India's Anti-Muslim Citizenship Amendment, and Iranian Religious Soft Power.

https://religionanddiplomacy.org.uk/2020/04/16/tpnrd-releases-its-2020-strategic-note/

Preparing for a Dark Future: Biological Warfare in the 21st Century by Thomas Mahnken

News of the spread of COVID-19 aboard the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt and the subsequent relief of its Commanding Officer has highlighted the tension that exists between maintaining military readiness and the need to safeguard the health of members of the armed forces in the face of a pandemic.

The disease has been a feature of war for the vast majority of human history – from the plague that ravaged Athens early in the Peloponnesian War, killing the Athenian strategos Pericles; to the diseases that European settlers brought with them to the New World, devastating local populations; to the host of tropical diseases that caused appalling casualties in the China-Burma-India and Southwest Pacific theaters in World War II. The fact that we were surprised by the emergence, growth, and spread of COVID-19 reflects the false conceit of 21st century life that we have "conquered" disease. In fact, pandemics are but one class of low-probability but high-impact contingencies that we could face in the coming years, including an earthquake or other natural disaster in a major urban area, regime change in an important state, and the collapse of financial markets leading to a global depression.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/04/16/preparing_for_a_dark_future_biological_warfare_in_the_21st_century_115208.html

Affordable, Abundant, and Autonomous: The Future of Ground Warfare by Liam Collins and Brandon Morgan

Transitions, whether in professional sports or business, are critical to get right. Those who get them right reap the benefits of championships or market share; those who do not, become easy wins, lose market share, or simply cease to exist (such as Kodak or Blockbuster). Transitions for militaries are no different. Between the world wars, Germany developed its blitzkrieg ("lightning warfare") doctrine while the French developed the Maginot Line. Thus, as the U.S. Army finds itself in transition after nearly 20 years of fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it must get it right.

This is not the Army's first major transition. Following the Vietnam War, the Army's conceptual focus transitioned from counterinsurgency to the employment of new, high-tech armor integrated with state-of-the-art air power to confront the Soviet Union. This new concept, called AirLand Battle, arrived from a wholesale transformation of the Army's doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities. Today, after decades focused on counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency, the Army is transitioning to another battlefield concept known as multi-domain operations. This concept envisions the simultaneous employment of army, navy, air force, cyber, and space forces to compete with, and if necessary, defeat Russia or China in armed conflict.

https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/affordable-abundant-and-autonomous-the-future-of-ground-warfare

We Are Missing Opportunities to Build Sustained, Total Force Readiness Inside Brigade Combat Teams by LTC Nicholas Melin, D.Phil.

Building readiness to fight and to win in large-scale combat operations is the Army's number one priority, and the Army's combat training centers (CTCs) are the crucible where the capabilities of the Army's primary fighting formations, brigade combat teams (BCTs), are tested. The train-up for and execution of a CTC rotation is how a BCT is made ready for combat; funding, personnel, training time, and priority for training resources all funnel to BCTs to allow commanders to certify their units from squad through battalion levels. Once CTC training is complete, the unit is deemed ready for worldwide deployment. In fact, one could argue that

the CTC rotation is the primary way the Army builds BCT readiness. There is, however, a gap in the Army's approach to building BCT readiness that needs further emphasis. That gap lies in the hundreds of echelons-above-brigade (EAB) enablers that are task-organized to a BCT both at the CTC and when deployed to combat. These units, which in total amount to an entire additional battalion (over five hundred soldiers) of combat power, are prepared for deployment individually by their EAB battalions and brigades but have no habitual relationships with the BCTs they will support. BCTs and their attached enablers meet at the CTC, train together for a month, and then scatter across the United States to their parent units. The BCT does not build readiness with its enablers ahead of the CTC, nor does it sustain them during the post-CTC period when the likelihood of deployment to crisis or contingency is highest. This article highlights the challenges posed by the current approach to integrating enablers into BCTs, identifies steps BCTs can take now, and offers institutional recommendations for formal, regional alignment of enablers from across the Total Force with BCTs and divisions. This alignment must be anchored to CTC rotations and should take into account units identified as deploying together in contingency plans. With habitual relationships in place and the CTC as a shared crucible experience, leaders can build and sustain BCT and enabler readiness.

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/March-April-2020/Melin-Opportunities/

Is the Infantry Brigade Combat Team Becoming Obsolete? by CPT Daniel Vazquez

The infantry community has a problem. The centerpiece of the Army's operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the infantry brigade combat team, is in danger of becoming obsolete in the face of near-peer opponents. This formation of three infantry battalions, an engineer battalion, an artillery battalion, a cavalry squadron, and a support battalion needs to be restructured to maximize an infantry brigade's chances of success in an era of fast-paced and rapidly evolving multidomain operations. For the first time in 50 years, the infantry brigade can expect to have its artillery outgunned and be under electronic and aerial attack. Army leaders often note that multidomain operations will not only have an impact on Army organizations and operations but will drive Army modernization efforts as well. I suggest that the Army needs to shift away from three infantry battalions in an infantry brigade to two. This will allow the brigade to bring in sorely needed electronic warfare and air defense capabilities that currently do not exist in the unit and increase other existing capabilities that will prove essential in a future fight.

https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/is-the-infantry-brigade-combat-team-becoming-obsolete/

Potential for Army Integration of Autonomous Systems by Warfighting Function by MAJ Thomas Ryan and Vickram Mittal, Ph.D.

Strategists analyze military history to understand the evolution of war. However, they often turn to science fiction to predict the future of war. Star Wars: Episode 1—The Phantom Menace captures a standard vision of the future of ground combat—autonomous robots marching into war with the guidance

of their human overlords. This view follows fairly simple logic: Combat is dangerous, so why not use technology to reduce the risk to humans? Meanwhile, other movies are equally adept at capturing the opposing view of the use of autonomous systems in combat. Take The Matrix and Terminator movies as examples. These movies preach a cautionary tale that autonomous systems can create an unparalleled capacity to destroy an adversary; however, left unchecked, the overuse of autonomy can destroy humanity. These beliefs are captured in the Army's official stance toward the use of autonomous systems, which clarifies that autonomous systems are intended to support the warfighter, not replace them.

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2019/Mittal-Autonomous-Systems/

One War is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great Power Competition by Hal Brands, Ph.D. and Evan Braden Montgomery

What are the implications of the Department of Defense's adoption of a one-war standard that is focused on defeating a great-power rival? Hal Brands and Evan Braden Montgomery discuss the gap between America's global commitments and the military challenges it can realistically meet. A quiet revolution in American defense strategy is currently underway. The U.S. military is no longer focusing on combating rogue states, terrorist groups, and other deadly, albeit relatively weak, enemies. Instead, the Defense Department is setting its sights on China and Russia: great power rivals that are contesting American military advantages and threatening to reorder the world. "The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by … revisionist powers," the 2018 National Defense Strategy states. Deterring these rivals, and defeating them should deterrence fail, will require far-reaching changes in what the American military buys and how it fights. The main pillar of this strategy is a new approach to force planning, which outlines how the U.S. military should be built to fight.

https://tnsr.org/2020/03/one-war-is-not-enough-strategy-and-force-planning-for-great-power-competition/

Divided We Fall: How the U.S. Force is Losing Its Joint Advantage over China and Russia by LTC Dan Sukman and LTC(R) Charles Davis, Ph.D.

Since the implementation of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), the U.S. military has held a particular operational advantage over potential adversaries with respect to joint interoperability. That advantage is the ability to conduct operations that are truly joint, where forces from different services work interoperably and interdependently. However, in recent years, the U.S. military has taken steps that threaten to undermine this advantage by weakening the very reforms that have lifted the joint force. Among other things, it has diluted joint education and curtailed joint duty assignments while adversaries such as China and Russia are slowly but steadily enhancing their ability to plan and conduct joint operations. To preserve its joint advantage, the U.S. military must reverse this trend and recommit to building military leaders who can think jointly, operate jointly, and lead jointly. Without a renewed emphasis on joint officer development, the United States stands to cede competitive space to global adversaries such as China and Russia.

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/March-April-2020/Sukman-Divided/

Primer on Sociopolitical and Military Developments in China-Indo China-South China Sea

This compilation of works by Army University Press consists mainly of articles from Military Review, publications authored by the Combat Studies Institute, monographs from students at the Command and General Staff College, and selected works from other sources.

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Special-Topics/World-Hot-Spots/China

Primer on Sociopolitical and Military Developments in Russia

Out of prudent concern for our own national interests, Russia's resurgence as a superpower with global aspirations deserves careful monitoring and analysis. Recognizing the potential for readers encountering a confusing surfeit of information on Russia—much of which is duplicative and in some cases duplicitous—the Army University Press has established this website to highlight selected published works that we regard as a good starting point for understanding current developments, trends, and events related to Russian society and security-related thinking. In some cases, we hope to illuminate alternative views largely unrepresented elsewhere. We do this in an effort to promote further research, analysis, and debate concerning how to best deal with the challenge of this rising superpower. This compilation of works by Army University Press consists mainly of articles from Military Review, publications authored by the Combat Studies Institute, monographs from students at the Command and General Staff College, and selected works from other sources for which we have permission to reproduce.

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Special-Topics/World-Hot-Spots/Russia/

Deepfakes 2.0: The New Era of "Truth Decay" by BG Patrick Houston and LTC Eric Bahm

Deepfake technology has exploded in the last few years. Deepfakes use artificial intelligence (AI) "to generate, alter or manipulate digital content in a manner that is not easily perceptible by humans." The goal is to create digital video and audio that appears "real." A picture used to be worth a thousand words – and a video worth a million – but deepfake technology means that "seeing" is no longer "believing." From fake evidence to election interference, deepfakes threaten local and global stability. The first generation (Deepfakes 1.0) was largely used for entertainment purposes. The next generation (Deepfakes 2.0) is far more convincing and readily available. Deepfakes 2.0 are poised to have profound impacts. According to some technologists and lawyers who specialize in this area, deepfakes pose "an extraordinary threat to the sound functioning of government, foundations of commerce and social fabric."

https://www.justsecurity.org/69677/deepfakes-2-0-the-new-era-of-truth-decay/

The Battle of Wills to Establish the Office of the Chief of Chaplains

By Mr. Dan Fitzpatrick

This year marks the 100th Anniversary of the establishment of the Army's Chief of Chaplains position with the approval of the National Defense Act (NDA) of 1920 by Congress. This article will focus on the two main philosophical differences that prevailed on the role of the chaplain in the U.S. Army post-Civil War to pre-World War One. During this time, the Army was becoming a more professional organization in training and doctrine. The introduction of service schools, revamped promotion system, and Elihu Root's reforms are some examples of this professionalism that was entering the Army. Some chaplains believed it was time to remake their branch into a functional organization, rather than the symbolic one it had been since 1775 when established by the Continental Congress. The focus of this article will be on two key personalities that embodied the conflicting philosophies during this period; Chaplain (CH) Orville J. Nave and CH Cephas C. Bateman. Both men were pious and dedicated chaplains in providing religious guidance for the soldiers of this nation, yet they were on opposing ideological sides on the role of the chaplain and the future of the branch. There were many others who contributed to both sides of this discussion, but for brevity sake, we will focus on these two men.

Background

Since ancient times, armies would march into battle with their priests, good examples of this are the Israelites and Romans. When Christianity became the official religion of Rome, this tradition would continue and was codified at 742 AD at the Council of Ratisbon (Regensburg) in 742 A.D.[1] The British chaplain traditions would carry over in the fledging Continental Army with the establishment of the Chaplain Corps in 1775. The Continental Congress authorized one chaplain per brigade and the State legislatures authorized one chaplain for each regiment. There would be a total of 111 Continental Army chaplains and 97 militia chaplains who served during the war.[2] With the end of the war the Continental Army was downsized to four regiments, with only one chaplain billet on the general staff.[3] The War of 1812 saw an increase of 11 Regular Army chaplain billets to fill the brigades that were stood up for the war, but with the end of the war, it was downsized to four to match the number of brigades in the Army.[4] Then in 1818, Congress did away with all the positions, except one active duty chaplain ministering and teaching cadets at West Point.[5] It would stay at this number for 20 years.

In 1838, after much discussion within the Department of War and in Congress, 20 chaplain positions were authorized for the growing number of frontier posts, but this was later reduced by the War Department to 15.[6] These chaplains were not to be commission officers, but civilian clergy selected and employed by the post councils of administration. There were no requirements for age, health, or ecclesiastical education or endorsement, so the post councils would pick local clergymen who had already been ministering to the post unofficially to fill the positions. In one case a retired cook was picked![7] The War Department corrected this oversight and required that the applicant to have at least a letter of recommendation from the clergyman's ecclesiastical authority.[8] This would characterize how the Army selected, with a few changes, post chaplains up to the Civil War.

With the start of the Civil War, the Union Army expanded greatly, so much so, that by the end of 1861, over 650 Infantry and Cavalry Regiments had been stood up and it was still growing. As the Federal Army expanded, so did the number of chaplains.[9] With just 30 civilian post chaplains on the payroll at the start of the war, there was going to be huge need for chaplains. The War Department would use the guidance set out since the War of Independence, one chaplain per regiment and by the end of the war there would be 100s of regiments (Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, Volunteers, and Militia) positions needed to be filled. At the end of the war, over 2380 Union commissioned chaplains would serve, but only about 600 at any one time.[10] And as in all previous wars, when the Army demobilized the hundreds of regiments, so went all of the commissioned chaplains. Except the one at West Point and the 30 civilian positions authorized prior to the Civil War located at frontier forts.[11]

In 1866, the Army stood up four African/American regiments (24th, 25th Infantry and the 9th, 10th Cavalry respectively) and authorized a chaplain for each regiment. Unlike the post chaplains, these chaplains would be commissioned as officers with the rank of "Chaplain without command" which was equivalent to a captain for housing and rations, but they would be paid as a first lieutenant. In 1867, the civilian post chaplains would also be commissioned and received the same pay and rank. Both would treated like other officers in such areas as terms of office, retirement, allowances for service, and pensions.[12] The duties of both regimental and post chaplains would be the same as before the Civil War, Chaplains first, then school teacher to the troops, plus a host of other additional duties as the commanders saw fit.[13] After the good experiences of having chaplains assigned to regiments during the Spanish-American War, the Army leadership wanted this relationship to continue. On 9th of March, 1901, Headquarters of the Army General Orders No. 9 would abolish the post chaplain position and would assigned all chaplains as unit chaplains with the regiments or corps of artillery, serving at "such stations" as directed by the Secretary of War. This order would consequently increase the number of authorized chaplains from 34 to 57.[14]

Chaplain Orville J. Nave

CH Orville J. Nave was born in Galion, Ohio on 30th of April, 1841. His first exposure to the Army was as an enlisted soldier with the 11th Illinois Volunteers Regiment during the Civil War. When he signed up, he was already a licensed minster of the Methodist Episcopal Church. During the war he would sometimes fill in for his regimental chaplain when he was sick or absent. His war record shows that he participated in many battles in the Western Theater with his regiment, notably the Battle of Vicksburg, and was mustered out of the service 6 JUN 1865. In 1870, he attended Ohio Wesleyan University and received his Bachelor Degree, he then earned his Master's in 1873 from the same school. Later, CH Nave earned a Doctor of Divinity degree (1895) and a Doctor of Law degree (1897), from Nebraska Wesleyan University. In 1882 he joined the Army for a second time, but now as a commission Army chaplain.[15]

While serving as a post chaplain on frontier outposts, he started advocating for a more structured and professional chaplain corps. The reason he wanted a truly professional chaplain corps is he saw the unfitness of some chaplains and the lack of any provision for the promotion or advancement of chaplains. Plus, he also saw the small number of chaplains in the Army as a hindrance to their mission of providing moral and religious guidance to soldiers. CH Nave knew he needed to have a consensus of chaplains if he were to bring these issues to War Department leadership. He reached out to his fellow Army Chaplains. After some correspondences they agreed to forma "chaplain's movement" to discuss and submit proposals to churches and then later to the War Department on resolving these issues. They also agreed to have CH Nave fill the role as the group's correspondence secretary.[16]

Two reform proposals were developed: 1. Applicants for the chaplaincy be examined

for fitness by experienced chaplains and that the President should appoint only those applicants recommended by the examiners. 2. That the Army provide annual or bi-annual conferences where chaplains could "compare methods, exchange views, instruct novices, inspire the discouraged, and devise improved methods of work."[17] CH Nave also understood that they would need the support of large civilian church denominations for needed reforms in the chaplaincy. During the 1880s, he made the case for reforms at several Protestant denomination leadership conferences. CH Nave's energetic persuasion worked, and several of the churches would present the matter to the military committees in Congress for the needed reforms. This momentum for reform by national bodies of Protestant denominations inspired many regional religious bodies and local churches to write their Congressmen asking for similar resolutions.[18]

In 1889, Benjamin Harrison became President and he appointed Redfield Proctor, a fellow Civil War Veteran, Secretary of War. During the war, both men had close dealings with Army Chaplains and CH Nave knew they would be supportive for his proposals, so he sent President Harrison a copy of the resolutions churches had sent to their congressmen. President Harrison passed these to Secretary of War Proctor, who

agreed to pursue the matter. Secretary of War Proctor tasked the Adjutant General Office to look at the question of advancement for chaplains and assignments mentioned in the resolution.[19] He also set up a study on the religious needs of the soldiers within the War Department. While this was happening, he asked Congress for money to provide chaplains for posts who didn't have one. The Inspector General in 1891 and 1892 made the suggestion that it would be better to assign chaplains to regiments rather than posts and to transfer all post chaplains to regiments. Their reasoning was sound, it would provide for greater efficiency and esprit de corps for both the chaplains and the soldiers that they ministered. CH Nave's efforts were close to realization in 1891 with House Bill 3868, a bill "To increase the Number of Chaplains in the Army of the United States, to define their Duties and Increase their Efficiency", but in May of that year Congress failed to enact the bill.[20] This didn't dampen CH Nave's resolve and he would continue his fight for the reform and for a "corps" of chaplains.

In his quest to reform the branch, CH Nave had a bad habit of jumping the chain of command and writing straight to politicians and church leaders with his ideals. As one can guess, this "habit" angered his supervisors and some fellow chaplains. Others in the military were also upset over his greater focus on morality and temperance in the Army. They believe that he tarnishing the reputation of the soldiers by implying that they were immoral.[21] Just as the "habit" of jumping the chain of command, this did not go over well either. His post commander at Fort Niobrara in Nebraska requested through military channels that CH Nave be relieved from duty and transferred to another post. Although the post commander's request was denied, it put a black cloud over his reputation and haunted him for the rest of his career.[22] Bad health also plagued him, he had a heart condition and suffered several heart attacks throughout his life. He had three while stationed at Fort McPherson Georgia alone. When the Spanish-American broke out, CH Nave requested to remain in the U.S. due to his health. This information was leaked out to the press and it has been suggested it was an attempt to tarnish his reputation. His dogged advocacy for reform of the Army Chaplaincy had rubbed some people in the Army the wrong way, and not deploying only made it worse.[23] Yet, CH Nave was irrepressible when it came to reforming and professionalization the chaplaincy.

Other than his campaigning for chaplain reforms, CH Nave is also remembered for his is writing. He was a prolific writer of magazine articles and books, but his most known work is Nave's Topical Bible, with over 7 million copies of the book published. It is a topical directory of the Bible, and contains Biblical references to over 20,000 topics. Scripture is quoted over 100,000 times; the same Scripture citation may appear under several headings. It had such a good reputation, that it was later endorsed by Billy Graham in the 1950s.[24] His other publication that would outlive him was the "Nave's Handbook on The Army Chaplaincy". This was his attempt to provide new chaplains with a manual on how to perform their duties. He would use his experiences from his time as acting chaplain during the Civil War and as a fulltime Army chaplain for over 23 years. The book would be used as the official manual for both Army and Navy Chaplains from 1917 to 1927. It was picked over several other books issued to new chaplains attending the Chaplain Schools during World War One and the follow-on post war schools.[25]

Chaplain Cephas C. Bateman

CH Cephas C. Bateman was born in Ionia, Michigan on 16th of May, 1857 and after attending the California College, San Francisco and graduating in 1878, he would follow in the footsteps of his father to become a Baptist Minister.[26] In 1891, he received his commission as an Army Chaplain and reported to his first duty station at Vancouver Barracks, Washington. There he fought an uphill battle with indifference to religion and a culture of heavy drinking in the Army. This did not dampen his spirt and vigor to do his best to remedy these issues. He published a bi-monthly newspaper covering the post, organized lectures and reading dealing with such subjects as "Army Life in Times of Peace," "Wit and Humor in Life and Literature," "Cranks," and "Great Libraries". CH Bateman worked with near-by Portland's Salvation Army Post, using their band for his temperance and gospel meetings in a hall near the post. The band, especially its brass section, help liven up the meetings. It was a hit with soldiers who were used to the more dignified services. His hard work paid off and his on post services increased in attendance between 60-90 soldiers, but it paled in comparison to this off post "brass band" service where attendance ranged between 200 and 300![27]

The one area that both CH Bateman and CH Nave agreed upon was the issue of alcoholism among the ranks in the Army. Both saw it as an evil that plagued the Army and they worked with other chaplains to organize Temperance meetings on many posts to fight it. CH Bateman prayed hard for a "cold water army' from top to bottom".[28] He established a Loyal Temperance League at all his posts and held weekly meetings. It was a main topic of his sermons and lectures, because he envisioned an entire Army of talented men, representing the "high water mark in morals" pursuing its "noble mission until the age of perpetual peace shall dawn."[29] He believed alcohol was a determent to that goal and had to be driven out of the Army. Although this wasn't always a popular sentiment of his fellow soldiers, his hard work and dedication to the betterment of the soldier was appreciated. He was happy to learn that the officers and men regarded him with "consideration and respect."[30]

Like CH Nave, CH Bateman was a prolific writer was well as a gifted orator. He wrote several articles for *Army Magazine* and other publications. His interests were broad, writing upon such subjects as "The Army and Education,"[31] and a piece on history in the *Army and Navy Register*, "A Landmark of the Old Frontier- Fort Clark, Texas." Then there was his own calling "The Army Chaplain: His Work and Worth," an article that focused on the chaplaincy and its impact on the lives of soldiers.[32] In reflecting upon his own chaplaincy, he said that it was "a labor of life and love," and that he would resign his

commission if it ever became otherwise.[33] This article provided an insight to his vision of what an Army chaplain's role was, a pastor to his flock and not a military leader. He presented this job-definition to the professional officer corp. This is the mindset of CH Bateman and reflects his attitude towards chaplains doing anything other than being a minster to the soldiers. In essence, CH Bateman believed that the chaplain, because of the position's role as spiritual guide and leader for the soldiers, should separate him from the other officers. In the wearing of a unique uniform and the wearing of no rank, which he believed was a wall between the chaplain and the enlisted soldiers, the chaplain best performed his duties.

Although he was one of the oldest chaplains in the Army, CH Bateman would serve in three of America's conflicts during his time in the Army. Other chaplains would request exemptions for deployments due to old age and bad heath. His first was the Spanish-American War where he volunteered to serve in Cuba with the 16th Infantry at his own request. In Cuba, he worked in the regimental hospital until 10th of July, 1898, when he joined Division Hospital at General Shafer's headquarters. In 1901, he sailed to the Philippines with the 28th Infantry Regiment and saw action in the Batangas Province against the Moros'. Upon his return to the States in 1903, CH Bateman would be reassigned to his old regiment, the 14th Cavalry. In 1912, he deployed with them to Texas as part of the General Pershing's force searching for Pancho Villa. While there, he provided pastoral services as well as worked with YMCA in an effort to boost the morale of soldiers. When General Pershing's pursuit of Pancho Villa officially terminated on 5th of February, 1917, CH Bateman returned to home station.[34] When the US declared war on Germany, thus entering World War One, he apply for a position as a hospital chaplain in France He was denied due to age, he was 60 at the time, and would serve in the US for the duration of the war.[35]

The Issues

Until 1920, the Chaplain Branch was just a name, it was a non-functional organization in reality. For varying reasons, an administrative organization dedicated to serving chaplains was never established. Since there were so few chaplains and they were mostly civilian contractors, both the Congress and the War Department saw no need to establish a dedicated administrative organization for them. It wasn't till 1867 when all chaplains were commissioned that the chaplains themselves recognized the need for reforms as a branch. With an increasing number of chaplain positions being authorized, it was becoming apparent that a central administration for chaplains was needed. Also, the need for stricter requirements and a screening process for chaplains entering the Army was readily apparent. On the way to making the branch more professional, one suggestion was to create "annual assemblies" for chaplains. The purpose of these assemblies was to compare methods, exchange views, improved the supply system, instruct novices, provide fellowship, and improve the chaplaincy professionalism. All of these suggested reform was leading to assimilation into the regular army. To make this assimilation real, wearing the same uniform and having the same rank, pay and promotions enjoyed by their fellow officers was a good starting point. A few chaplains even dared to speak of creating of a Corps of Chaplains. During the mid-1890s, there was a concerted effort to authorize a "chaplain general" who would oversee the branch. CH Nave was the lead proponent for these reforms and he had several likeminded chaplains in his corner.[36]

There was another school of thought in the ranks of the chaplains and that idea was not the path most wanted to follow. Some believed whole heartily that as chaplains, they needed to be "separate" from the regular officer corps, in order to eliminate the "rank" barrier" between them and the enlisted men. They believed that wearing uniforms and rank would "militarize" their positon. The suggestion of a "chaplain general" was abhorrent to most of them. They also feared one denomination might gain control of branch leadership positions, which then could force its beliefs or thoughts through policies. These chaplains were happy to leave it as it had been and continued on as the "handyman" of the post/regiment. They saw themselves as rugged individualists who chaffed at the thought of giving up their independence to a supervisorial chaplain. Granted, this perception came from the lack of any fellowship with other chaplains. Working in an environment of isolated outposts only reinforced this view of their position and role in the Army.[37] As we seen, CH Bateman held similar beliefs, and was considered by many to be the lead spokesman for chaplains who held this line of thinking.

What did the leadership of the Army think about these changes to the chaplaincy? Some regular army officers supported chaplain reforms, but most were indifferent to the plight of the chaplains. Then there were others who either experienced a "bad padre" or saw them as Major General Howard (ret.) would proclaim, that "some of the Army's chaplains were weary, overworked, and sick clergymen that frequently got political appointments, the chaplaincy appear as a haven of rests."[38] This group of officers saw no need for chaplains to be commissioned officers, and some preferred they return to contracted civilian chaplains. This attitude resonated with many in the

War Department during the 1880s-90s. The Commanding General of the Army during this period was Lt. Gen. John M. Schofield and his mentor through much of his career was Major Gen. Howard (ret.). In 1895, Lt. Gen. Schofield proposed that commissioned post chaplains revert back to their 1867 civilian status and be hired as contractors by the post administrative councils.[39]

CH Nave stated that Lt. Gen. Schofield's proposition, was "unmistakable prejudice" against chaplains. Later he wrote an article titled, "The Status of Army Chaplains," where he accused the advocates of contract chaplains as seeking to deny chaplains the benefit of retirement pay. In the article, CH Nave restated his position that the only way for chaplains to become efficient was giving them administrative and policy-making roles in the chaplaincy. Strangely, CH Bateman didn't address Lt. Gen. Schofield's proposal, but instead reiterated his opposition to CH Nave's reforms for chaplains to have military rank, to create a corps of chaplains, and to have the corps commanded by a chaplain-general with headquarters in Washington, D.C.[40]

CH Nave believed wearing rank was a symbolic act of assimilation of chaplains into the officer corps. He believed that the only way the Army's chaplaincy was to progress was to develop the same organization and administration like the other branches. He wanted chaplains to look like the other officers and not be set apart by a uniform. To that end, CH Nave believed that wearing the same uniform and rank as fellow officers would allow admittance of chaplains into the officer corps, as he stated "the army has unwritten code which admits no one who is not part of it".[41] CH Bateman's views were totally opposite: he stated before Congress, "In my relations with the garrison I wish only to remember that I am a minister of the, Master by divine calling and forget that I am an officer of rank by presidential appointment."[42] CH Bateman was happy wearing the Civil War era chaplain uniform of black flock coat with a single roll of buttons and no insignia of rank. He felt, like many chaplains, that wearing rank would be a hindrance to preforming his duties as chaplain to enlisted men and saw no need to wear it. He also felt that not wearing the regular issue uniform would identify him as a chaplain and not as a line officer.

The biggest issue separating both men was the establishment of the position of Chief of Chaplains. CH Nave wholly approved and endorsed it, whereas CH Bateman did not. There had been a growing sentiment among some chaplains they needed a leader to represent them at the War Department. Many knew that the British Army in 1778 established a "Chaplain-General" to work with their War Office on chaplain issues and selection.[43] All US chaplain issues fell under the Adjutant General Office in the War Department, but there was no one there to work for them who understood their issues. With the growth in their numbers and now being commissioned officers since 1867, many wanted a voice for them in Washington. CH Nave understood this and was a very vocal advocate for the establishment of a Chaplain-General. In his meetings with the many church officials and groups, he spoke of the need for some sort of leadership for the branch. The Army Chaplains' Alliance even suggested to the War Department in 1893 that they transfer CH Nave to the Adjutant General assist in chaplains' affairs.[44] It wasn't acted upon, but this didn't stop the growing call for a position of leadership for the chaplain branch with CH Nave leading the charge.

If CH Nave was the Chief of Chaplain biggest champion, CH Bateman was its most vocal critic. He viewed the proposal as "un-American", because it would propagate a "spirt of state churches" in the Army. His biggest fear was that the position would fall under the control of one denomination and force the other denominations to follow its rules. During the period when Lt. Gen. Schofield proposed to convert chaplains back to civilian contractor, CH Bateman completely disregarded the general's proposal and instead replied, writing "The Army Chaplain among the U.S. Army Soldiers." This article condemned Nave's proposal for a Chaplain-General; "Should this idea become concrete in a bill before Congress, the writer of this article may be counted on to resist it with tongue and pen to the full limit of his ability and influence. He will favor no such thing. Imagine a group of

nonconformist Chaplains taking orders from a high churchman, of high churchmen being dominated by a Roman Catholic proudly set above the corps to lord it over God's heritage in true medieval style. Why, the dissenting Chaplains would be court-martialed within twenty-four hours for conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline in violation of the sixty-second article of war. The proposition can never he seriously considered by either Protestants or Catholic."[45] He also persisted in his belief that if a Chaplain-General was authorized, the Corps would become militarized and degrade the role of chaplains. He further feared the appointment of a chaplain-general greatly hurt the choices of the chaplains to perform their tasks. Tied to dictates of a tyrannical chaplain-general, regardless of their own personal or professional beliefs, the "spirit of state churchism" would crush their denominational beliefs.[46]

The Debate

After three conflicts in quick session, Spanish-American War (1898), Philippines War (1898-1905) and Boxer Rebellion (1900), a new and more favorable opinion of chaplains emerged within the War Department. The retirement of Lt. Gen. Schofield helped change this outlook. The efforts of CH Nave were making inroads with several likeminded chaplains. In 1904, CH Charles C. Pierce worked on the composition of the Act of 21st of April, 1904 that authorized the Army to promote chaplains of "exceptional efficiency" up to the rank of major.[47] This was a major step to making the chaplains more in line with their fellow officers and integrating them into the Army fold— one of CH Nave's goals. That year, four chaplains made the cut to the rank of major, but CH Bateman nor CH Nave were on that list. For CH Nave, his unfavorable evaluations dating back to Fort Niobrara held him back.[48] For CH Bateman, the reasons are not known, but it might have been his well-publicized argument against the wearing of rank by chaplains.

In 1907, CH Barton W. Perry sent out a letter to all chaplains asking if there would be interest in submitting to the War Department a way to for them "to view matters from a chaplain's standpoint. Maybe setting up a "Committee of Chaplains" to work as a "medium of communications between chaplains and the General Staff." CH Perry stated he was not trying to establish a "Chaplaincy-in-Chief," because he knew the views of the General Staff and the "general aversion of the Chaplains themselves to such a project." A most obvious reference to CH Bateman and CH Nave's debate over the topic.[49] To calm the angst of the War Department or the chaplains, he also stated the committee would not become a part of the General Staff, and would have no administrative authority, no permanent members, and only represent the various views held among the chaplains. The response from his fellow chaplains was less than stellar, only 19 of the 53 replied to his letter. Of that 19, only nine favored such a committee, seven favored it with qualifications, two were noncommittal, and one disapproved (Bateman?).[50] So went the attempt to get a committee of chaplains appointed by Adjutant General called the "Chaplain Board". It was to be permanent, composed of three or more chaplains, no two of the same denomination, to meet once a month. Its charter from the Adjutant General would focus on national issues. However, the proposal was disapproved, but with a small encouragement: "if cases arise where expert advice of chaplains seems to be needed, boards for consideration of such matters can be ordered at any time by the War Department."[51]

Embolden by this, in 1908, CH Aldred A. Pruden (a reformer) made the proposal to the Secretary of War, that an alternate version of a board of chaplains be set up to make the chaplaincy more effective, by canvasing both chaplains and commander on what should be done. Then make these recommendations available to the War Department. Unlike the previous proposals, this one fell on friendly ears and was approved. Questionaries' were sent out by the Adjutant General's Office to all commanders and chaplains in the Army. After getting the replies back, six chaplains were selected to make up the board. Meeting at Fort Leavenworth in 1909, the board examined the canvassing correspondence triumphantly, the "Chaplain Board" made 12 recommendations to the Secretary of the War, of which six were approved (some only partially). Approved: field equipment such as photographs, stereopticons, tents, and stages, the selection, management and training of new chaplains, and the establishment of enlisted chaplain as assistants. Postponed: but were not disapproved; more post libraries and an increase in the number of chaplains. Disapproved : chapel construction, chaplain uniforms to conform more nearly to that of other staff officers, a special depot be established to handle chaplain supplies and equipment and, permanent record books to be furnished at each post for the recording of baptisms, marriages, and funerals.[52] This wasn't a total victory, but it was a step in the right direction for the chaplaincy.

Surprisingly, CH Nave wasn't happy with the board or its recommendations. He had retired from the Army in 1905 and was now the president of the Association of Chaplains. He saw the chaplains' board as a watered down effort in his quest to reform the chaplaincy. He continued lobbying the Army for a head of a department for chaplains, just like the rest of the staff branches. He did not insist the chief of chaplains had to be a chaplain, but rather, "suitable officers, well known to be favorable to religion, and sympathetic with the proper work of Christian ministers to supervise the chaplains." If this a tactic to ease tensions between reform-minded and conservative chaplains is not known. Perhaps he was trying meet them halfway, focusing on some common goals between the two groups. In any case, he appeared to back off the concept of having a chaplain lead chaplains simply securing a position had become an end in itself.[53] For now, the War Department and most chaplains were happy with the arrangement, nothing would be done until 1920.

Not surprisingly, CH Bateman was not pleased with the board, he saw it as an attempt leading to a chief of chaplains' positon. He felt as did CH George Waring, who wrote " Under no circumstances would a chaplain in charge or a chaplain under any other title…be a good thing….To put a chaplain on the General Staff

would be disastrous to the corps."[54] Their fear was that this would lead to friction and undermine their independent regimental autonomy.

CH Bateman continued to wrestle with his convictions as more changes occurred throughout the Army. In 1914, the Army authorized the wear of issued uniforms, with rank, for chaplains. With the continued growth of the chaplaincy from 146 Active and Guard in 1917 to over 2,360 in World War One, CH Bateman saw the writing on the wall. The pre-war status quo for administration and training of this growing force was totally inadequate. In late 1918, he developed a proposal that reflected the new reality but remained opposed to a chief of chaplains. By then he was a senior chaplain in the Army and recommended to the Adjutant General that "all Army chaplains be placed under the Chief of the Morale Division of the War Department in lieu of having . . . a Chaplain General."[55] But this proposal was not realistic. Instead, Congress moved towards establishing a Chief of Chaplains position for the Army. In keeping with his views on the Chief of Chaplains, Bateman again objected, writing in the Army-Navy Journal that a board of three chaplains - Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish - should be established instead; and, that they would fall under the Chief of the Morale Division within the Adjutant General Office. He could not let it go. He insisted the board's responsibilities be limited to "morale matters and welfare work," and to "represent the work of the Army chaplains before church conventions, councils and welfare organizations."[56] By then the impetus was too strong for the establishment of a Chief of Chaplains position, and his recommendations were ignored. Opposition to a Chief of Chaplains position within the Chaplain Corps were at an end.

Conclusion

The National Defense Act of 1920 established the Office of the Chief of Chaplains for the U.S. Army. Chaplain John T. Axton solemnly assumed the title as the first chief, thus after 145 years the idea was reality and no longer a dream. This was not only a victory for the reformers in the chaplaincy, but the corps as a whole. The 1920 act allowed the branch to become a professional and functional branch for the first time since it its establishment. It also gave greater control to chaplains for running their branch in the areas of selection, training, assignments, and promotion. Decisions were no long made on a whim subject to outsiders, but unto the chaplains themselves; but what did Chaplains Bates and Nave think of the change?

For CH Bateman it was not what he wanted, but he would accept it, begrudgingly. Maybe his youthful beliefs in an "un-militarized" chaplaincy gave way wand he saw the necessity and value of having a Chief of Chaplains overseeing and interceding for good of the corps. Or maybe he just accepted it as inevitable and moved on with his career keeping his thoughts to himself. Either way, in his 26th of June, 1920 article in the Army and Navy Register "Evolution of the Army Chaplain Corps" he makes mention of the passing of the NDA 1920 concluding, "that the bill, as a whole marks a distinct advance….In time will, no doubt, their [chaplains], lot will be further improved." However, he also warned his fellow clergymen, saying, "we are still on trial and will be judged often by standards not applied to any other class of men in uniform." For those who had served in the World War, he had nothing but praise: "no body of men of equal number and of equal rank [gave] . . . a better account of their stewardship in an army in any war, in any age."[57]

As for CH Nave, the longtime champion for the reform of the chaplaincy, the man who pushed to see the establishment of a Chief of Chaplains, he would never live to see it. His efforts to achieve his goals, the tactic of going over the heads of his superiors, had upset several officers in the Army. His strong views on reform alienated him from other chaplains, but he stuck to his guns. All of this may have contributed to his poor health and most likely led to him being passed over for promotion. With his retirement from the Army in 1905 as a Major, he continued his quest for reforming the chaplaincy, even as his poor health kept him from attending some religious

conferences and the Association of Chaplains. Yet he never gave up on his dream and continued to lobby congressmen and writing articles for reform. His vision influenced many fellow chaplains to take up his cause, Chaplains Pruden, Axton, and Perry to name just a few. He also kept writing articles, books and gave lectures on religious subjects; and, as mentioned previously, his manuscript, *Nave's Handbook on The Army Chaplaincy*,[58] was set to be published in August of 1917. Sadly, CH Nave would never see his book published or more importantly, his dream of a reformed chaplaincy. On 24th of June, 1917, he was hit by a cable car in Los Angles and succumbed to his injuries.[59]

In a historical twist of fate, CH Bateman would be considered for the Chief of Chaplain position. He was a senior chaplain in the Army, veteran of three wars, and had a very good career record. The major drawback for him was his age, he was 63 at the time of the passing of the bill and only two years away from mandatory retirement. There would also be another factor at play, the majority of the chaplain corps knew he was one of the lead critics to the whole idea. His name never made it to the top of the list and CH (COL) John T. Axton (also a reformer) assumed the post as first Chief of Chaplains on 15th of July, 1920. However, CH Bateman was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and selected as the first peace time commandant of the Chaplain School at Fort Grant, Illinois. During his tenure he published the first Army Regulation on military training for chaplains, but left any mention of the Chief of Chaplains having any supervisorial authority over the school. That was given to the War Department.[60] This was his last passive-aggressive poke at the position of Chief of Chaplains; he reached mandatory retirement in September of 1921 and moved to Texas. He continued writing and lecturing until he passed away in San Antonio, 18th of July, 1934.[61]

Both CH Nave and CH Bateman would be astonished if they saw the Chaplain Branch in the 21st Century. Today's Chaplain Branch recruits, trains, and cultivates all of the Army's Chaplains and Religious Affairs Specialist as any other branch in Army trains its soldiers. Develops doctrine, policies, and guidance for chaplains to meets the Army's missions in a Joint environment and is an integral part of both the Army and the Department of Defense. Regardless of their ideological differences, they both left a legacy that is still present in the chaplaincy today. In CH Nave's case, it is the assimilation of chaplains into the main stream of the Army and the position of Chief of Chaplains a reality. The Chaplain Branch is now equal with all the other Army branches in terms of representation is his legacy. And what would be CH Bateman's legacy to the Chaplain Corp you might ask? Whatever his fears may have been about the reforms that CH Nave proposed, he never forgot that his primary role was as a spiritual guide and leader for the troops. His legacy of unselfish service, is still alive in every chaplain who dons a uniform and serves alongside the finest warriors of the United States of America.

If the reader is interested on reading more about the establishment of the Chief of Chaplains, I highly recommend CH (COL) Robert Nay's paper, *The 100th Anniversary: Establishment of the Army Office of the Chief of Chaplains (OCCH)*, 22 JUN 2020.

Mr. Dan Fitzpatrick

U.S. Army Chaplain Branch Historian

Mr. Dan Fitzpatrick came on board as the U.S. Army Chaplain Branch Historian in November 2019. He has 30 years of service in the Army as Field Artillery officer serving with units in Korea, Germany, Southwest Asia and the U.S. In 2001 he was assigned to U.S. Central Command as a strategic war planner and later serve as Acting Command Historian. In 2010 he was assigned as the International Security and Assistance Force, Afghanistan (ISAF) Commander's Historian. After retiring in 2012, he went to Germany as the U.S. European Command Historian.

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Into the Dark, Alone:
Moral Injury and PTSD in Civil War Veterans

By CH (LTC) Brian Koyn

Just as he was drifting from them,
Out into the dark, alone,
(Poor old mother, waiting for your message,
Waiting with the kitten, all alone!)
Through the hush his voice broke,—"Tell her—
Thank you, Doctor—when you can,
Tell her that I kissed her picture,
And wished I'd been a better man."

From "A Message"
Elizabeth Stuart Phelps Ward

American Civil War poets, like Elizabeth Ward, Longfellow, Dickinson, and Whitman, reveal glimpses of the horrors of the world's first modern war. Unlike their WWI successors, who inaugurated a dark and gritty poetic sub-genre, Civil War poets left much to the imagination about the reality of war. It is up to the reader to search within the verse and feel the real pain and suffering intimated. This need to read between the lines is not just a necessity in Civil War poetry but also in understanding the effect of combat trauma on individual soldiers.

Much of the official histories document decisive battles and unspeakable bloodshed, yet they do so from the vantage point of politicians and generals, thus somehow overlooking the human cost at an individual level. However, if one believes that, at the personal level, warriors of the past have much in common with modern warriors, then the trauma of combat certainly had significant effects on the well-being of Union and Confederate veterans alike. One recent history of Confederate suicides narrated that "the historical record leaves no doubt that Confederate veterans suffered from an array of emotional and psychological ailments, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Returning soldiers exhibited a variety of symptoms that today are readily associated with combat stress: despondency and detachment, anxiety, sleeplessness, mania, violent behavior, irritability, delusions and paranoia, hypervigilance, depression, and alcoholism."[1] Even tougher to tease out is the incidents of moral injury among Civil War veterans. This paper will attempt to reveal evidence of moral injury and PTSD among Civil War veterans by examining incidents of suicide, substance abuse, incarceration, and statement of guilt and shame. Moral injury is a relatively new clinical category of trauma with research in the nascent phase. In the simplest terms moral injury occurs when an individual "transgresses deeply held moral beliefs, or they may experience conflict about the unethical behavior of others."[2] As a result of war moral injury may result "from direct participation in acts of combat, such as killing or harming others, or indirect acts, such as witnessing death or dying, failing to prevent immoral acts of others, or giving or receiving orders that are perceived as gross moral violations."[3] Jonathan Shay adds to the causes as a betrayal of "what's right" by someone in legitimate authority.[4]



Specific effects of moral injury often include feelings of guilt, shame, anxiety, and anger/betrayal.[5] "Behavioral symptoms could include: anomie, withdrawal, self-condemnation, self-harming, and self-handicapping behaviors, such as chemical use/abuse."[6]

Studies of modern combat veterans demonstrate a strong and independent correlation to increased suicide risk for those experiencing PTSD and moral injury.[7] While no comprehensive study on Civil War service and suicide exists, there is some evidence that military service increased suicidality. In Eric Dean's groundbreaking book, *Shook Over Hell: Post Traumatic Stress, Vietnam, and the Civil War*, the author looks at the records of hundreds of Indiana Civil War veterans and finds that 51% of the men either attempted or completed suicide or were suicidal.[8] These veterans were tracked into the 20th century, providing a much longer-term study than anything else readily available and also adding to the reliability of the figures. Correlation does not equal causation, but this conjecture is likely to best indication possible 150 years later and at least hints at war as the proximate cause of the increased suicide rate. One illustrative case is of E.J. Hudson of Richmond. He served as part of the 3rd U.S. Cavalry before the war resigning to enlist in the Virginia 1st Light Artillery in 1861. He served first as an enlisted man before applying for a commission. Lieutenant Hudson was captured at the battle of Gettysburg and exchanged. No records exist from his exchange until the end of the war. Hudson killed himself in a Baltimore hotel in 1869. In his suicide note, he "advised that a postmortem examination was unnecessary" because his cause of death was "consumption of thirty grains of cyanide of potassium, though in a cryptic afterthought he corrected" or rather freedom from the accursed ills I cannot bear."[9] Diane Sommerville's review of Confederate suicides outlines many such cases where veterans indicated there was something more to the burden they carried due to their wartime service.

Another such case is that of a Confederate chaplain, Reverend Doctor Robert Woodward Barnwell. He volunteered as a chaplain with a South Carolina regiment and served extensively recruiting hospital volunteers. "Diarists Mary Chestnut and Emma Holmes lavishly praised Bartwell's efforts while noting his deteriorating mental state."[10] "Barnwell himself described horrific images after one unnamed battle: 'Such a sight as that field of slain I never dreamed of."[11] In 1863 he was admitted to the Western State Asylum in Staunton, Virginia, at his request and ended his life by jumping out of a window on his second day there.

Hudson, Barnwell, and the men of the Indiana Regiments are indicative of a more significant problem of suicide among Civil War veterans. While other reasons could be attributed to their decisions, including physical wounds, lack of work, and failure to adapt to the civilian world, serious consideration should be given to the possibility that PTSD and moral injury have at least some impact on their situation.

Another common symptom of both PTSD and moral injury is substance abuse, and both of these saw a rampant increase in the years following the civil war. If working through the causes of suicide is difficult from the vantage of 150 years, substance abuse is even more difficult to link directly to combat experiences.

Brian Jones, in his book, *Marching Home: Union Veterans and Their Unending Civil War*, points out that "alcohol consumption rates, which had reached stratospheric levels in the first decades of the new republic, plunged to record lows as medical journals, religious tracts, stump speakers, circuit riders and political parties all deplored the tyranny of the bottle."[12] Jones recounts the efforts of former Army chaplain William Oland Bourne who labored in New York to restrict the sale of "ardent spirits" to former soldiers. Using moral language, he argued that to sell alcohol to disabled men and those of comparable helplessness amounted to a crime. Whiskey was plentiful in Army camps throughout the war, and it returned home with soldiers. One Ohio paper of the day described an incident with a former lieutenant who was found drunk in a filthy corner of a local tavern. The reporter hinted at the cause by stating that "this man was a hero on the battlefield, but now we see him beneath the level of the brute."[13]

Complicating the quest for understanding veteran substance abuse was the view among medical professionals of the day that alcohol

was the cause of insanity rather than self-medicating for other issues. A "significant number of Southern asylum inmates admitted with extensive alcohol and drug use, which was seen as unrelated to the war…Asylum caregivers failed to consider that veterans' drinking habits might have been linked to the stress and anxiety from combat experience."[14]

Opium addiction also took an upturn after the war. Dr. Horace Day writing shortly after the war reported that

> the events of the last few years have unquestionably added greatly to their numbers. Maimed and shattered survivors from a hundred battlefields, diseased and disabled soldiers released from hostile prisons, anguished and hopeless wives and mothers, made so by the slaughter of those who were dearest to them, have found, many of them, temporary relief from their sufferings in opium.[15]

Again, not all of this may be attributed to PTSD or moral injury. Still, at the very minimum, it demonstrates that service during the war played a significant factor in the increase.

Another cause of moral injury is the perceived betrayal of the individual by those in authority. "According to Shay, these feelings of betrayal were associated with instances in which the veterans felt that their military commanders or government leaders had lied to them."[16] This betrayal is evidenced in the immediate conflict and subsequent treatment by the government after the war. One resident of a soldiers' home, in speaking about the weekly veteran funerals, said: "It is so that these men, who have made the names of Grant and Sherman and Meade and Thomas and Sheridan immortal, recross the ghostly shore."[17] In this statement, the author hints at the fact that it was the ordinary soldier who paid in blood while the generals became famous. Examples abound of incompetent decisions by officers at various levels that led to the needless death of thousands. Viewing these betrayals through a modern-day lens of moral injury, it is inevitable that many a soldier suffered due to these slights. Corporal Patrick Sloan of the 90th Illinois Volunteers on seeing the nation's capital for the first time at the Grand Review noted that "a great many lives had been foolishly sacrificed to keep Washington out of the hands of the rebels."[18]

Another form of betrayal emerged as soldiers returned home. Like veterans of so many other American wars, the vast majority of the citizenry wanted to forget the war and could not understand why veterans could not just move on. Immediate slights abounded even during welcome home ceremonies. Near riots broke out in Chicago, New York, Washington, and other cities when the citizenry showed contempt for returning soldiers even before they mustered out. One of the 33rd Iowa Volunteers remarked that "even the Negro children in the South…had many times been more glad to see us than our own fellow-citizens here."[19]

In 1867, as the move to reconciliation was in full bloom, another veteran wrote a newspaper editorial lamenting that "Jefferson Davis is today a hero and more care is taken of him, than the soldiers who fought to preserve the Union."[20] This lack of care took many forms, but one notable was the trials of disabled former soldiers seeking

pensions from the government. "One New Hampshire veteran knew several comrades 'entitled to a pension, beyond a doubt'… who could not secure an allowance 'for lack of medical evidence.'"[21] This further betrayal was admitted by one veteran who wrote: "as a survivor of the late war I cannot but feel deeply when I see the motives of my comrades impugned."[22]

Moral injury, due to its deeply personal nature, is likely to rear its ugly head not just in the immediate aftermath of combat but many years in the future. The betrayal of Union veterans who "did not go to the fight for the miserable $11 a month, but to save his country"[23] must have led to increased incidents of moral injury in the years following the Civil War.

Both PTSD and moral injury can lead to behaviors that result in incarceration. The U.S Bureau of Justice Statistics did not track veterans until after the Vietnam War. However, Edith Abbott researched in 1918 on the result of the Civil War on prison populations. She found that during the Civil War, prison populations plummeted as most of the potential prisoners were enlisted in the fight. Shortly after the end of the war, prison beds were rapidly filled with returning veterans.[24] The many reasons may be lost to history, but this is one more indicator of the Civil War veterans' troubled homecoming possibly as a result of what we now know as PTSD and moral injury.

Several other anecdotes reveal hints of moral injury experienced by Civil War veterans. Paul James Lindberg of the 61st Illinois Volunteer Infantry found himself in the Northwestern Branch of the National Asylum for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. "What distressed Lindberg most was the realization that he and every veteran who lived in a soldiers' home occupied a wretched middle ground – some uneasy space between dead and the living, the past and the present, meaning and inconsequence."[25] At several times he wanted to take his own life but found incapable. "There is nothing within, he conceded, "that is not dead already."[26]

Simple phrases written by Civil War veterans provide a glimpse of their view of their internal struggle. Private John Haley of the 17th Maine Volunteers stated that "my bruises are inward."[27] Sergeant Rodney Tirrill of Iowa discussed his combat service as though it were a disease. "I have had Shiloh ever since the sixth day of April 1862."[28] Samuel Cormany of Pennsylvania desired to return home fully to his wife, Rachel, but admonished the service for the changes it brought in him. "He begged Rachel for a forgiveness he denied himself."[29]

Each of the problems experienced by returning Civil War veterans can easily be explained away as the result of character issues, failure to adapt, or any one of several causes for such behavior. Given what we now know if the effects of combat exposure on human beings in the form of PTSD and moral injury, both of these should be considered in any reading of the after-effects of Civil War combat. After the band stopped playing "When Johnny Came Marching Home Again" Civil War veterans faced a troubled homecoming. Attempting to understand the root causes can only help modern soldiers and leaders better care for current veterans.

One last illustration may be helpful to not only illustrate the issue of moral injury but leave on a positive note of the effect of chaplains and clergy in the caregiving of modern veterans. Mary Livermore was a Union Army nurse. One day while making her rounds, she found a very severely wounded soldier who was in deep distress. He answered her care by exclaiming, "Oh, no, I can't live – I know it…. I've got to die – and I can't die! I am afraid to die!"[30] He went on to talk about the great distress in his soul, declaring, "I ain't fit to die. I have lived an awful life…I shall go to hell."[31]A religious person herself, Livermore found a Methodist chaplain who consoled the boy with the message of Christ. She reported that after receiving ministry from the chaplain, "the burden rolled from the boy's heart."[32] The answer was found and still is, through the direct ministry of a chaplain nurturing the living, caring for the wounded, and honoring the dead.

Division Chaplain, 82nd Airborne Division

CH Koyn assumed duties as the division chaplain for the 82nd Airborne Division in 2019. Some of his previous assignments include West Point, 75th Ranger Regiment, 7th Infantry Division and United States Army Hawaii. He is married to the former Tracey Williams and they have three sons.

NOTES

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3 Shira Maguen and Brett T. Litz, "Moral Injury in the Context of War," accessed December 31, 2019, http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/co-occurring/moral_injury_at_war.asp.
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5 Ibid.
6 Ryan Normandin, "Moral Injury - The Lesser-Known Reality for Veterans: A Systematic Review" (St. Catherine University, 2017), 5, https://sophia.stkate.edu/msw_papers/772.
7 D. Ames et al., "Moral Injury, Religiosity, and Suicide Risk in U.S. Veterans and Active Duty Military with PTSD Symptoms," *Military Medicine* 1, no. 184.
8 Eric Dean, *Shook Over Hell: Post-Traumatic Stress, Vietnam, and the Civil War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 151.
9 Sommerville, *Aberration of Mind: Suicide and Suffering in the Civil War-era South*, 174.
10 Ibid., 36.
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15 Horace B. Day, *The Opium Habit* (Harper and Brothers, 1868), 7.
16 Megan M. Thompson, "Moral Injury in Military Operations: A Review of the Literature and Key Considerations for the Canadian Armed Forces" (Defense Research and Development Canada, Toronto, Canada, 2015), 5.
17 Brian Jordan, *Marching Home: Union Veterans and Their Unending Civil War* (New York: Liveright Publishing Co, 2014), 190–91.
18 Ibid., 18.
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22 Ibid., 168.
23 Ibid., 157.
24 William Brown, Robert Stanulis, and Gerrad McElroy, "Moral Injury as a Collateral Damage Artifact of War in American Society: Serving in War to Serving Time in Jail and Prison," *Justice Policy Journal* 13, no. 1 (Spring 2016), 25.
25 Jordan, *Marching Home: Union Veterans and Their Unending Civil War*, 171.
26 Ibid., 172.
27 Ibid., 73.
28 Ibid., 82.
29 Ibid., 51.
30 Mary Livermore, *My Story of the War* (Hartford: A.D. Worthington and Co, 1896), 191, http://name.umdl.umich.edu/BCD7501.0001.001.
31 Ibid., 192.
32 Ibid., 194.

Book Recommendations

From the Cold War to ISIL: One Marine's Journey

by Brigadier General Jason Q. Bohm, USMC



The best way to understand history is to make a lifetime of serious study. Reading about people and especially leaders is a popular and interesting way to begin to learn history and, at the same time, comprehend the human condition. One new, interesting, and well-presented book is Jason Bohm's From the Cold War to ISIL: One Marine's Journey. His work is not only a personal memoir, but it is the story of his comrades, their families, and the evolving strategic context that they have encountered over the last three decades. Bohm enters the force at the end of the Cold War and soon found himself in Haiti immersed in a Three Block War of combat, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations. This was followed by the years of maintaining naval presence, securing embassies, fighting terrorists, and conflict in Iraq. Bohm also did a tour in the Pentagon's J5 where he understudied our most senior officers. In his last command, Colonel Bohm and the 2500-marine task force built around the storied 5th Marine Regiment helped the Iraqis and other nations to battle ISIL.

Think Outside the Building: How Advanced Leaders Can Change the World One Smart Innovation at a Time

by Rosabeth Moss Kanter



Over a decade ago, renowned innovation expert Rosabeth Moss Kanter co-founded and then directed Harvard's Advanced Leadership Initiative. Her breakthrough work with hundreds of successful professionals and executives, as well as aspiring young entrepreneurs, identifies the leadership paradigm of the future: the ability to "think outside the building" to overcome establishment paralysis and produce significant innovation for a better world. Kanter provides extraordinary accounts of the successes and near-stumbles of purpose-driven men and women from diverse backgrounds united in their conviction that positive change is possible. When traditional approaches are inadequate or resisted, advanced leadership skills are essential. In this book, Kanter shows how people everywhere can unleash their creativity and entrepreneurial adroitness to mobilize partners across challenging cultural, social, and political situations and innovate for a brighter future.

War and the Art of Governance

by Nadia Schadlow



For more than 170 years, senior U.S. military leaders have confronted the vexing problem of reestablishing civic order in foreign states during and after a war. In virtually all of its major wars, American forces have applied some form of governance in an attempt to convert battlefield victory into broader strategic success. The efforts have been diverse and often spontaneously developed, and the results have been mixed. In 2017, Dr. Nadia Schadlow, former Deputy National Security Advisor under then-Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster and the primary author of the 2017 National Security Strategy, published a thoroughly researched book on this subject. War and the Art of Governance is a thoughtful contribution that may offer beneficial insight to military officers and political leaders involved in strategic national security decision-making. Ultimately, however, the book offers little new insight and omits too much critical material. The book, an extension of a 2003 article in the journal Parameters, which focused on a lack of strategic planning for post-regime operations in Iraq, recounts the history of American military governance operations. Schadlow works through 15 historical case studies, all of which contain some variant of the same missteps made in Iraq. From the Mexican-American War through Cold War ventures in the Dominican Republic and Panama, the author covers successes and failures in turning battlefield victory into strategic success.

What's Your Problem?: To Solve Your Toughest Problems, Change the Problems You Solve

by Thomas Wedell-Wedellsborg



Are you solving the right problems? Have you or your colleagues ever worked hard on something, only to find out you were focusing on the wrong problem entirely? Most people have. In a survey, 85 percent of companies said they often struggle to solve the right problems. The consequences are severe: Leaders fight the wrong strategic battles. Teams spend their energy on low-impact work. Startups build products that nobody wants. Organizations implement "solutions" that somehow make things worse, not better. Everywhere you look, the waste is staggering. As Peter Drucker pointed out, there's nothing more dangerous than the right answer to the wrong question. There is a way to do better. he key is reframing, a crucial and underutilized skill.

Prediction Machines: The Simple Economics of Artificial Intelligence

by Ajay Agrawal, Joshua Gans, and Avi Goldfarb



Artificial intelligence does the seemingly impossible, magically bringing machines to life - driving cars, trading stocks, and teaching children. But facing the sea change that AI will bring can be paralyzing. How should companies set strategies, governments design policies, and people plan their lives for a world so different from what we know? In the face of such uncertainty, many analysts either cower in fear or predict an impossibly sunny future. But in Prediction Machines, three eminent economists recast the rise of AI as a drop in the cost of prediction. With this single, masterful stroke, they lift the curtain on the AI-is-magic hype and show how basic tools from economics provide clarity about the AI revolution and a basis for action by CEOs, managers, policy makers, investors, and entrepreneurs. When AI is framed as cheap prediction, its extraordinary potential becomes clear:

•Prediction is at the heart of making decisions under uncertainty. Our businesses and personal lives are riddled with such decisions.
•Prediction tools increase productivity--operating machines, handling documents, communicating with customers.
•Uncertainty constrains strategy. Better prediction creates opportunities for new business structures and strategies to compete.
•Penetrating, fun, and always insightful and practical, Prediction Machines follows its inescapable logic to explain how to navigate the changes on the horizon. The impact of AI will be profound, but the economic framework for understanding it is surprisingly simple.



Command: The Twenty-First-Century General

by Anthony King

In the wake of the troubled campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, military decision-making appears to be in crisis and generals have been subjected to intense and sustained public criticism. Taking these interventions as a starting point, Anthony King examines the transformation of military command in the twenty-first century. Focusing on the army division, King argues that a phenomenon of collective command is developing. In the twentieth century, generals typically directed and led operations personally, monopolizing decision-making. They commanded individualistically, even heroically. As operations have expanded in range and scope, decision-making has multiplied and diversified. As a result command is becoming increasingly professionalized and collaborative. Through interviews with many leading generals and vivid ethnographic analysis of divisional headquarters, this book provides a unique insight into the transformation of command in western armies.

The Fighters

by C. J. Chivers



The Fighters, is a book that provides a deep understanding of individual experiences in multi-domain warfare as well as the continued costs paid by individuals engaged in each aspect of combined operations. The book follows six service members from the Army, the Navy and the Marine Corps through their experiences in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom and in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, pulling together a book for both the casual reader as well as serious scholars of military history. Chivers does not set out to provide deep insight into these campaigns, and the book is not intended to be a regurgitation of the reasons for the conflicts or the policy decisions behind them. Instead, Chivers masterfully takes the reader through the initial phases of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and illustrates the individual experiences of the respective strategies for each campaign through personal stories. While many other books have been written on the strategies for each campaign and the reasons for the shifting policies, this book provides an illustration of the day-to-day actions of individuals trying to implement those policies and engage in multi-domain battle before it was doctrine, and it documents the individual costs to be paid by service members and their families after returning from the battlefield.

Exception to the Rule: The Surprising Science of Character-Based Culture, Engagement, and Performance

by Peter Rea



The antidote to navigating turbulent times isn't more rules. It is timeless virtue that creates sustainable value. Thoughtful leaders are keenly aware of the enormous challenge they face to drive high performance in a world that continues to ratchet up pressure and uncertainty. Some leaders respond by getting tough and establishing strict rules. They get people in line, but they don't inspire excellence. Wise leaders, on the other hand, help their people practice character to navigate their way through the turbulence without lowering performance expectations. As a result, their people are more reliable under pressure. Exception to the Rule links ancient wisdom with contemporary science on high performance, teamwork, and engagement. Building an organizational culture based on classical virtues of trust, compassion, courage, justice, wisdom, temperance and hope is both strategically smart and a better way to live. Exception to the Rule walks you through the steps of helping everyone in your organization focus on character defined by virtue. The word virtue means excellence, which is why each one is essential to help people perform at a high level despite uncertainty and pressure. Under character-based leadership, teams work better together, creativity flourishes and engagement increases.

Leadership In Turbulent Times

by Doris Kearns Goodwin



In this culmination of five decades of acclaimed studies in presidential history, Pulitzer Prize-winning author Doris Kearns Goodwin offers an illuminating exploration of the early development, growth, and exercise of leadership. She draws upon the four presidents she has studied most closely—Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Lyndon B. Johnson—to show how they recognized leadership qualities within themselves and were recognized as leaders by others. By looking back to their first entries into public life, we encounter them at a time when their paths were filled with confusion, fear, and hope. Leadership tells the story of how they all collided with dramatic reversals that disrupted their lives and threatened to shatter forever their ambitions. Nonetheless, they all emerged fitted to confront the contours and dilemmas of their times. No common pattern describes the trajectory of leadership. Although set apart in background, abilities, and temperament, these men shared a fierce ambition and a deep-seated resilience that enabled them to surmount uncommon hardships. At their best, all four were guided by a sense of moral purpose. At moments of great challenge, they were able to summon their talents to enlarge the opportunities and lives of others. In today's polarized world, these stories of authentic leadership in times of apprehension and fracture take on a singular urgency.

Ethics and Military Strategy in the 21st Century: Moving Beyond Clausewitz

by George R. Lucas Jr.



This book examines the importance of "military ethics" in the formulation and conduct of contemporary military strategy. Clausewitz's original analysis of war relegated ethics to the side-lines in favor of political realism, interpreting the proper use of military power solely to further the political goals of the state, whatever those may be. This book demonstrates how such single-minded focus no longer suffices to secure the interest of states, for whom the nature of warfare has evolved to favor strategies that hold combatants themselves to the highest moral and professional standards in their conduct of hostilities. Waging war has thus been transformed in a manner that moves beyond Clausewitz's original conception, rendering political success wholly dependent upon the cultivation and exercise of discerning moral judgment by strategists and combatants in the field. This book utilizes a number of perspectives and case studies to demonstrate how ethics now plays a central role in strategy in modern armed conflict.



One Nation Under Drones: Legality, Morality, and Utility of Unmanned Combat Systems

by John E. Jackson, Captain (USN, Retired)

One Nation Under Drones is an interesting and informative review of how robotic and unmanned systems are impacting every aspect of American life, from how we fight our wars to how we play to how we grow our food. Edited by John Jackson, this highly readable book features chapters from a dozen experts, researchers, and operators of the sophisticated systems that have become ubiquitous across the nation and around the world. Press reports have focused primarily on unmanned aerial vehicles, officially designated as UAVs, but more often referred to as "drones." This work takes you behind the scenes and describes how Predators, Reapers, Scan Eagles, and dozens of other pilotless aircraft have been used to fight the Global War on Terrorism. Chapters written by international law specialists and drone pilots with advanced education in ethics address these issues from both sides of the argument. The book also details how robotic systems are being used on land, in and below the seas, and in civilian applications such as driverless cars. Three dozen photographs display drones as small as an insect up to those as large as a 737 airliner.

The Culture of Military Organizations

by Peter R. Mansoor



Culture has an enormous influence on military organizations and their success or failure in war. Cultural biases often result in unstated assumptions that have a deep impact on the making of strategy, operational planning, doctrinal creation, and the organization and training of armed forces. Except in unique circumstances culture grows slowly, embedding so deeply that members often act unconsciously according to its dictates. Of all the factors that are involved in military effectiveness, culture is perhaps the most important. Yet, it also remains the most difficult to describe and understand, because it entails so many external factors that impinge, warp, and distort its formation and continuities. The sixteen case studies in this volume examine the culture of armies, navies, and air forces from the Civil War to the Iraq War and how and why culture affected their performance in the ultimate arbitration of war.



Proxy War: The Least Bad Option

by Tyrone Groh

The U.S. has indirectly intervened in international conflicts on a relatively large scale for decades. Yet little is known about the immediate usefulness or long-term effectiveness of contemporary proxy warfare. In cases when neither direct involvement nor total disengagement are viable, proxy warfare is often the best option, or, rather, the least bad option. Tyrone L. Groh describes the hazards and undesirable aspects of this strategy, as well as how to deploy it effectively.

Proxy War explores the circumstances under which indirect warfare works best, how to evaluate it as a policy option, and the possible risks and rewards. Groh offers a fresh look at this strategy, using uncommon and understudied cases to test the concepts presented. These ten case studies investigate and illustrate the different types and uses of proxy war under varying conditions. What arises is a complete theoretical model of proxy warfare that can be applied to a wide range of situations. Proxy war is here to stay and will likely become more common as players on the international stage increasingly challenge U.S. dominance, making it more important than ever to understand how and when to deploy it.

Boy on the Bridge: The Story of John Shalikashvili's American Success

by Andrew Marble



Biographies are frequently hit or miss and often tell linear, one-dimensional stories. The value of a biography as a contribution to a larger history depends on how broad an intellectual swath the author cuts and how extensive and probing the research. The wider the cut, the greater the chance the reader will learn not only about the subject but also about the greater social, cultural, political, and technological aspects of the subject's lifetime. The deeper the research, the more one learns both about the subject and the key events during his or her career. Boy on the Bridge: The Story of John Shalikashvili's American Success, Andrew Marble's thoroughly researched and exquisitely crafted biography of former Army general and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili, is an excellent example of a biography that tells a compelling story and offers the reader a window into the surprising life of an American success story.



No Time for Spectators: The Lessons that Mattered Most from West Point to the West Wing

by GEN(R) Martin Dempsey

Why are the best leaders the ones who are most adept at following? What should we expect of those who have the privilege of leading? And what may leaders expect of those who follow them? Drawing upon a military career spanning more than four decades, General Dempsey examines the limits of loyalty, the necessity of sensible skepticism, and the value of responsible rebelliousness, and explains why we actually should sweat the small stuff. The book takes readers behind the closed doors of the Situation Room, onto the battlefields of Iraq, and to the East German border at the height of the Cold War. It contends that relationships between leaders and followers, employers and employees, politicians and constituents, coaches and athletes, teachers and students, are most productive when based on certain key mutual expectations. The book begins from the premise that life is not a spectator sport. Especially not today, especially not at a time when issues are so complex, information is so pervasive, scrutiny is so intense, and the stakes are so high.

The Russian Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines Between War and Peace

by Oscar Jonsson

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles," wrote the influential Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu in The Art of War. Russia's ongoing efforts to reshape the world in ways that are at odds with American values and interests have turned Moscow into a dangerous adversary. Countless analyses have appeared in recent years that venture to understand how Russian leadership thinks, what Russia wants, and how it plans to get it. Oscar Jonsson's The Russian Understanding of War is a valuable addition to the corpus of knowledge on Russia's military thinking about war.

Relying on a close reading of Russian security, military, and foreign policy doctrines and the writings of Russian military, academic, and political elites, Jonsson traces the evolution of Russian military thought about war from the early Soviet period through contemporary times. According to Jonsson, the nature of war—traditionally understood in Russia as armed violence for political purposes—had not changed much until recently. The advent of information-psychological warfare has led to the blurring of the boundary between war and peace. Having observed the role of information in "altering the consciousness of a country" and undermining public trust in state institutions "to the degree that citizens are prepared to revolt, creating color revolutions," Russian strategists began conceiving of information as a weapon and a more effective means of achieving strategic outcomes than armed force.



Make Your Bed: Little Things That Can Change Your Life...And Maybe the World

by Admiral William H. McRaven, USN (Ret.)

On May 17, 2014, Admiral William H. McRaven addressed the graduating class of the University of Texas at Austin on their Commencement day. Taking inspiration from the university's slogan, "What starts here changes the world," he shared the ten principles he learned during Navy Seal training that helped him overcome challenges not only in his training and long Naval career, but also throughout his life; and he explained how anyone can use these basic lessons to change themselves-and the world-for the better.

Admiral McRaven's original speech went viral with over 10 million views. Building on the core tenets laid out in his speech, McRaven now recounts tales from his own life and from those of people he encountered during his military service who dealt with hardship and made tough decisions with determination, compassion, honor, and courage. Told with great humility and optimism, this timeless book provides simple wisdom, practical advice, and words of encouragement that will inspire readers to achieve more, even in life's darkest moments.

"Powerful." –USA Today "Full of captivating personal anecdotes from inside the national security vault." –Washington Post "Superb, smart, and succinct." –Forbes

Range: Why Generalists Triumph in a Specialized World

by David Epstein



Plenty of experts argue that anyone who wants to develop a skill, play an instrument, or lead their field should start early, focus intensely, and rack up as many hours of deliberate practice as possible. If you dabble or delay, you'll never catch up to the people who got a head start. But a closer look at research on the world's top performers, from professional athletes to Nobel laureates, shows that early specialization is the exception, not the rule.

David Epstein examined the world's most successful athletes, artists, musicians, inventors, forecasters and scientists. He discovered that in most fields—especially those that are complex and unpredictable—generalists, not specialists, are primed to excel. Generalists often find their path late, and they juggle many interests rather than focusing on one. They're also more creative, more agile, and able to make connections their more specialized peers can't see.

On Obedience: Contrasting Philosophies for the Military Citizenry and Community

by Dr. Pauline Shanks Kaurin



This volume is designed to be an in-depth and nuanced philosophical treatment of the virtue of obedience in the context of the professional military and the broader civilian political community, including the general citizenry. The nature and components of obedience are critical factors leading to further discussions of the moral obligations related to obedience, as well as the related practical issues and implications. Pauline Shanks Kaurin seeks to address the following questions: What is obedience? Is it a virtue, and if it is, why? What are the moral grounds of obedience? Why ought military members and citizens be obedient? Are there times that one ought not be obedient? Why? How should we think about obedience in contemporary political communities? In answering these questions, the book draws on arguments and materials from a variety of disciplines including classical studies, philosophy, history, international relations, literature and military studies, with a particular focus on cases and examples to illustrate the conceptual points. While a major focus of the book is the question of obedience in the contemporary military context, many similar (although not exactly the same) issues and considerations apply to other political communities and in, particular, citizens in a nation-state.



Exercise of Power: American Failures, Successes, and a New Path Forward in the Post-Cold War World

by Robert Gates

Since the end of the Cold War, the global perception of the United States has progressively morphed from dominant international leader to disorganized entity, seemingly unwilling to accept the mantle of leadership or unable to govern itself effectively. Robert Gates argues that this transformation is the result of the failure of political leaders to understand the complexity of American power, its expansiveness, and its limitations. He makes clear that the successful exercise of power is not limited to the use of military might or the ability to coerce or demand submission, but must encompass as well diplomacy, economics, strategic communications, development assistance, intelligence, technology, ideology, and cyber. By analyzing specific challenges faced by the American government in the post-Cold War period - Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, Syria, Libya, Russia, China, and others--Gates deconstructs the ways in which leaders have used the instruments of power available to them. With forthright judgments of the performance of past presidents and their senior-most advisers, firsthand knowledge, and insider stories, Gates argues that U.S. national security in the future will require learning, and abiding by, the lessons of the past, and re-creating those capabilities that the misuse of power has cost the nation.

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